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ABSTRACT 
'NATIONALISM' AND THE COLONIAL SITUATION 
IN ALGERIA UNDER FRENCH RULE 1830-1962 
The thesis seeks to situate the 1954-62 Algerian war within an 
intelligible theoretical framework. It outlines two different interpretations 
of Third World Nationalism. One, shared by orthodox liberal Western political 
scientists and even some Marxists, suggests that nationalism arose from the 
disintegration of 'traditional' society and the rise of ' modernity'; European- 
created towns were its cradle, 'Westernize'd'elites its midwives, and novel 
political language and organization its birthmarks. However, social anthro- 
pological insights into segmentary dynamics, together with Marxist analysis 
of the dialectics of colonialism, suggest that 'nationalist' manifestations 
must instead be related to built-in features of every, and special variables 
in each colonial situation. 'Nationalism" then evaporates as an analytical 
category describing a single, consistent pattern of behaviour at all levels 
of a total 'nation'. 
Key aspects of the Algerian colonial situation are pinpointed. The 
indigenous political 'game' was an intricate, mobile pattern of segmentary 
groupings allied and opposed in competition for economic and 'saintly' 
resources, complicated by the claims of 'central' dynastic hegemonies and the 
wider moslem community. The colonial administration superimposed its own 
socio-economic norms and structures upon this, yet had neither the resources 
nor the will to do so thoroughly; its 'holding position', characterized by 
deliberate 'underadministration', both sought and tried to prevent revolutionary 
impact. This contradiction helped moslem society to survive the experience, 
as did a wide variety of defensive, evasive and adaptive strategies. The 
resultant bifurcation at the heart of the colonial situation deepened as native 
groups "retood the initiative'. 
The FLN exploited this context rather than created a new one. Its 
strength came from the combined solidaraties of 'traditional' segmentary 
communities - entrenched in inaccessible regions long marked by armed resistance, 
social banditry and clandestine self-government - rather than from a small 
'evolved' urban elite. It was not ä closely-co-ordinated, seasoned or 
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-I. NATIONALISM 
-i. The Concept of Nationalism 
. Nationalism 
is a notoriously vague catch-all concept. It may be used 
to describe either a kind of ideology, or a form of behaviour. 
As an ideology, Halpern points out, "Nationalism can assert itself 
without at the same time demanding loyalty to any particular form of 
government or society, economic organization or values, or any particular 
religious beliefs. No other ideology presents as cheap 
'a bargain". 
1 
Presumably, belief in the supreme value of 'the nation' is a basic feature 
of such an ideology. Yet this does not get us very far towards concrete 
definition, since the actual shape or content of this 'nation' lies 
firmly embedded in the subjective realm of the nationalist's judgement. 
Indeed, belief in the nation may be 'projective'; it may seek to bring a 
nation into existence rather than to cherish or foster one which already 
exists. One man's nation is another man's negation of nationality. 
As a description of a coherent mode of behaviour, the term 'nationalism' 
has also been used in many ways. It may refer only to particular kinds of 
organization pursuing specified goals in a specific context. Alternatively, 
the label may cover activities lacking any formal organization or explicit 
articulation of ideals. Nationalism may be considered appropriate only for 
the more or less clearly defined 'political' sphere, or it may be extended 
to otherý, spheres - cultural, for example, religious, or economic. 
Clearly, it is not a primary, irreducible concept, but very much a 
secondary one. Beyond a certain depth of analysis, it becomes an obstacle 
to understanding. One sympathizes with Minogue's conclusion that "the 
concept of nationalism is a miscellany of beliefs, images, and assumptions 
L 
quite unsuited to academic purposesN 
2 Whoever does employ the term must 
define it closely, or at least indicate precisely which of several possible 
definitions he is adopting - and then stick to it. 
-ii. Third World Nationalism 
These problems are compounded when the term is imported into discussion 
of the political process in the Third World. Anachronism is immediately 
invited, since the term 'nationalism' originated in Europe, was used to 
describe certain European phenomena and preoccupations, and inevitably trails 
certain connotations behind itself. If we use the concept of nationalism in 
the Third World context, we structure our viewpoint in a quite marked way. 
The political process is looked at from the outside in, as it were, or from 
the top down. The problems of nationality 
projected 
upon the real political 
process from the outside. The analytical starting-point, the given, becomes 
the 'nation-to-be', and discussion then proceeds in terms of what changes are 
necessary to make this materialize. Naturally, this inhibits looking at the 
political process from the inside outwards, or from the bottom upwards - 
through the eyes of local social groups, and in the light of indigenous 
values and political culture. If these latter phenomena figure in the 
analysis at all, they play the role of obstacles: those things which must 
be changed or abolished if nationhood, in the externally-defined sense, is to 
be implanted and strengthened. 
The fact that the term is widely employed by 'nationalist' parties, 
politicians, and intellectuals in the Third World itself, does not affect 
er 
these considýations, in as far as they may represent a partly-European- 
educated elite within their own societies, with special economic and social 
3 
interests. In-a partial sense, they may represent an 'inside' rather than 
an 'outside' view, but within that 'inside' tradition they still represent 
a 'centralizing' perspective - one which sees (defines) questions from the 
top down. 
3 
It is certainly possible to construct a fairly consistent picture from 
such an 'external' vantage-point. The chosen perspective slants evidence in 
such a way as seemingly to confirm the choice of perspective. But by pre- 
structuring data we may produce no more than a 'dialectic of the surfaces' 
4 
logical, but over-mechanistic, and out of touch with the more profound and 
everyday reality. This all too often proves true of the political science of 
the Third World. 
-iii. Political Science and Social AnthroEology 
In some respects, the use of the concept of nationalism in the Third 
World context distinguishes Political Scientists from Social Anthropologists. 
This is certainly the view of Coleman who distinguishes "generally accepted 
political concepts elaborated with specific reference to developments in the 
Western world (i. e. state, nation, nationality, nationalism)" from the 
explanatory language used by Social Anthropologists in the African sphere 
(e. g. tribe, lineage, chief, segmentarism). 
5 Coleman pushes the claims of 
Political Science by suggesting that the former set of conceptual tools, 
first used to analyse the European political culture, is more useful for the 
understanding of present-day Africa. Such terminology is not anachronistic, 
he claims, because "the concept and institution of the modern nation-state, 
towards the creation of which African nationalism tends to be directed, is 
distinctly Western in its form and content". This statement well illustrates 
the technique of several Political Scientists who take a projected 'nation-to-be' 
4 
as their analytical starting-point; "a post-tribal, post-feudal terminal 
community' in Coleman's words'idhich has emerged (sic) from the shattering 
forces of disintegration that characterizes modernity". The projected 
in future (the outside) thus takes priacy over the actual present (the inside), 
or the 'essential' present over the concrete past! The past may survive in 
the actual present, and thus by implication there may be residual utility in 
Social Anthropological terminology, but because it has no future it has no part 
in the 'essential' present. Nationalism thus performs the task of injecting 
the future into the present, and of destroying the past; it plays a key role 
for Political Scientists. 
By contrast, Social Anthropologists have little time for 'nationalism' as 
a concept. The term comes awkwardly to such lips. Consistent differences 
between Social Anthropologists and Political Scientists over the interpretation 
of the same social reality rarely take the form of rivalry over the precise 
meaning of the term nationalism. We '. have to manufacture such a clash if 
we wish to bring out the points of discord, because Social Anthropologists 
manifest their disagreement simply by not employing the word at all. They 
prefer, instead, to talk about specific 'reactions to the colonial situation'. 
Where the word is used, by Balandier for example, 
6 
this is chiefly to point 
out the superficiality and anachronism of the conventional Political Science 
version. It is likely to be given an intensely localized meaning, and intimately 
linked with complex layers of social interaction. 
Thus, in any discussion aimed at tempering the Political Science of the 
Third World with the considerable contributions of Social Anthropology, one 
of the first items on the agenda IS the useful.. ness of such concepts as 
'nationalism'. 
5 
II. ORTHODOX INTERPRETATIONS OF THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM 
Various senses have been given to the word nationalism in analyses 
of social process in the Third World. These can be usefully grouped 
into two main traditions - the one; ' mainly associated with post-war 
American Political Scientists, and the other with Social Anthropologists. 
For the sake of labelling, they might be called the 'orthodox' and 
'dynamic' interpretations of nationalism. There are a number of 
intermediate positions, and many inconsistencies. 
-i. The Work of Coleman 
A preliminary statement of the orthodox viewpoint can be found in 
the work of Coleman. The school of thought he represents is usually shot 
through with implicit assumptions rather than expounded in an explicit and 
systematic manner, so it is useful to dwell on his account in order to 
clarify its internal logic and definitional procedures.? 
Though acknowledging that Third World nationalism is an intricate 
jumble of past and present social discontents and aspirations, Coleman 
argues that we must try-to unravel and isolate its various strands. 
According to him, three distinct phenomena have too frequently been 
lumped together under the general heading of nationalism: traditionalist 
movements, syncretistic movements, and modernist movements. He considers 
that only the last of these are nationalist movements proper - indeed, only 
certain groups within the category. 
Traditionalist movements include 'primary resistance' to colonial 
conquest, and subsequent revolts against the implantation of colonial 
personnel or institutions. They also include 'nativism', by which he means 
"nativistic, mahdistic, or messianic mass movements - usually of a magico- 
6 
religious character - which are psychological or emotional outlets for 
tensions produced by the confusions, frustration, or socio-economic 
inequality of alien rule". Resistance and Nativism are 'negative' in 
Coleman's view. They do no more than refuse the European; they are 
unable to construct a positive alternative to him. 
Syncretism is also distinguished from nationalism proper. It 
and-ffi e foCMa{. On of 
comprises such phenomena as religious separatism, kinship associations 
and tribal associations. The leadership of such tendencies, he argues, 
usually comes from a Westernized or semi-Westernized elite, but draws 
upon pre-colonial sources of loyalty, and presses on traditional pedals 
of control. However, it is not as wholly 'negative' as nativism; indeed 
it contains "an element of rationality", namely "an urge to recapture 
those aspects of the old which are compatible with the"new, which it 
recognizes as inevitable and in some respects desirable". 
Only certain elements of Modernism are to be regarded as 'nationalism 
proper'. Only nationalism proper is considered 'positive' and 'rational'. 
Coleman subdivides modernist movements into three; economic interest 
groups, nationalism proper, and pan-African or trans-territorial movements. 
Nationalism proper is "Organized and led by the Westernized elite, which is 
activated by the Western ideas of democracy, progress, the welfare state 
and national self-determination, and which aspires either a) to create 
modern independent African nation-states possessing an internal state 
apparatus and external sovereignty and all the trappings of a recognized 
member state of international society.... or b) to achieve absolute 
social and political equality and local autonomy within a broader Eur- 
African grouping.... or within what is manifestly a plural society". 
7 
Thus Coleman associates nationalism with those social groups which, 
by education (the 'intelligentsia') and/or economic role (the bourgeoisie, 
the middle-class, or the wage-earning urban workers), have adapted to or 
adopted a 'westernized' life style. He links nationalism with ideas expressed 
in terms of Western political culture; its driving ideas are "democracy, 
progress, the welfare state, and national self-determination". The same 
elite, who, during the colonial era, are nationalists in the narrow sense 
of seeking the abandonment of political sovereignty by the colonial power, 
are those who subsequently seek to build a 'modern nation'. 
It is difficult not to conclude that such a modernization programme is 
what makes the elite, 'positive' and 'rational' in Coleman's eyes. 'Positive' 
and 'rational' are equated with acceptance of the Western political culture 
and rejection of the indigenous (or any other) political culture. Acceptance 
of Western political sovereignty is not a prerequisite but opposition to this 
should be cast in forms which the Western sovereigns can understand and come 
to terms with. It should offer a measure of predictability within the 
Western cultural framework.. Such organizations as formally constituted and 
structured political parties, with elected leaders, paid officials, dues- 
paying membership, journals, policy documents and conferences, are 
'comprehensible' political forms, for example. 
Not only are such manifestations embraced as 'nationalism proper', but 
Coleman regards them as the only truly political activities. He distinguishes 
between what is 'political' and what is 'politically consequential'. The 
excluded forms of behaviour, traditionalism and syncretism, undoubtedly have 
political consequences, - in the colonial situation they pose problems for the 
colonial administration - but they are not themselves of a political 
character. "Each of the movements, " he argues, "is in one way or another 
8' 
a response to the challenge of alien rule, or of the intrusion of the 
disintegrating forces - and consequently the insecurity - of modernity"... 
but... "only nationalism is primarily political in that it is irrevocably 
committed to a positive and radical alteration of the power structure)'; 
The implicit definition of 'political' here - "irrevocable committment to 
a positive and radical alteration of the power structure" - is vague and 
circumstantial, and perhaps it would be wrong to over-emphasize it. But 
'positive' is the key word; as suggested, it connotes acceptance of the 
framework of Western political culture. Otherwise, more radical or 
'total' attempts to alter "the power structure" in a colonial situation 
would seem to be such reactions as armed uprising, messianism, and refusal 
to play any part in the rudimentary colonial administrative framework. 
When Coleman speaks of the 'power structure' which needs "radical 
alteration", he means not so much the colonial administration as the 
indigenous 'traditional' political process. To be 'positive', to be 
'political', is to seek to replace the colonial authority without merely 
returning to traditional forms of social organization and without 
transcending the basic structures donated by the colonial Administration. 
Only such a programme, and only such bodies as are clearly designed to 
bring about its realization, are truly nationalist. 
Paradoxically, Third World nationalism become 
, nAColeman's 
writings, 
the outcome; of forces external to the society within which they operate. 
His definition excludes manifestations which draw their strength from 
indigenous (or other non-Western) sources. Nationalism substitutes 
itself for these; it feeds upon their decay. Rejection of Western political 
culture, and assertion or defence of alternative political values, are 
'irrational' and 'negative' reactions. 
9 
Having delimited his idea of what constitutes nationalism, Coleman 
goes on to outline the sociological factors which he considers explain 
its growth: the rise of a money economy and wage labour, the growth of a 
middle-class, urbanization and social mobility, Western education and 
Christian evangelization, the eclipse of traditional authorities, the 
setting of new 'national' boundaries and the operation of centralized 
institutions within them, and (finally) a sense of frustration among 
"detribalized, Western-educated, middle-class intellectuals and professional 
Africans" caused by continuing exclusion from full participation in this new 
social system. 
The analysis is undoubtedly neat. It isolates one segment of political. 
activity, what might be called 'elite nationalism', and 'tries to explain 
it in terms of a clear set of social factors. But confusion begins when he 
implies that this one segment of apparent reality wholly encapsulates the 
essence of change and development at various other levels of social reality. 
The problem then is not merely one of circular argument - elite nationalism 
proper depending on the emergence of a proper elite and a proper nation - 
but of distorted reality. 
-ii. Liberal Western Political Science 
Coleman is merely one representative of a very large school of thought 
seeking to equate Third World nationalism with 'modernization'. Sometimes 
the two are englobed within the terminology of . 
"'Nation-Building". 8 As 
Minogue points out, "the commonest explanation of nationalism would have 
it as the political wing of a more general process of modernization". 
9 
The idea is central to orthodox American political science. Rustow, for 
example, argues that: "Nationalism and the drive for modernity are today 
10 
two facets of the same social, cultural, and political revolution", 
10 
and that nationalist political parties aim at "hastening the process of 
modernization of which the rise of national consciousness is itself but 
one facet". 
" Nationalism, according to this tradition, is linked 
sociologically with the emergence of new 'modern' social strata (especially 
middle-class and bourgeoisie, but also proletariat) in response to socio- 
economic changes set in motion by contact with advanced European countries. 
It is linked ideologically with the drive for 'modernization' and the 
building of a 'modern nation state'. And in organizational terms, it is 
identified with those political forms which are held to be characteristic 
of 'modern' political systems: above all, mass political parties, but also 
-a miscellany of such things as newspapers, manifestoes, placard-bearing 
demonstrations, petitions, electoral campaigns, draft constitutions', 
strikes, boycotts etc. In other words, activities which are recognizably 
'political' in terms of the European political culture. 
12 
All these attributes of nationalism are virtually indistinguishable 
from factors associated with the shift from 'gemeinschaft' to 'gesellschaft'. 
Europe has apparently already made this shift since the 18th Century, and 
this school of thought believes that the Third World is undergoing exactly 
the same process. Nationalism is thus the sister of industrialization, 
urbanization, secularization', individualization, mass literacy, increased 
social mobility, and so forth. It arises as traditional society collapses. 
There are two prongs to this identification of nationalism with 
modernization. One prong sees nationalism resulting from the actual 
emergence of various facets of modernity. Coleman exemplifies this: 
"Where nationalism manifests itself in considerable strength, it is 
evidence that disintegration of the old, and social mobilization around 
11 
the symbols of the new order, have occurred on a scale sufficient to 
weaken or destroy attachments and loyalties of the nationalist to pre- 
colonial socio-political units, either because they have been crushed 
and are beyond memory, or because they are unattractive or manifestly 
unsuitable as 'nations' in a modern world of nation-states". 
13 The 
other prong sees nationalism as an attempt to bring about these conditions 
of modernity. Gellner's remark is an example: "Nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they 
do not exist". 
14 
The two prongs of the argument are not contradictory but mutually 
supportive. This school of thought deals with what it calls transitional 
situations, in which modernization is never complete, and nationalism 
never straightforward. The appearance of clearly 'non-modern' aspects 
within a specific nationalist movement - aspects which cannot be defined 
in relation to the modernization issue - can be explained by a well-trodden 
definitional circle: they are not part of nationalism 'proper'; they are 
pre-nationalist, sub-nationalist, proto-nationalist, cry o-nationalist, 
non-nationalist, or perhaps even anti-nationalist. 
The difficulty is that while, in one sense, nationalism is being 
used very broadly, associated with a world-wide social evolutionary trend, 
in another sense, when confronted with a specific Third World context, it 
has an extremely narrow and restrictive meaning. It is recognized, only 
among the so-called 'modern' or even 'westernized' social strata. It must 
have definite and explicit goals. It must take specific organizational 
forms. So precise and demanding is its meaning, in fact, that the orthodox 
school of thought is often driven to conclude that such 'pure' nationalism 
nowhere exists, nor even can exist, in the Third World anyway. The price 
12 
of insistence on this straitened definition is that the word becomes 
irrelevant to the very empirical facts it was set up to describe. One 
symptom of lost relevance is confusion of what is with what ought to be. 
There is a tendency to resort to "Gap Theory" and "Requisite Theory", 
the former contenting itself with listing obstacles to pure nationalism, 
the latter with specifying attr. 1butes or pre-requisites of pure 
nationalism, without'any serious attempt to understand what actually 
exists. 
15 
There are several minor modifications to this orthodox thesis which 
identifies nationalism with modernization. Pye, for example, argues that 
"nationalism is only a necessary, but far from sufficient condition to 
ensure political development". 
16 Coleman asserts that though nationalism 
has been linked in the past with modernization, there is no guarantee 
that in the future they will not diverge. 
17 Ashford feels that ultimately, 
at least after the phase of independence from colonial rule, nationalism 
and modernization are bound to conflict. 
18 And others, for example 
Huntington19 stress that certain aspects of nationalism - such as 
mobilization - may be inconsistent with others - such as institutionalization. 
But such -disputes smack more of petty confusion over in-bred terminology than 
of real disagreement over substantive issues. The identification of 
modernization with nationalism in the Third World is solidly established 
among a wide spread of scholars. So much is this so that since the granting 
of formal independence from colonial rule to most of these areas, 
consideration of 'nationalism' has tended to be abandoned for a miscellany 
of virtual synonyms like 'mobilization', 'integration', 'development' and 
'modernization'. 
13 
-iii. Marxism and-Nationalism 
Some components of Marxist analysis of 'nationalism' appear to echo 
basic assumptions of liberal Western political science, though other 
components contradict them. Marx's own work on nationalism and social 
change in the Third World is fundamentally 'Eurocentric' in tone. 
20 
For a direct expression of his views, only a miscellany of occasional 
articles and tracts exists. This is symptomatic; his analysis was 
neither systematically developed, nor nourished by direct observation. 
Where he discusses Third World communities, this is rather for purposes 
of contrast - to throw into relief the distinctive features of the 
capitalist West - than for intrinsic interest. The result, frequently, 
is caricature. Marx did not greatly differentiate between rural or 
pre-capitalist communities in Western Europe, and Third World society 
as a whole; he tended to assume that their respective fates under the 
impact of capitalist industrialization were identical. 
21 Indeed, we 
can glean his ideas more simply from his analysis of pre-capitalist 
formations in Europe - the French peasantry in his 'Eighteenth Brumaire' 
for example - than from his incidental jottings on colonized communities 
proper. To this extent, Marx shares the same blunt and distorted 
perspective as the orthodox liberal theorists of nationalism, and 
unimaginative elaborations of his methodological framework have 
entrenched this rigidity. 
Many other features of Marx's analytical approach, however, greatly 
sharpen our perception of 'nationalist' phenomena. Dialectical materialism, 
for example, ensures that political institutions and ideas are constantly 
related to class structure and forces of production, rather than discussed 
in isolation. Most Marxists escape the morass of endlessly-subclassified 
l4" 
abstract concepts - for example, the cultural, psychological or 
ideological concomitants of social change - into which liberal political 
science so frequently sinks. In fact, the Marxist interpretation of 
nationalism must usually be deduced from the Marxist view of what 
constitutes a (modern) nation. Potekhin's formula is typical: a 
nation differs from just any grouping of population in that it has 
"a geographical division of labour and a regular exchange of products: 
in a word, a single market". As a corollary, it has a fully-developed 
class-structure. 
22 
Though the ingredients of this 'nation' strikingly resemble those 
of the 'modern nation' of liberal political science, the distinctive 
contribution of Marxism is its stress on the class basis of the national 
vision. Rather than referring in the abstract to 'modernity', 'national 
integration', or 'development', Marxism points out the specific class 
content of such concepts. "A nation, " argues Potekhin, "can only come 
into existence under the capitalist system... and nations are the 
product of capitalist development". 
22 One social group is the midwife 
of this national revolution: the 'bourgeoisie'. This minority, Marx 
and Engels suggest, "keeps more and more doing away with the scattered 
state of the population, of the means of production, and of property; 
it has agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and has 
concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this 
was political centralization. Independent, or but loosely connected 
provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments, and systems of 
taxation, become lumped together into one nation, with one government, 
one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier, and one 
customs tariff". 
23 The process of 'nation-building' is thus at the same 
15 
time a unifying force, and a fundamentally divisive and disruptive one, 
for 'unity' consolidates the power of a small exploitative class. 
Though this inference can be drawn from the framework of Marx's own 
work, its consequences in the colonial context are more clearly spelled 
out in the work of Lenin. 
24 In a colonized society, the entreprenci"al 
bourgeoisie consists, initially at least, of an alien minority. It 
represents not indigenous capitalism but imperialism. Imperialism is a 
development of 'metropolitan' capitalism in its search for new markets 
and resources to exploit. At first, the foreign bourgeoisie has an 
obvious interest in fostering the growth of a local quasi-capitalist 
elite, as part of its project of 'national development'; likewise, the 
local elite has an interest in allying with the alien minority. 
25 But 
the needs of imperialism conflict with those of 'local' capitalism; the 
building of an indigenous 'nation' facilitates but also threatens the 
interests of European capital. Where interests diverge, so too do 
ideologies: the 'nation-builder' terminology of the colonizer and the 
'nationalist' terminology of the colonized elite. But 'nationalist' 
ideology is not merely anti-imperialist; it provides a smokescreen and 
indeed a rallying cry behind which the accumulation of capital within 
indigenous society can be effected. 'Nationalist' behaviour must thus 
be seen as part of a strategy in class struggle. Class interests may, 
indeed, cause the 'nationalist elite' to retain or develop close links 
with imperialist institutions. Thus, whereas the liberal school of 
political development blandly treats the 'nationalist movement' as an 
enlightened wedge of the total community, representing its long-term 
interests, the Marxist method opens for examination those aspects of its 




Marxist thought also helps to locate nationalism in a temporal 
context, as only one phase of an unfolding revolutionary process. Liberal 
political science often treats this phase - 'modernity', 'integration', 
'development' - as one of completion, as a final state of grace. But 
Marxist analysis of the socio-economic forces at play suggests that the 
nationalist stage must eventually be superseded by some form of socialism. 
There is thus a basic difference in approach. At this juncture, however, 
basic assumptions of the orthodox liberal school of nationalism are 
seemingly reinforced by the way in which Eurocentric 'Stalinist' variants 
of Marxism discuss the process of supersession. To put it crudely, these 
Marxists argue that the Third World road to socialism has first to run 
through a capitalist or quasi-capitalist stage of nation-building, led 
either by an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie or by a manager-State; 
Industrialization, urbanization, and proletarianization are preconditions 
for social revolution. This kind of position stems from a complex of 
ideas, many of which are rationalizations and some of which are mutually 
contradictory. These include radical determination to oppose 'feudalism' 
and 'backward traditions', Eurocentric inability to envisage alternative 
agents of socialist revolution other than a politically-conscious urban 
working-class, and a pragmatic tactic of temporarily supporting 
bourgeois-democratic movements as the only effective lever against 
imperialism. Dogmatic exposition of this kind of Marxism leads to neglect 
of (indeed hostility towards) truly indigenous political manifestations, 
overestimation of the role of European institutions, and the inculcation 
of attitudes which often differ little from those of colonialists. It 
reinforces those aspects of the 'orthodox' interpretation of nationalism 
which stress the inevitability of 'modernity' and 'urbanization', and 
17 
which minimize the positive role of 'tradition' and the peasantry. 
This approach marked (stultified) for decades the relationship between 
the Third World and the Second and indeed Third International. 
26 
The Marxist method, however, has proved richer and more flexible 
than this narrow school of interpretation indicates. Building on the 
work of Lenin, 
27 
other Marxists this century - inspired by and inspiring 
social revolutions in Africa, Asia, and South America - have bypassed 
the Eurocentric and rigid logic of the earlier school. The view whereby 
the economic distortion and class exploitation of a 'national development' 
phase are unavoidable if temporary evils, has been confronted with the 
different circumstances and experiences of non-Western communities and 
its ideological implications have been subjected to withering critique. 
28 
A wealth of Marxist interpretations of Third World reality has been 
accumulated, suggesting that both imperialism and domestic capitalism can 
be effectively combatted and/or avoided by the mobilization of the communal 
resources of traditional social groupings. Marxism has thus played a 
crucial part in the generation of non-orthodox theories of nationalism. 
:ö 
III. BASIC ASSUMPTION IN 'ORTHODOX' THEORIES OF NATIONALISM 
This section examines in greater detail the various strands of the 
orthodox 'Nation-Building' theory of nationalism, in both its Liberal 
and Marxist variants. 
-i. The 'Phoenix' Theory of Change 
--- --------- ------ -- ------ 
The colonial situation, or more generally contact with the West and 
involvement with the world economy, is viewed in terms of what Alan 
Moorehead calls "the fatal impact". Social change is double-sided. 
Firstly the past inevitably crumbles, and is reduced to ashes; secondly, 
the future irresistibly rises from those ashes and is built in its place. 
Nationalism plays a key role in both processes. 
Deutsch, for example, speaks of the process as one of 'social 
mobilization', and argues that "the major clusters of the old social, 
o economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken, and people 
become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour". He 
points to "two distinct stages of the process: (1) the stage of 
uprooting or breaking away from old settings, habits and commitments,. 
and (2) the induction of the mobilized persons into some relatively 
29 
stable new pattern of group membership, organization and commitment". 
To emphasize how clearcut and decisive this process is, he draws an 
analogy with military mobilization: "In this fashion, soldiers are 
mobilized from their homes and families, and mobilized into the army 
in which they then serve". 
The same dual process is referred to in Marx's work on India. 
There are two stages ("a double mission") in the impact of British 
colonialism on Indian society: "one destructive and the other regenerative - 
19 
the annihilation of the old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material 
foundations of Western society in Asia". 
3° As Kiernan puts it, "Marx's 
vision.. (was).. of the Indian slate being wiped clean and promptly covered 
with fresh writing". 
31 
This type of interpretation suggests that the process is ineluctable. 
The impact of the West is as shattering and irresistible as that of a 
metal pot on an earthenware one. "We are confronted", writes Marion Levy32 
"whether for good or bad, with a universal social solvent. The patterns of 
the relatively modernized societies, once developed, have shown a universal 
tendency to penetrate any social context whose participants have come into 
contact with them". Faced with such penetration, a traditional society 
may put up resistance, but Can do little more than postpone the inevitable 
day of destruction. The ringing boldness of these declarations of 
inevitability is striking; Lerner speaks of Islam as "absolutely defenceless" 
against "modernization" and "the infusion of a ratiorl. ist spirit". 
33 Yet, 
on close examination, such boldness is, accompanied by considerable hedging 
of terminological bets, rendering such declarations ultimately self-fulfilling. 
Halpern's is only one ungainly example: "All pre-modern systems of society 
disintegrate as systems, and so does the pre-modern pattern in which these 
systems interacted with each other, and so maintained a particular life- 
process. (This radical change is usually obscured by the fact that some - 
aver all - of the elements or linkages of pre-modern systems continue to 
function, though with altered relevance and effectiveness". 
3 
-ii. The Inevitable Disintegration of the Traditional --- ---------- ------- -- --- ----------- 
The first stage of the dialectic, many observers are prepared to say, 
has been virtually completed. Its importance to nationalism is stressed by 
20 
Emerson, who argues that: "Nationalism is a response to the atomization 
of society, a turn toward a new form of community to replace old 
communities which are in the process of being destroyed"35 and also that: 
"Nationalism is a product of the breach with the old order, of which a part 
is the disruption of traditional communities and their ties of kinship and 
custom". 
36 This stage of social change is already visible: "The forces of 
the West have been let loose, the oake of custom has been almost everywhere 
broken and the world appears to be moving along the path which the West has 
ö. 
taken". 37 Van Verys too, without naming a specific venue, declares that 
the first leg of the clash has been won: "socially definitive and self- 
sufficient" small-scale traditional communities have been disrupted. Yet 
he is not confident that the second leg, "reintegration on a national 
scale", has yet taken place; hence, he argues 
social disarray in 
"developing areas". 
38 
Marx in 1853 regarded India similarly as having finished phase one 
without yet fully entering phase two: "England has broken down the entire 
framework of Indian society without any symptoms of reconstitution yet 
appearing". 
39 Traditional village society centred on cotton spinning and 
weaving - "these small stereotype forms of social organism" - had 
"dissolved" under the effect of English technology; while the-building 
of an Indian nation had hardly progressed beyond a skimpy infrastructure. 
The tragedy of this disintegration is not one of Marx's themes, but 
Western liberal political science occasionally pauses briefly to shed a 
tear. 
40 
Halpern, indeed, in emphasizing the finality of the fatal impact, 
is moved to poetry, quoting a Pakistani verse entitled "There is no 
Messiah for shattered glass" 
41: 
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"Be it a pearl, a looking glass, or a drinking cup, 
Once broken it is broken forever. 
What is shattered is better given up as lost, 
For tears can mend it never... 
Fruitlessly you gather and cling to these pieces, 
And continue to pin your hopes in them; 
Remember, no messiah can patch them together". 
Nationalism thus may eloquently, but momentarily mourn the past; 
it finds no source of future strength there. Those manifestations of 
traditional society which do remain are assumed either to be lingering 
survivals whose turn for disintegration will come, or to be not essential 
parts of "the pre-modern system". They provide 'local colour' a universal 
phenomenon which, in the form of folk-dancing, handicrafts and quaint 
customs, presents greater interest to the tourist than to the political 
scientist or sociologist. Thus, argues Fischer, "there are signs that the 
preservation of ancient civilizations will have in the long run to be 
reduced to their artistic and folkloristic components, but that the social 
structure proper will be reformed according to the Western example". 
42 
What exactly is, and is not, part of this "social structure proper" is a 
crucial question, however, which the orthodox theory of nationalism 
never satisfactorily answers. 
-iii. The Irresistible Rise of the Modern 
The second phase of the phoenix process is the "turn toward a 
new form of community". The colonial situation, and post-colonial 
situation, are settings for the development of 'gesellschaft' in its 
psychological, sociological, economic, and cultural aspects, analysis 
of which is submerged by voluminous footnotes to the work of Maine, 
Weber, Toennies and Parsons. Claims that this stage has been completed 
are rare. 
22 
The literature on development resembles a terminological lucky 
dip. Pye, for example, lists as characteristics of modernization: 
national unification, Western education, secularization, commercial- 
ization, social restratification, urbanization, and international 
pressures. 
43 
Lerner stresses economic growth; public participation; 
secular-rationalism; social, psychic, and physical mobility. 
44 
Parsons points to stratification, secularization, bureaucracy, the 
market economy, rational-universalism, and democratic association. 
45 
Lipset lays his main emphasis on capitalist industrialism, urbanization, 
wealth and education, 
46 
while Levy lays his on specialization, 
interdependence, rationalization, universalism, functional specificity, 
centralization, and a capitalistic exchange market. 
47 
Deutsch measures 
it in terms of "exposure to modern life", exposure to mass media, 
mobility, urbanization, industrialization, literacy, and high income. 
48 
The more specifically political dimensions of this 'development' 
are discussed in various publications of the Committee on Comparative 
Politics of the Social Science, Research Council in the United States. 
The implications of the spread of communications, bureaucracy, formal 
education and political parties, and changes in the political culture 
are all analyzed. 
49 
Numerous other individuals have written in 
sympathy with this general line. Eisenstadt lists differentiation, 
increased capacity, spread of power, weakening of tradition, and 
heightened participation, as characteristics of political modernity. 
50 
Huntington fixes on rationalization, national integration, 
democratization, mobilization/participation, and institutionalization. 
51 
Parsons stresses the existence of an elective leadership, universal 
franchise, consensus over procedural rules, and voluntary group 
23 
membership. 
52 Coleman takes differentation, equality and 
secularization, and heightened capacity, as his main criteria. 
53 
Weiner speaks of the process of development as one of 'political 
integration', by which he means consolidation of subjective 
loyalty, objective control, identification of governed with 
government and vice versa, consensus over ends and means, and 
growth of capacity for purposive cooperative activity. 
54 Binder 
lists similar criteria, but prefers to call them aspects of 
'national integration'. 55 
It is easy to lose one's sense of direction amid this 
myriad of overlapping, sometimes contradictory, categories of 
analysis. Some of them are quite specific and detailed (and thus 
difficult to generalize about); others are extremely vague and 
general (and thus impossible to test empirically). Many disputes, 
rejoinders, and counter-rejoinders within this tradition turn out 
to be little more than semantic quibbles or minor adjustments to 
classificatory schemes. A combination of homogeneity of viewpoint, 
and imprecision of terminology, inspires these volumes rather than 
clearcut rival interpretations of concrete situations. 
Through the mists, it is clear, however, that for this school 
of thought modernity involves such phenomena as growth of towns, 
spread of industry, developgent of a money economy, and adoption 
of bureaucratic norms (contract rather than status), together with 
spread of new kinds of 'secular' education and mass media which 
encourage these developments. It is accompanied by the adoption 
of apparently 'rational' and 'secular' political forms and norms - 
24 
for example, elections, parliaments, political parties and responsible 
ministers. Nationalism hovers on the margin as that force which 
deliberately promotes the emergence of these factors, Vhich drabs its 
strength from their existence, and which is a sign of such changes 
having already taken place. 
In this respect, Marx's account of what he called "the material 
foundations of Western society" implanted in colonial India could be 
underwritten without blushing by the Committee on Comparative Politics 
of the Social Science Research Council. Among the factors enumerated are: 
a. Unity imposed by conquest (He assumes that India, or "Hindoostan", is 
a 'natural' unit which needs only to be staked out to be viable) 
b. Internal integration through modern communications (especially telegraph 
and railway) c. Western culture and skills via education d. Mass Media 
(a 
free press) e. A new educated social elite ('a fresh class') 
f. Industrialization (this would sap the caste structures - "decisive 
impediments to progress", and generate true classes) g. Private property 
in land h. Agricultural development and i. Entry into the 'world system' 
in the economic and cultural sense (with regular shipping contact, he 
argued, "the day is not far distance when.... that once fabulous country will 
thus be actually annexed to the Western world". ) 
56 
-iv. The Importance of Towns 
"Nationalism", according to Emerson, "is essentially and in the 
first instance an urban phenomenon". 
57 According to the Marxist 
viewpoint of Barratt-Brown, "urbanization of Africans encouraged the 
forming of associations to fill the void left by the break with 
25 
, 58 tribalism and these have been the basis of the nationalist parties.. 
Both schools of thought stress the crucial role which towns play in 
the development of nationalism. 
Towns bring about a radical change in life style for what are 
predominantly rural communities. They wrench men from their traditional 
environment, from ascriptive ties of kinship and custom, and offer them 
a new modern environment, with the possibility of fresh associative 
ties. In the towns, men of one tribe or grouping rub shoulders with men 
from other tribes. In the towns they come most closely into contact 
with the economic and cultural manifestations of modernity. There they 
are most open to the outside world, to European influences. The 
education system is most highly developed in towns; the literacy rate 
is highest. Urban areas have most radios, most newspapers. The new 
forms of political action and organization develop in towns. Secular- 
rational bureaucratic norms take root most firmly there. 
The degree of urbanization is often regarded as the chief index 
of socio-political development, or, in Deutsch's phrase, of 'social 
mobilization'. The growth of towns logically precedes other 
manifestations of modernity. Lerner suggests that "the secular 
evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular 
sequence of three phases. Urbanization comes first, for cities 
alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which 
characterize the modern, industrial economy. Within this urban 
matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next 
two phases - literacy and media growth". 
59 Both Lipset60 and McCrone 
and Cnudde6l agree in making urbanization the key variable upon which 
EUNIVERSrry 
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education, and hence the growth of communications, and hence ultimate 
'development'ýdepend. 
Urban man becomes nationalist man for various reasons, according to 
his social situation. There are two major kinds of reason, however, 
either positive, in that he has developed new associative ties which seek 
political expression, or negative, in that he is uprooted and alienated 
and sees in nationalism a compensatory structure. 
It is in the light of such assumptions that we must understand the 
assertion that urban politicians provide the energy for nationalist 
movements in the oo lonial era. In developing mass political parties, they 
push out from the towns to capture support and organize pressure among the 
rural populations, but it is in the towns that the political parties are 
founded and have their strength. Their newspapers are published5and their 
major meetings held, in urban centres. 
-v. The Role of the Modernized 'Elite' 
--- ---- -- --- ---------- 
Nationalism, according to the orthodox view, is born among new, 
'modern' social strata. "The groups and classes which have been most 
susceptible to infection by the nationalist germ", writes flnerson, 
"are those who have been most sharply divorced from their old worlds 
by the impact of the new". 
62 
There are two tendencies of thought: theiripoC¬is 
either negative in that nationalism develops among those sectors 
most cut off from their traditional roots, or positive in that 
nationalism develops among those in contact with the West or with 
Western education, or in--a social situation most akin to that 
prevailing in the West. The urban style of life, the cash economy, 
industrial work discipline, the ethos of the liberal professions, 
27 
exposure to modern mass media - these mould the reactions of the 
modern sectors. These new social strata can be subdivided into 
two groups at least: the middle class and educated elite, and the 
new group of wage labourers. 
63 
This orthodox model of nationalism could be called 'elite 
nationalism'. Iverson typifies the liberal tradition in arguing 
that "nationalism throughout the world has derived its first 
formulation and drive from the middle-class elements which are so 
evidently a creation of the ferment of Western modernity". 
64 
And Kilson is in the mainstream of the Marxist tradition when he 
asserts that "historically, it seems that the commercial and 
educated middle class has been the organizer of nationalism 
wherever found, as well as the bearer of the ideas underlying 
this phenomenon". 
65 
This identification of the elite with nationalism is generally 
explained in terms either of their economic interest as a class, or 
their education in new ideas as individuals, Indeed 'middle-class' 
and 'intelligentsia' are frequently confused with each other, or 
lumped together within such a term as 'the evolved', or 'the moderns'0 
or 'the elite'. 
The bourgeoisie, as a social class, is traditionally 
associated in Marxist thought with the rise of nationalism. 
Nationalism is a fine example of ideology generated in the pursuit 
of economic self-interest. Third World 'modern elites', at least 
in the colonial situation, have typically not played a truly 
entrepreneurial role in the economy. They do not control massive 
productive resources or 'capital'. Those in liberal professions 
28 
or administrative posts are not a middle class in the Marxist sense. 
However, it is still possible to argue, as does Kilson, that this 
embryonic class turns to nationalism 
66 
in order to seize what few 
modern means of production there are (those controlled by the 
colonial power), and to encourage their further growth. 
A rather less radical account of the elite's economic 
motivation figures in liberal 'nation-builder' accounts of 
nationalism. The elite seeks access to, or prdection of bureaucratic 
if not productive power. In other words, there is competition for 
jobs, and professional status. The elite is a class in the rather 
special sense of Djilas's 'new class'. 
67 
Failure to obtain full 
acceptance into 'modern society' under colonial rule generates 
frustration, which expresses itself through nationalism. This is 
Coleman's view: "Nationalism, where it is most advanced, has been 
sparked and led by the so-called detribalized, Western-educated 
middle-class intellectuals and professional Africans; by those 
who in terms of improved status and material standards of living 
have benefited most from colonialism; in short, by those who have 
come closest to the Western World but have been denied entry on 
full terms of equality". 
68 
The elite not only plays a leading role in nationalism, 
according to these theories, but does so as a means to one end: 
modernization. Without the driving force of nationalist ideology, 
'development' would be impossible. "Nationalism is a sine qua non 
of industrialization", argues Davis, " because it provides people 
with an overriding easily acquired secular motive for making 
painful changes. National strength or prestige becomes the 
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supreme goal; industrialization is the chief means. The costs, 
inconveniences, sacrifices, and loss of traditional values can 
be justified in terms of this transcending collective ambition". 
69 
He goes on to add, in an interesting confusion of 'is' with 'ought', 
that. "to the degree that the obstacles to industrialization are 
strong, nationalism must be intense to overcome them". This stress 
on the elite's commiTment to the transformation of their own society 
inevitably leads to a playing down of elements in nationalist 
ideology which reject the values of the colonizers and exalt those 
of traditional society. The elite is a heroic group, dedicated to 
ideals culled from Europe, isolated from and battling with its 
indigenous environment. Its historic mission, almost its sole 
preoccupation, is to Nation-Build. 
Identification of nationalism with the 'elite', and character- 
ization of this group by its dedication to 'modernity', is the 
overriding theme of Shils' work. "The elites are almost always 
intensely nationalistic", he argues, "... As contemporary nationalists, 
they are not merely concerned with self-rule; they are concerned 
simultaneously to elevate the dignity of their traditional culture, 
and their standing in the world. But they also wish to have, for 
the sake of economic progress and because it is entailed in being 
modern, a modern culture diffused through the medium of a modern 
educational system that runs from the early years to university". 
70 
He paints a picture of an elite cut off from its traditional 
environment, haunted by a vision of modernity implanted in them 
by European education and experience of the joys of middle-class 
life, and encapsulating their country's future in the present. 
30 
The elite, above all, bears "the burden for the transformation"71: 
the White Man's Burden has been transferred on to their frail 
shoulders! Their major problem lies in the intractability of the 
masses, with whom they have so little in common. 
Analysis by liberal political scientists centres disproport- 
ionately upon this elite. It is treated as the key, if not the 
only political group. They speak the political language of the 
colonial power; they have learned about Western-style political 
organization and how to manipulate it; they are versed in Western- 
style ideology. Politics, almost literally, is coterminous with 
their concerns. Thus Lucian Pye's discussion of modern Burma72 
concentrates entirely on the psychocultural problems of adaptation 
experienced by modern-educated administrators and politicians. 
The book implies not merely that one sector of political reality 
has been charted, but that in essence the whole of that reality has 
been explained. The jacket of his book proclaims simply that "Mr. 
Pye examines Burma's political culture", and Pye himself is 
equally modest: "I decided to explore the dynamics of a particular 
transitional system - that of Burma - by investigating the basic 
attitudes and orientations of various key groups in the society 
toward the political process..... Their personal lives reflected 
the experience of their entire society". 
73 Coleman, too assumes 
that the whole of nationalism in the Third World can be understood 
by studying the elite: "Unlike the field anthropologist, who 
consciously seeks to work among the traditionalists, the student 
of political nationalism is concerned mainly with the attitudes, 
activities, and the status of the nationalist-minded Western- 
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educated elite... Only here can one get a partial glimpse into the depth 
of nationalist feeling, the sources of inspiration and ideas, and the 
key elements in nationalist motivation". 
74 
These works imply that only the urban elite is politically active. 
Conversely the (mainly rural) masses are politically docile; at best 
they are apathetic, at worst hostile, towards modern nationalism. This 
is a theme of Lerner's study of the Middle East: "The Moderns, already 
within the audience for mass communication, are the currently active 
element in Turkish society. The Traditionals, on the other hand, are the 
quiescent segment of the society and do not participate significantly in 
either the new communications or other modernizing institutions. They do 
not attend to the output of the mass media, nor do they in the normal 
course of events want to think or do much about the problems these media 
describe. The Transitionals, moving from traditional ways towards a 
modern style, are the new source of social energy for the future... Their 
passage, writ large, is the passing of traditional society in the Middle 
East". 75 In other words, the modern elite is regarded less as a special 
group with separate interests (even less as an exploitative class), than 
as an advanced segment or wedge of the population which will grow ever 
wider until eventually it embraces the whole society. This is a classic 
Whig Interpretation of contemporary African history. 
-vi. The Role of the 'Proletariat' 
Wage-labourers are the other 'modern sector' commonly linked 
with the growth of natinnalism - "the workers in those employments 
which are least characteristic of native society, and most character- 
istic of the new superimposed Western society". 
76 
The role of industrial 
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wage-earners is particularly stressed, but also wage-labourers on 
colon farms. Deutsch contrasts this 'politically relevant' stratum 
with the 'politically apathetic' rural masses, "isolated, subsistence- 
farming, tradition-bound". 
77 Participation in the money economy 
creats new spending patterns, new family living patterns, and new 
attitudes. It also fosters physical mobility - emigration to large 
towns in a search for higher income, or even emigration to the European 
'metropolis'. The Marxist tradition particularly stresses how work 
discipline leads to consciousness of common interest vis ä via, the 
colonial exploiters; the fragmented traditional landscape causes no 
such awareness. Among the embryonic working class, hereditary 
divisions of labour, (castes, guilds, clans, etc) are slowly dissolved; 
new, more 'rational' associative ties develop. Trade Unions provide 
a link with modern political nationalism, with their international 
affiliations, bureaucratic organization, and articulate programmes. 
Mobilization into the colonial army, albeit temporarily, may 
also be compared in its effects with industrial mobilization. It 
mixes together formerly isolated and perhaps rival groups, imposes 
discipline on new units, teaches skills, and provides an environment 
within which certain aspects of the 'modern' style of life can be 
learned, and aspects of 'traditional' life can be safely unlearned. 
-vii. The New Political Culture 
Nationalism tends to be associated with a specific kind of 
political culture, political language, and set of political 
institutions. 
33 
Nationalism strives for and requires a change of political 
attitudes, indeed a new way of thinking about problems. An extreme 
version of this theory is provided by Lerner: "The Modern impetus 
to make a better world is absent from the Traditional psyche, 
because Modern confidence that such a world is feasible is absent 
from its perspective. In obeisance to the fatalistic role of Kismet, 
the Traditional lives under the narcosis of resignation... (he) cares 
nothing, wants nothing, can do nothing about this world". 
78 
Psychological attitude changes are required for a modern political 
culture, and these include such matters as: trust, ability to 






or 'mobile personality' 
82; 
and a sense of 'citizen competence' and 
'subject competence'. 
83 
It is only on such psycho-cultural foundations that a truly 
political system can hope to build itself. By a 'political system', 
in this context is meant the standard Western liberal 'democratic 
society'. Lerner calls it 'Participant Society', Shils calls it 
'civil society', Almond and Verba dub it 'the-civic culture', and 
Crick simply talks of 'a political system'84 In Shils' view, 
non-Western countries cannot be considered 'civil societies' at 
all until modernizing nationalists have begun to transform their 
political culture; what is otherwise lacking is "the affirmative 
attitude towards rules, persons, and actions that is necessary for 
consensus... (and) the sense of membership in a nation-wide society, 
and the disposition to accept the legitimacy of the government, its 
perso 
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1 and its laws". Often, this necessary shift from 
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traditional to modern political culture is treated as a change from 
an a-political or pre-political culture to a political one. Indeed, 
Riggs openly describes the whole process of 'modernization' and 
national 'mobilization' as one of 'politicization'. 
86 
The rise of nationalism is felt to imply not only a change of 
general political culture, but also a new political language. 
This is the modern political language derived from Europe which 
contrasts sharply with the traditional, indigenous language. 
Western political scientists are instinctively drawn towards 
manifestations of their own 'modern' political language in the 
Third World, and pay inordinate attention to it. Ehnerson for 
example, pays particular attention to a manifesto issued by a 
group of 'evolved' Congolese in 1956, calling for modern education, 
respect for the individual, and democratic participation in 
government. 
87 
It was clearly directed at the colonial regime, in 
its own language. Yet Emerson does not weigh in the balance 
other political manifestations which take indigenous forms and 
are directed at other Congolese. Despite contrary appearances, 
this kind of selective interest implies a reluctance to consider 
the indigenous language as political at all. The 'modern 
political language', as used in courts of law, administration, 
political party headquarters, legislative assemblies, committee 
rooms, and the mass media, (in other words a very small and 
untypical segment of Third World life), is used to interpret the 
whole of the political process. Morris-Jones attacks the 
predilection of English observers for studying "arguments and 
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representations, discussions and demonstrations, deliberations and 
decisions" at this restricted level, rather than coming to grips 
with living community politics. 
88 
They turn to conflicts "between 
party groups in legislatures, between ministers and backbenchers, 
and between ministers and civil servants" as if to "a well-recognized 
familiar fri ýd", and treat them as if they were "the whole of Indian 
politics, the whole story". 
89 
Nationalism as an ideology is associated with articulation in 
terms of this 'modern language',, Hence its identification, too, 
with the 'modern-educated elite', the kind of 'spokesmen' who sound 
intelligible when interviewed in the Western press, and who engage 
in debate with the colonial authority in terms it understands. 
Lerner in particular makes such assumptions. After asking various 
Turkish interviewees what they would do if they were President, he 
classes the following responses as 'modern' (and therefore political): 
"I would adjust the taxes according to social justice.... Base the 
economic policy on a liberal doctrine. I would like the government 
to do things private enterprise cannot do.... To follow a peaceful 
foreign policy, basing my actions on the U. N. Charter" and "I would 
raise the standard of living. I would try to wipe out the illiteracy 
and raise the cultural standard. Take steps to make the newly- 
established democracy in our country permanent. Separate matters 
of religion from matters of state.... " He contrasts these sturdy 
individual opinions with the"rejection or evasion" and "dumb 
silence or frightened retreat before the 'unseemly' question" which 
. characterized the replies of what he calls 'Traditionals' 
90 
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The more the language of such replies employs concepts derived from the 
Western political vocabulary, the more he feels they are 'modern' 
minded, and authentic as voices of nationalism. 
Nationalism as action is identified not only with language in 
this narrow sense, but also with 'modern' forms of political organization. 
These are the sole vehicles of true nationalism, of politics proper. 
Only in the light of such assumptions can we understand statements 
like Rotberg's: "The onset of Mau Mau interrupted the growth of 
African politics in Kenya". 
91 Politics must be 'rationally' organized, 
based on voluntaristic rather than ascriptive norms, and on fairly 
predictable procedures. Such assumptions help to explain the 
considerable academic attention paid to , mass political 
party organizations in the Third World. They appear very similar 
to Western parties; indeed some are born within the organizational 
shell of Western parent parties. They have recognizable, tangible 
attributes like constitutions, party cards and subscriptions, 
cadres, elected officials, committees, programmes, official buildings, 
pamphlets, newspapers, elections, congresses and public meetings, 
and perhaps even publicity offices. These 'concrete''assets often 
prove to be more firmly implanted in the mind of the observer- 
political scientist than in living political reality. 
92 Indeed, 
the apparent lack of deep-rootedness in indigenous reality of these 
'modern' political parties may even be treated as an advantage, 
given their role of injecting a future into the present. Halpern 
believes this ; after extrapolating nationalist parties from 
their indigenous soil, he magically breathes into them the power 
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to irrigate that soil. "Political parties have peculiar advantages", 
he writes, "as instruments of social change. They are a form of 
organization unknown in traditional Islamic society.... They cease 
being organically related to the old social structure and so can 
move themselves and others beyond the established order". 
93 
The considerable interest shown in the legal-constitutional 
phase of colonial 'nationalist movements' stems from a belief that 
a challenge to the colonial power in the name of political principles 
enshrined in the Western tradition (for example, "No taxation without 
representation", "One man one vote", and "Self-determination") is 
more clearly 'political' than raw manifestations of indigenous 
political culture. 
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-viii. Inspiration of Nationalism from outside 
According to the orthodox theory, the West not only established 
the foundations of political modernity and unity; it also inspires 
nationalist ideas among the 'products' of Western education. Thus, 
Emerson asserts of Asia, "the well-spring of.... nationalism lies in 
the ideas and political example of Europe". 
95 A common theme is 
that the West releases ideas and principles among subject populations 
which eventually weaken its own dominance. "The ideas of Rousseau, 
Burke, Mazzini, and the great figures of American indep4: 
ience", 
studied by the colonized, subsequently inspire them to formulate 
their own nationalist ideologies. 
96 Emerson, indeed, goes 
further: "The very idea of nationalism is certainly of Western 
origin, and there is every reason to assume that the mere element 
of imitation in Asia is a powerful one. The strength of the West, 
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which enabled it to dominate so much of Asia, was a thing to be 
studied and copied, and a major component of that strength according 
to the testimony of the West itself, was the existence of coherent 
and integrated nations". 
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This view follows from identifying nationalism with 'modern' 
political language. Paradoxically, the driving force behind 
nationalism, the very concept of 'the nation', is said to come not 
from within the 'national' political culture, but from abroad. 
Plantey is fairly typical in his remark that Moroccan nationalism 
was "born of our (French) labour"; France not only built the 
technical and administrative infrastructure which is indispensable 
for true nationhood, but enabled,, "through our education and 
publications, the spread of our egalitarian, rationalist and 
universalist ideas". 
98 The fact that this education and these 
publications could have touched only a very small section of the 
community is of little import, for the restricted elite is seen 
as the driving force behind nationalism. This elite's umbilical 
cord is linked not with the traditional culture, or the masses, 
from which it is largely cut off, but with the outside worlds 
Western ideas, and the vision of the 'nation-to-be'. 
Kedourie particularly stresses the role of ideas in 
stimulating nationalist behaviour. He also emphasizes the 
phenomenon of ideological contagion in Third World nationalism. 
"Nationalism", he argues, "is a doctrine invented in Europe at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century". 
99 Since then, it has 
become "Europe's latest gift to the world". 
100 "The sweet and 
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heady poison of Western enlightenment"101 is particularly seductive 
in countries whose entire social fabric has been shaken by the impact 
of the colonial situation. Elites poisoned by this enlightenment 
learn "an ideological style of politics, of which nationalism is a 
variant", which is totally alien to their own society. But they 
discover, too, that emotions about the traditional past, including 
religion, can be manipulated for purposes of building a new future. 
Belief in the power of (European) ideas is less evident among 
Marxist interpreters of nationalism, who calculate the 'debt' to 
Europe more in terms of the economic and social changes it provoked. 
However, variants of Marxism have themselves often been considered 
by orthodox political scientists as part of the ideological 
contagion carried from Europe to the Third World. 
102 
-ix. Passivity of Traditional and Rural Society -------- -- --- ----- ------- 
'Meanwhile, back in the bush', according to this interpretation, 
passivity reigns. A somnolent outback is the logical corollary of an 
active, urban minority. "In general", argues Elverson, "the rural 
masses have been indifferent to the new currents, or at best and 
belatedly passive adherents to the nationalist creed". 
103 He erects 
this passivity into the central paradox of nationalism: "The one 
place where the nationalists are characteristically not found is in 
those parts of the society which are most obviously representative 
of the heritage of the past, although these must furnish much of 
the claim to national distinctiveness... The elements of society 
which can probably be taken as the most authentic heirs of the 
'national' culture and tradition are the rural peasantry, who 
4o 
everywhere constitute the great mass of the population, and such of 
the old aristocracy as have been able to hold on. These elements 
have, however, contributed neither the leadership nor the active rank 
and file partisans of Asian and African nationalism". 
104 Gellner 
puts this point succinctly: "The self-image of nationalism involves 
the stress of folk, folk-lore, popular culture etc. In fact nationalism 
becomes important precisely when these things become artificial. 
Genuine peasants or tribesmen, however proficient at folk-dancing, do 
not generally make good nationalists". 
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The role of the rural areas is thus limited to 'receiving' change 
stimulated from and through the towns, by the process of modernization. 
Their contribution is usually discussed in terms of the stimulus which 
social decay, uprootedness, and economic misery in such zones gives to 
the growth of nationalism. Indeed, rural areas are viewed rather as 
obstacles to nationalism than as sources of it. They are the dormant 
territories which nationalists strive to awaken, politicize, and 
organize. Some nationalist leaders do emerge from such backgrounds 
but they only prove the paradox. "The elements of the rural population 
most susceptible to the nationalist appeal", Everson explains, "are 
those who have been brought nearest to the super-imposed Western 
society through such channels as the labour force of mines and 
plantations, or through military service, particularly abroad". 
106 
All possibility of political initiative in such areas is not 
excluded. Such manifestations, however, are rarely explored in 
depth, or regarded as expressions of genuine nationalism. They 
are not 'political' in the sense that nationalism is political. 
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Coleman classifies them as 'nativism'. bnerson states that peasant 
movements are either parochial or xenophobic: merely "a protest 
against local grievances that are felt to be intolerable" or "an 
effort to maintain the customary way of life against alien encroach- 
ments". 
107 
As such they cannot be 'positive'. At best such 
manifestations are 'precursors' of nationalism. 
-x., Break with the Past ----- ---- --- 
Nationalism breaks with history. It is something new, sui 
generis, resulting from the unique conditions obtaining in the 
modern world. The positive contribution of the traditional past 
to the rise of nationalism is negligible. 
Resistance to colonial implantation, and subsequent revolts 
against its practical consequences, are merely classified as 'primary 
resistance'. These are "the first instinctive reaction of hostility 
to the alien intruder ... a futile effort on the part of the old 
society to reject change". 
108 Later - for these are regarded as 
chronological stages - 'secondary resistance' may occur: turbulent 
upheavals within traditional society, which Coleman calls 
'syncretistic', and which disturb the colonial order. 
log But all 
such reactions to the colonial situation are regarded as "rather 
the dying struggles of the old tribal or traditional society than 
manifestations of the new nationalism". 
110 A classic dichotomy is 
thus established between "the early instinctively defensive reactions, 
in which xenophobia played a considerable part" and "the later 




By this criterion, the Indian Mutiny is merely an antiforeign 
"feudal outburst". 
112 The Boxer Rebellion is "a last great upsurge 
of, the older China". 
113 Abdelkrim's uprising in the Rif "represents 
authentically the old Morocco of the tribes, and everything which 
distinguishes it from the countries... led by their semi-modernized 
elites" . 
114 rogue's formula is typical: "The French took decades 
to subdue Morocco, and the British had to maintain strong forces on 
the north-west frontier of India. The growth of nationalism depends 
not on this tribal resistance, but upon the development of a third 
new social complex composed of Westernized natives". 
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This definitional guillotine cuts off nationalism from its 
past. Like the modern elite, its umbilical cord is severed, or 
rather, by a surgical feat, grafted on to the future (the nation-to-be). 
Suddenly, age-old communities become new nations, adrift in an 
uncharted sea. Thus, Pye suggests, 
116 "There is a quality of newness 
. about South East Asia... A generation of peoples seeking to live 
without a history, and with only hopes. Lacking a common store of 
memories the people cannot look to the past for strength and guidance. 
They must look the other way, and in doing so they can see only a 
tentative present and an insecure future". 
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This interpretation follows logically from the 'fatal impact' 
theme. Marx, too, states it quite explicitly: "This loss of (its) 
old world, with no gain of a new one... separates Hindostan, ruled by 
Britain, from all its ancient traditions, and from the whole of its 
past history". 
118 
Such an attitude reflects a very rigid and 
undifferentiated image of what the traditional past actually consists of. 
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At one point, indeed, Marx leaps to the logical conclusion declaring 
that "Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history", 
and that "the whole of her past history, if it be anything, is the 
history of the successive conquests she has undergone". 
119 
Neither nationalists, nor their self-appointed Western mentors, it 
appears, have much to learn from this past, or much in common with it. 
Modernization has an independent logic of its own, situated firmly in 
the present. Thus, suggests Halpern, "Problems are in some important 
ways actually easier to perceive and analyze in new nations than in 
the old". 
120 Reluctance to study history in depth can thus be 
scornfully justified: "Neither we nor the new nations must become 
familiar with their entire past before we or they can cope with the 
issues of modernization. We can become expert and professional in 
the study of modernization of new nations without having to become 
universal encyclopaedists". 
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IV. CRITIQUE OF THE 'ORTHODOX' METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of the orthodox school of interpretation can be 
criticized in several respects. 
122 
-i. It is Mechanistic -- -- ----------- 
The theory of change which underpins the explanation of 
nationalism is highly abstract and mechanistic. The phrase 'nation- 
building' is symptomatic; it connotes models, blueprints, architects 
and social engineers, and above all it implies that the new building 
will have "partial independence from its environment"123 as will its 
builders. It reflects too, a schematic view of what constitutes 
'modernity' and what constitutes 'tradition'. The two are made to 
appear incompatible; they clash as total systems. The resultant 
change is one-way, and the specific conditions under which the 
interaction takes place are largely ignored. 
Four aspects of this mechanistic approach are particularly 
striking: 
a) Binary Opposition. The use of tradition and modernity in 
constant contradistinction makes them appear mutually exclusive 
and incompatible. It also means that the two 'units' are treated 
as internally homogeneous and coherent systems; internal contradic- 
tions and alternative potentialities for change are ignored. Both 
tradition and modernity emerge as caricatures. Furthermore, the 
technique of binary opposition makes them appear static; tradition 
appears settled, timeless and uniform, without any history of 
internal conflict; modernity seems a fixed goal. 
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Binary opposition not merely oversimplifies a complex process, 
and overestimates the speed of the interaction 
124; 
it distorts and 
misinterprets the nature and direction of the process. This is 
largely because it adopts a false perspective, from outside and 
above. 
125 
It is not enough to refine the traditional-modern 
dichotomy, as Lerner has done, by adding an intermediate category 
such as 'transitional', since this same distorting perspective 
survives. 
b) Macro-sociological Perspective. "The study of new. states", 
according to Shils, "is a macrosociological study: it is the study 
of societies, and when it studies parts of these societies, it 
studies their contribution to the functioning of the society as a 
whole". 
126 
The society 'as a whole' is the nation-to-be, and 
thus certain abstract features of the Phoenix Theory of Change 
are inevitable. It makes it difficult not to view the interaction 
between 'modern' and 'traditional' as one between two coherent 
cultures at a 'national' level. In reality, however, the complexity 
and variety of change, and the many levels at which, and forms in 
which it operates, can only be appreciated if a non-centralized 
perspective is adopted. In other words, there are not two forces 
at work, but several multi-directional ones, at different levels 
of social organization. 
Because of the macrosociological perspective, analysis becomes 
little more than an exercise in logic; it refines categories and 
explores corollaries in an inductive manner, without coming to 
terms with detailed empirical facts. This height of generalization 
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cannot really illuminate the concrete information provided by 
historians and social anthropologists. Much of the theorising could 
have been produced without direct experience of actual events on the 
ground. 
127 
c) Linear Change. In the clash between binary opposites, 
change appears one-way. The 'modern sector' ("detached from its 
environment") is an ever-widening wedge driving into the flank of 
the doomed traditional sector. There is little room for synthesis 
(or syncretism? ), for coexistence, or indeed for strengthening of 
'the traditional sector'. 
d) Neglect of the Colonial Situation. Change is treated as 
the outcome of a neutral play of 'culture contact'. The political 
and social characteristics of the specific colonial situation within 
which the 'contact' is made - organized groups and institutions in 
a situation of conquest or domination characterized by control of 
resources for certain economic and political ends - are largely 
ignored. Although the specific colonial situation, with its 
internal contradictions, ambivalences and tensions, determines 
the success of particular kinds of resistance and reconstruction, 
the mechanistic nature of the classic theory of nationalism makes 
the discussion of such parameters extremely difficult. 
-ii. It is Ethnocentric -- -- ------------ 
The conceptual scheme developed to discuss nationalism and 
modernity in the Third World is ethnocentric. Sometimes, this 
is explicitly admitted. Coleman argues that the "concept and 
institution of the modern nation-state, towards the creation of 
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which African nationalism tends to be directed, is distinctly 
Western in its form and content". 
128 He denies that the self- 
image of the indigeneous political culture merits attention, 
since "the shattering forces of disintegration that characterize 
modernity" are steadily destroying it. Just as Coleman stresses 
the Western origins of the nation-state phenomenon in order to 
justify the exclusive use of concepts drawn from Western politics, 
so Gabriel Almond argues that "the political scientist who wishes 
to Etudy political modernization in the non-Western areas will 
have to master the model of the modern, which in turn can only 
be derived from the most careful empirical and formal analysis 
i Z. of the modern Western politics". 
ý9 
The ethnocentrism implicit in this is of a specific kind. 
There are two possible kinds of egoism: the one is simply to 
ignore the people around you, to deny their importance or their 
'validity'; the other (more complex) is to try to absorb them, 
to project your own concerns upon them, to accept them on your 
own terms. You can either refuse discussion, or agree to 
discussion nnly on terms laid down by yourself. Both are 
egocentric. The latter egocentrism sets itself up as an apparent 
negation of the former egocentrism, but in fact is only an 
adaptation of an original simple egocentrism to new circumstances 
of challenge. So it is with ethnocentrism. Though the Nation- 




It is universalistic because it purports to, and in certain 
respects does, come to terms with heterogeneous political systems. 
Different cultures are treated as interesting, important, understandable 
and coherent in their own right. The systemic-functionalist school 
which emerged in the late 1950's and 1960's, especially in the U. S. A. y 
was a genuine attempt to break down the ethnocentrism (of the simple 
variety) which characterized political studies in the West. It 
attempted to develop terminology which could embrace the socio-political 
phenomena of the Third World within an overall scheme. It was a healthy 
development in that it deigned to treat as 'political', activities and 
phenomena which had hitherto been ignored, or dismissed as 'incomprehen- 
sible' and 'primitive', by self-styled Political Scientists. It sought 
to understand these as alternative'means (institutions) for the 
performance of functions which every political system everywhere must 
perform. They were accepted as 'systems', as 'institutions'. Non- 
Western institutions, the argument ran, should not be judged in terms 
of outward resemblance to Western institutions; we should not look 
for cabinet committees in Burundi, nor for presidential elections by 
single-transferable voting every five years in Afghanistan. Instead, 
we should scrutinize Burundi or Afghan societies for evidence of 
political functions being performed by such local 'institutions' as 
lineage-groups or holy men. 
This approach entailed a refreshing broadening of horizons, and 
breathed new life into the words 'political' and 'institution' and 
'function'; or rather it acknowledged such advances already made in 
practice by social anthropology. It laid the foundations, it 
131 
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seemed, for a new school of comparative politics, embracing West, 
East and Third World within its compass. All comparison requires 
a shared standard of analysis; this school now offered one. 
"Political systems", wrote Almond in 1960,132 "may be compared with 
one another in terms of the frequency and style of performance of 
political functions by political structures". 
Yet this new 'universalism' always remained one-sided. The 
yardstick of assessment was forged with varying degress of explicitness, 
naivety, or self-consciousness, within the workshop of Western political 
culture. Several of the new-heralded functions (for example, rule- 
making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication) proved to be little 
more than poorly-disguised translations of traditional Western 
analytical concepts into more obscure language. Above all, there 
usually seemed to be a built-in assumption that the Third World has 
less of what the West has more. "From the Wests argued Lerner, "came 
the stimuli which undermined traditional society inthe Middle East; 
for the reconstruction of a modern society that will operate efficiently 
in the world today, the West is still a useful model. What the West is, 
in this sense, the Middle East seeks to become". 
133 
The assumption is never far away that the problems of modernization 
are the crucial issue facing Third World nationalists, as such labels as 
'Developing Nations' imply. Pye is one of the most blatant proponents 
of this view. "The dominant theme in South East Asia", he writes, "is 
the effort of the leaders in their new countries to create modern 
nation states out of their transitional societies". 
134 In other words, 
such areas are defined in relation to the problem of 'nation-building' 
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rather than in terms of their own individual, specific, and spnntaneous 
expressions of political life. 
135 Pye asserts this vigorously: If 
development means anything, it means the rejection of current realities 
in favour of hoped-for eventualities". 
136 He elaborates this point in 
a noteworthy passage: "In the developing countries, the legitimacy of 
the state does not necessarily depend on its responsiveness to existing 
social values. The situation is, directly reversed and legitimacy 
depends upon the commitment to use power to change the values and 
personalities of the citizens. Under these conditions it is not 
possible to speak of a moral order in the same manner as has been 
fashionable in the West... The strength of commonality, the reassurance 
of established ways, and the command of dignified maturity, are all 
denied to such societies. Above all, the states they are now forming 
cannot, in building up the authority they need for directing further 
political change, exploit the power of legitimacy that is inherent in 
shared moral expectations... The establishment of legitimacy must be 
more heavily dependent upon effectiveness and efficiency". 
137 
In such hands, it is difficult to see how the systemic-function- 
alist school could live up to its theoretical promise. Third World 
institutions are not analysed in terms of the functions they perform 
inside their own system; these theorists describe, indeed preach, 
how systems must be transformed and institutions changed to enable 
the performance of externally-defined functions. 
The systemic-functional approach never came to a comfortable or 
convincing decision as to what was politically relevant. Despite its 
theoretical radicalism, it had a distinct tendency to look for 
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discrete groups whenever it sought empirical evidence, and discrete 
groups of the type which the Old Tradition had deemed 'political' in 
a purely European context. The shift of focus was essentially verbal. 
Apter, for example, argued that Third World political systems should 
not be called 'anti-democratic', yet felt they were nevertheless 
'pre-demncratic'. 138 Through the back door crept in the old 
distinctions and emphases. Shils, for example, made a distinctly 
Aristotelian distinction between 'pre-democratic society' (Third 
World) and 'civil society' (us). 
139 It is difficult to see how, 
except in blatancy and style, such a distinction differed from 
Crick's 'pre-systemic-functionalist' view: 
"It may be proper, though one doubts, to call the Grand 
Turk's barber a 'politician'; but if we call such a system 'political' 
then we are losing... a crucial distinction; we are saying no more 
than that all power is open to influence, that all power rests on 
some kind of consent... These are properly differentiated as 
'political systems': what-Aristotle meant by 'polity', Fortescue's 
dominium politicum et regale, what the Whig translators meant by 
'mixed government', or what Machiavelli, the European inhabitants 
of Free Cities, and the American patriots meant by 'republican'... 
Political systems only exist in relatively advanced societies.. 011.140 
Sadly the so-called functionalists have been unable to do more 
than confirm the 'orthodox' interpretation of nationalism, and have 
141 indeed been its most prominent devotees. 
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-iii. It is Non-specific, mainly comparative 
The 'nation-builder' theory of nationalism is both mechanistic 
and ethnocentric. Both flaws reflect its overriding concern with 
comparison. It is not concerned with explaining specific facts, 
but with developing a framework to facilitate the discussion and 
classification of cross-cultural patterns. Thus Shils explains: 
"We are not historicists. We aim at generalized categories and 
analytical propositions both because we regard them as among the 
highest intellectual achievements and because we think they are 
indispensable for the better understanding of concrete and 
particular events... It is obviously necessary to ascertain the 
unique features of societies and politics... (But) Our task in 
this regard is to find the categories within which the unique 
may bei3escribed". 
142 He goes on fiercely to attack 'historicists' 
who insist on "the uniqueness of every society, of every culture, 
and every epoch... (They) assert that those unique features are 
incomparable with one another and so different from one another 
that... no general categories can illuminate any significant aspect 
of the events that occur in these diverse societies, cultures and 
epochs". 
143 Pye, too, attacks "the smug knowledgeability of the 
area specialist who seems determined to demonstrate that there is 
nothing universal", and "the assertions of the aggressive cultural 
relativists that concepts formulated in the West were inapplicable 
in explaining the exotic behaviour of non-Westerners". 
144 
Several problems are associated with a purely comparative 
approach. Though, logically, no analysis can take place without 
some comparative framework, erecting the scaffolding may become 
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an end in itself. The bricks and mcrtar- empirical facts - are 
neglected; they become secondary. Much of the work of the new 
nation-builder school reads like an everlasting introduction to 
a book on a specific 'nationalist' movement which is never finally 
written. 
There is a further danger, that the framework of comparison 
may distort the real nature, the specificity, of the 'material' it 
seeks to compare. It may promote anachronism, when material is 
selected to fit in with pre-conceived ideas of what (for example) 
'true nationalism' is. The principle of selection in comparative 
studies is thus crucial; questions of ideological bias and heuristic 
inappropriateness centre around this. 
14.5 The methodological problem 
of bringing order to material which resists categorization tends to 
merge with the ideological problem of ensuring that the particular 
comparative framework used is 'neutral', and free from ethnocentrism. 
It is not enough to argue that a frame of reference is value-free on 
the grounds that some frame of reference is necessary, and that pure 
'relativism' is methodologically unsound. 
Even supposing that the particular comparative frameworks used 
by the classic 'nation-builders' were free from ethnocentrism, 
146 
doubts about the comparative approach remain. A framework may be 
'neutral' in relation to the values specific to each of the units 
being compared, yet reflect or generate values of its own: those 
of an academic discipline, for example, or of international 
administration. Pitt-Rivers raises this problem: "All anthropol- 
ogists aspire to escape from the intellectual limitations of their 
national culture... But perhaps they can succeed only at the cost of 
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becoming 'technocentric', centred in the values of an international 
class of professional investigators". 
147 
The values of 'professional 
expertise' among researchers may blind them to the uniqueness and 
self-defined interests of their 'material' 
148 
The values of 
'international administration' perhaps instinctively seek to reduce 
heterogeneity to uniformity, and therefore to 'manageability'. 
149 
-iv. It is Tautological 
A classic formula has grown up whereby 'nationalism proper' is 
a novel development in the Third World. It has its origins in the 
social revolution brought about by colonization and contact with the 
West - the spread of industry and towns, the growth of literacy and 
social mobility, the development of modern communications. It is 
predominantly based on towns, and is typically led by a small 
middle-class educated elite and other groups in the 'modern' sector 
of the economy. Particularly in the early stages, there is little 
participation in the movement from the traditional rural masses. 
The movement tends to organize itself into one or more mass political 
parties, analogous to those in Western societies; these adopt modern 
methods of political pressure, propaganda, and direct action. This 
nationalist movement seeks modernization, and the construction of 
new associative ties within the total society. To effect this, it 
has to awaken the slumbering outback from its political torpor, and 
help it to organize itself. 
The interlocking nature of these various facets of the orthodox 
theory should not disguise the tautology on which the theory itself 
is based. Unfortunately, much of the literature takes corollaries 
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of the original definition of nationalism as confirmation of the 
premiss on which it is based. Gellner, for example, though his 
account of nationalism is a subtle one, 
15° 
strays into tautology. 
He arrives at the orthodox interpretation of Third World nationalism 
by way of seeking to distinguish 'nationalism' from 'just any kind 
of group loyalty and sentiment'. He recognizes the danger of 
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circularity in his argument! Ito movement can be called 'nationalist' 
until certain pre-conditions (modernity) exist) yet the major evidence 
of this modernity is the emergence of genuine nationalism. 
152 Yet he 
asserts that his theory has a hard 'non-tautological' core: the 
empirical statement that nationalism proper "underlies the great 
majority cf modern 'national' movements". This apparently testable 
assertion, however, remains uncomfortably circular. 
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As against this kind of logical drift, it is worth emphasizing 
that nationalism was not born in the towns, although it may in certain 
senses be true that the 'nationalist political parties' were. 
Nationalism was only born in the towns in so far as the label is 
confined to those political sentiments and activities expressed 
through these urban parties and their middle-class and modern 
sector membership. If nationalism is so defined, then it is neither 
the only nor the most important political component in the colonial 
situation; nor indeed in the post-independence political process. It 
would, of course, be the most important political component if we gave 
to the word 'political' a restricted sense, involving cultural 
assumptions of European origin. If political ideology is only 
political when articulated in Western terms and through Western-style 
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media, if political action is only that which takes forms which are 
comprehensible in a Western context, then naturally such manifestations 
as accord with this definition turn out to be politically most 
significant. In other words, we are faced with a very narrow use of 
the word nationalism, and this should be recognized. The problem is 
that, in other contexts, nationalism is defined so broadly that it 
is bound to seem the most important political component in play, since 
it is co-terminous with the political process itself. 
154 Confusion 
and distortion arise when arguments based on the restricted sense of 
nationalism are linked with those based on the larger meaning, so 
that 'modern urban nationalism' appears to explain the whole political 
process at all its levels. 
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I. THE COLONIAL SITUATION 
A non-orthodox interpretation of Third World nationalism can be 
pieced together from several sources. A group of social anthropologists 
have developed 'dynamic' interpretations of social process, using 
fieldwork findings to build up comparative data on the political 
behaviour of colonized societies. Contributions have been made by a 
few political scientists versed in the terminology of social anthropology, 
a convergence of interests which has developed particularly since the war. 
l 
Decolonization in the Third World has also caused a revolution of 
perspective, which has thrown up various committed theorists free from 
some preconceptions of Western thought. 
This amalgam of influences has made it possible to construct a new 
framework for understanding Third World 'nationalism'. Nationalism, in 
this view, is best understood as a reaction, or series of reactions, to 
a colonial situation - that peculiar setting within which colonized 
societies and their colonizers interact. We must study how such 
! situations' are dismantled, but also how they are established, and how 
they manage to persist. 
2 
A. Development of the Concept of a Colonial Situation 
The usefulness of 'the colonial situation' as a concept for 
organizing data has gained slow acceptance. Until the second world war, 
social anthropologists commonly analyzed Third World communities as self- 
contained units, or as networks of self-contained units. Many were 
clearly undergoing, or actively resisting changes provoked by contact 
with highly-complex Western technologies, but where such change was 
74 
studied at all, it was essentially as a contagion from outside. 
Processes of 'acculturation', decay, transformation and adoption of 
social institutions, were studied in relation to the traditional 
functions and equilibrium of indigenous society. 
Malinowski was an active exponent of this view. 
3 He treated 
societies as 'islands' of experience which, for the purposes of 
fieldwork and systems analysis, had to be isolated from their 
surroundings. In a colonial setting, the indigenous community 
constituted a separate system, to be studied on its own terms. The 
colonizers were another social island, or rather an archipelago of 
different groups. Though they coexisted within the same territory, 
Malinowski argued that native communities and foreign settlers had 
too little in common to be treated as components of a single society. 
Because they had extremely distinct and antagonistic cultures, they 
were not parts of a "well-integrated whole" and could not meaningfully 
be considered within the same analytical framework. In his view, the 
prime characteristic of any social system was equilibrium; where 
fundamental conflict existed, there could be no 'system' as such. 
Though two 'cultures' in the colonial setting share interests and 
experiences, and even a coherent pattern of conflict, these merely 
indicatel a third, separate island of analysis. 
This approach was increasingly challenged by 'dynamic' social 
anthropologists who regarded conflicts as inevitable, indeed vital 
aspects of all social systems. Moreover, perspectives broadened, 
and the overall relationship between colonizer and colonized gained 
acceptance as a valid field of study, at least as a. framework within 
which smaller-scale fieldwork had to be situated. Max Gluckman, 
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drawing his material from study of colonized Southern. Africa, was 
particularly active in this double process of reassessment* 
4 
He 
argued that, although the network of interactions between colonizer 
and colonized could never be termed a "well-integrated whole", it 
nevertheless constituted a common situation. The juxtaposition of 
two diametrically conflicting groups within a common institutional 
framework, dominated by the colonizer, established an identifiable 
pattern of behaviour among the groups, a "single social field" 
susceptible to social anthropological analysis. This had to be 
understood before the evolution of any participant group could be 
charted. 
Gluckman argued that both the conflicts, imbalances, and 
institutional 'pathologies' within this field, and the devices by 
which equilibrium is maintained, hfere of intrinsic interest. He did 
little more himself than hint at the structural dynamics typical of 
these 'social fields', and at variables which might determine specific 
outcomes. His concern, as a practical social anthropologist, was not 
a comparative typology of colonial situations. This is less a 
criticism than a statement of the necessary division of labour between 
social anthropology and political science. "It is not to be expected, " 
as Fallers explains1 "that social anthropologists will attempt holistic 
studies of the new states, for methods of research are designed 
primarily for microscopic study of institutions within particular 
cultural settings. But the future of the anthropological study of 
politics in Africa depends upon their ability to conceptualize the 
place of the local institutions they study within larger political 
wholes, so that the results of their work may articulate fruitfully 
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with the macroscopic research of political scientists". 
5 Gluckman's 
work makes great contributions in the latter respect. 
Comparative studies of European colonial policy - Furnivall's 
work in England, for example, 
6 
and Walcker's in Franc e7 - made 
initial attempts to list characteristics of situati6ns where two or 
more quite distinct cultures and communities coexist in a colonial 
institutional framework. Both spoke of "plural societies". A more 
sophisticated comparative typology of such societies was developed by 
the social anthropologist M. G. Smith. 
8 
He differentiates plural 
societies from merely 'heterogeneous societies'. All heterogeneous 
societies comprise different occupation groups and minorities but in 
a plural society these divisions are expressed in 'institutional' terms, 
through different educational, kinship , religious and economic 
organizations. Yet a plural society is a single society rather than 
several separate ones, because it constitutes a "territorially distinct 
unit having its own governmental institutions". The most important 
kind of "plural society", Smith suggests, is a colonial setting, which 
is "structurally peculiar", and"a field worth special study". One 
peculiar feature is that "the dominant minority is inescapably 
preoccupied with problems of structural maintenance and economic and 
political control", and therefore actively discourages the acculturation 
of the subordinate majority. For this reason, "conventional models of 
homogeneous equilibrium systems or integrative stratification orders" 
do not explain such situations; new models are needed. In more recent 
years, Smith has attempted, if not to develop such models, at least to 




The concept of the "colonial situation" has most insistently and 
interestingly been employed by the political anthropologist Georges 
Balandier. 
10 His work combines careful microscopic fieldwork and 
analysis with bold macroscopic typology, impressively spanning the 
gap between social anthropology and political science mentioned by 
Fallers. Balandier argues that contact and conflict in colonial 
situations is never random. It takes place under special conditions 
which involve radically contrasting cultures, transmitted by groups 
with differential power and rival needs. A pattern of interaction 
develops, albeit pathological, the outcome of which is determined by 
numerous variables, which he attempts to identify. Indigenous social 
change - much of it confused with the term 'nationalism' - can only 
be 
understood within this analytical context. "The interesting fact", he 
argues, "is not the existence of pluralism (a characteristic of any 
global society). but the indication of its specific features: the 
racial basis of 'groups', their extreme dissimilarity, the antagonistic 
relationships this entails, and the necessity imposed on them to 
coexist 'within the limits of a single political framework'. 
" 11 He 
devotes a great deal of energy to analyzing these specific features. 
Until recently, his work has been neglected in British and American 
academic circles, though its influence now appears to be growing. 
12 
B. Basic Features of a Colonial Situation 
A colonial situation is a particular socio-political conjuncture, 
producing social dynamics with fairly predictable characteristics. 




Two complex 'civilizations' or 'technologies' interact in a colonial 
situation. They are radically foreign to each other. Typically, the one 
is European - more rationalistic, individualistic, bureaucratic, 
capitalistic, and backed up by a hiay complex technology. The other 
is non-European - more affective, ascriptive, kinship-dominated and 
communalistic, with a considerably less complex technological foundation. 
So radically different are these two juxtaposed 'civilizations' that some 
kind of intense interaction or clash is inevitable. 




The contact between the two cultures is not one of 'free exchange'. 
13 
Discrete groups are vehicles of the interaction. Though there are 
commonly other groups and invariably sub-groups present, the two 
principal groups involved are a foreign minority, and a native majority. 
These are ethnically distinct, have totally different cultural roots, and 
pursue conflicting interests; yet they coexist within the same overall 
colonial framework, and inevitably develop some areas of cooperation. 
Yet despite some shared interests, they tend to become closed off from 
each other socially: "sharply separated by custom and language, 
standards of living, types of work, marriage barriers and social 
exclusiveness". 
14 The outcome of the culture contact is shaped, or 
distorted, by the specific features of these groups. 
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-iii. Conquest and-disproportionate power. ---------------------------------- 
The relationship between the groups is not evenly balanced; 
it is deformed by grossly uneven power. The juxtaposition of the 
groups is imposed by force of arms, or by threat of this. 
15 Even 
where conquest is effected by indirect and apparently peaceful 
pressures, economic for example, nevertheless "colonialism is a fact 
of power". 
16 
It is maintained by force, too; awareness that the 
colonizer group has "got the Maxim gun"17 underpins the implantation 
of the formal institutions which regulate contact between the groups - 
police, judiciary, administration, legislature, and technical 
services. Force involves more than the naked assertion of physical 
will; it includes "not only actual arms, but better organization, 
central control, greater overall unity, telephones, and so forth". 
18 
Thus the foreign group, despite numerical inferiority, is in fact a 
dominant minority; despite its numerical superiority, the native 
group, sociologically speaking, is a dominated, colonized, or 
subject majority. This disparity of power generally ensures that 
the needs and attitudes of the colonizer minority determine the 
nature of the interrelationship, at least initially. Reciprocal 
interests which emerge do so on lines laid down by the minority; 
the administrative structures that are established transmit first 
and foremost the colonizer's conception of what these links should 
be; social changes that occur are profoundly marked by this 
imbalance. 19 
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-iv. Ideological cement of domination. 
-------------------------------- 
Not merely the language of material force expresses the domination 
of the colonizer group. It is invariably reinforced by and combined 
with a whole complex of universalistic pseudo-justifications, which 
weave together racist, cultural, religious, moral, political and 
economic themes. This set of rationalizations stimulates deeply 
interventionist activities on the part of the colonizer, who 
simultaneously tries to inculcate them into the colonized population, 
a process known as 'civilization'. Stiffly stereotyped group 
behaviour patterns result. 
C. Variables in a Colonial Situation 
These are four basic features of all colonial situations. The 
precise dynamics of any particular situation need to be discussed in 
the light of several variable factors. 
20 The degree to which the 
situation persists - in other words the way in which conquest is 
'consolidated' - depends on a whole constellation of such variables; 
so, too, do reactions to that situation - what is sometimes called 
'nationalism'. 
Although several useful discussions of these variables have 
been published, particularly Balandier's, no systematic typology 
has yet been developed. Yet such a typology would provide an 
invaluable reference point for the study of individual colonial 
situations, and a matrix for comparative study. Some fragments of 
what is necessary are suggested here, to illustrate the contextual 
constraints on colonial dynamics. Both the relative strength of 
1 
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colonizer and colonized, and the specific cha±acteristics of each, 
need close examination. In any particular setting, the precise 
importance of each individual factor varies not only from one 
geographical sub-zone to another, but also from one time to another. 
-i. Relative strength of Colonizer and Colonized. 
-------------------------------------------- 
This set of factors includes such matters as relative population 
size; relative rates of demographic growth; relative military strength 
(including potential reserves, and in relation to logistic possibilities); 
and, perhaps, as a derivative factor, the length of implantation itself. 
-ii. Characteristics of the Colonizer Group. 
-------------------------------------- 
These factors can be grouped under five broad headings - 
a) Relationship with the Mother Country. The physical proximity of 
------------------------------------ 
the colony to the mother country, and the effectiveness of communications, 
are aspects of this; so is the degree of dependence on the metropolis for 
military, economic, and financial support. The status of the occupier 
group in their homeland, whether they made the conquest themselves, how 
permanently they are expatriated, and how regularly population inter- 
change takes place, are further important elements. The behaviour of 
the occupiers is affected by the political characteristics of the 
mother country, the constitutional status conferred upon the colony, 
and metropolitan pressures concerning colonial policy. The susceptibility 
of the mother country to world pressures of various kinds must also be 
taken into account. 
b) Social Composition. Particular study must be made of the relative 
------------------ 
'weight' within the colonizer group of soldiers and traders, artisans 
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and missionaries, farmers and industrialists, administrators and 
technical cadres, and other such social categories, since each 
plays a slightly different role at different times and divisions of 
interest inevitably reveal themselves. Above all, there are great 
differences between those colonizer groups which include a large 
number of permanently 'settled' immigrants, usually on appropriated 
land, and those characterized by a 'presence' of rather impermanent 
representatives of the metropolis together with a small community of 
expatriates to service their needs. 'Settler' colonies produce special 
distortions. 21 The colonizer group may also include sections of 
population from European countries other than the metropolis. Further 
complication may be brought about by partial incorporation into the 
colonizer camp of 'intermediate' non-European groups, such as Lebanese, 
Jews, Chinese, Indians, Arabs, and 'half-castes'. 
c) Goals and Economic Character of Occu ation. Economic motives usually 
provide the major drive behind occupation, but the form this takes varies 
according to the precise economic factors at work. 
22 The character, 
rhythm and scale of economic development depends on whether the 
colonizer's chief interests are desire for booty or the imposition of 
regular taxation; the settling of emigrants or the capture of slaves; 
the investment of capital in an industrial infrastructure or the control 
of trade outlets; the establishment of plantations or the extraction of 
raw materials. 
23 The coloniser's ability to achieve these goals, or in 
other words his technological capacity, is another crucial determinant. 
The goals of occupation may not be purely economic, however; considerations 
of military strategy, military tactics, and international prestige affect 
the nature of the colonizer's enterprise. 
83 
d) Administrative Resources and Policy. The assumption of different 
types of territorial sovereignty over different areas; the availability, 
character, and deployment of administrative officials; the nature and 
density of the administrative framework, and the tasks it is expected 
to perform - these considerations yield another set of important 
variables affecting the dynamics of a colonial situation. Ease of 
communications, management methods practised, and open-ness of 
recruitment to the indigenous population also must be considered. The 
policy adopted towards existing traditional authorities, including 
legal institutions., is particularly vital. The types of representative 
institutions injected at local and central levels, both for the 
colonizer group and the colonized, are also important in structuring 
the interaction; this is also affected by the kinds of 'civil liberty' 
permitted gnd institutionalized. 
24 
e) Ideoloffy and Attitudes. Particularly important in this set of 
variables are racial attitudes (sense of superiority, aloofness, and 
disposition to intermarriage, for example) and cultural attitudes 
(including sense of identity, sense of superiority, desire to dominate, 
tolerance of other ways of life). Intertwined with these are 
educational policies (as reflected in the organization, methods, and 
content of education provided for colonizer and colonized) and 
religious policies (types of faith imported church organization, 
desire to proselytize) which together indicate the degree of 
commitment to moral interventionism. Myths of the colonizer about 
himself and about the colonized take on independent force as variables. 
Pre-conceptions derived from other colonial situations may effectively 
reinforce or counteract these. 
25 
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-iii. Characteristics of the Colonized GrouE. 
------------------------------------- 
Similarly, these may be slotted into five categories of variable: 
a) Relationship with Occupied Territory. The dimensions and topography 
------------------------------------ 
of the colonized area, the ease of internal communication and the 
density and mode of its occupation by indigenous groups5greatly influence 
the character of the colonial interaction. Links with other population 
groups both inside and outside the colonized area are particularly 
important. These comprise physical links (including recent invasion 
and patterns of migration), economic links (including trade, clientage, 
slavery), political links (alliance, feud, nominal suzerainty), ethnic 
links, religious links, cultural links, and linguistic links. 
b) Social Characteristics. The internal social divisions of colonized 
---------------------- - 
communities may be exploited or counteracted by the colonizers. 
Elements of social solidarity, and higher unifying loyalty equally 
determine behaviour. Segmentary, pyramidal, and oligarchical social 
structures respond in different ways to the colonial setting; some 
prove adaptable, and others resistant, to endogenous and exogenous 
change. Social divisions and combinations generated by the colonial 
situation itself may later become independent elements in the 
interaction. The nature of pre-existing social units vitally 
affects the success of educational or socio-economic developments, 
and the formation of new elites, new classes, or new occupational 
groups. 
c) Economic Organization and Goals. Different modes of production, ------------------------------- 
distribution, exchange and consumption can be found among different 
sub-groups. Some prove more adaptable or resistant than others to 
the conditions imposed by the occupier. Prior urbanization, 
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sedentarization and industrialization; sophistication of technology; 
manpower resources; trade outlets; the existence, exploited or 
undiscovered, of natural resources - all determine the pattern of 
economic interaction. 
d) Political or Administrative Structures. A variety of factors - 
ranging from acephalous segmentation, lineage chieftainship, and 
centralized bureaucracy, to theocratic monarc17- determine the political 
outcome of colonial dynamics. The cross-cutting political interrelation- 
ships which predate conquest, or are forged in response to it, can 
determine the resp6nses of colonized groups. 
e) Ideology and Cultural Attitudes. Religious organization and 
beliefs contain countless possibilities for division or unity; many 
of these exist before conquest, others develop after it. The sense 
of racial and cultural identity, and attitudes towards outsiders 
provoke particular kinds of response. The methods and character of 
education or value-transmission, including the extent of literacy, 
also deserve consideration. 
From this assemblage of cross-cutting variables we can construct 
the 'field of social interaction' of each colonial situation. 
Within such parameters, groups adopt a number of possible policies, 
stratagems, and responses at different times - or even contradictory 
ones at the same time. These strands of behaviour fall into a 
fairly consistent or logical pattern; together, the interweaving 
of these constitutes the dynamics of the colonial situation. 
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II. THE DYNAMICS OF THE COLONIAL SITUATION 
Nationalism is inextricable from the dynamics of the colonial 
situation. These dynamics do not take the form of a simple clash 
between, for example, 'exploited' and 'exploiter', or 'modern' and 
'traditional'; they are fraught with contradictory strategies and 
tactics, at several levels. For reasons of clarity, these strategies 
may be discussed separately, as actions of the colonizer and reactions 
of the colonized, but an active-passive relationship should not be 
inferred from such terminology. 
A. The Strategies of the Colonizer Group 
"The dominant minority", writes M. G. Smith, "is inescapably 
preoccupied with structural maintenance, and economic and political 
control". 
26 The colonizer group is an oligarchy; it has a position 
of power to establish and defend. Balandier echoes this point: 
"above all we are dealing with a society whose function it is to 
achieve political, economic and spiritual domination". 
27 This leads 
it to interfere with every aspect of the strange environment in which 
it finds itself. Yet the pursuit to their logical conclusion of the 
economic, social, administrative and cultural goals implicit in this 
interference begins to call into question precisely that initial 
oligarchical position. It eats away at its material and ideological 
foundations. To shore these up, systematic mechanisms of restraint 
coexist with the mechanisms of attabk. Thus the paradox of the 
colonizer's strategy: his attack on the colonized population appears 
extreme and totalitarian, yet strangely peripheral and half-hearted. 
The two prongs of the dilemma need to be examined in turn. 
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-i. The Attack of the Colonizer. --------------------------- 
The colonizer appears to seek domination over the indigenous 
majority in all spheres. Though the socio-economic politico-administrative, 
and ideo-cultural aspects of this all interconnect, the logic. - of each can 
be understood separately. 
a) The Socio-Economic Attack. The economic confrontation between the 
------------------------- 
two groups is diametrical, expressing not competition for spoils within 
a shared system, but a total clash of economic cultures. In terms of his 
own economic culture, the colonizer seeks to "valorize" the colonized 
resources, 
28 
to create some form of "market economy" and open it up to 
the currents of world, or at least metropolitan, trade. 
29 Since in his 
view "the black man who is absolutely self-contained, neither producing 
for export nor receiving any import, has no place in the world's work", 
3° 
the colonizer provides shock troops for forcible industrial or 
agricultural mobilization. He seeks to "develop" the colony (labelled 
'underdeveloped'), by relating its "backward" and "fragmented" economic 
activities to the 'overall needs of the country"; the latter in 
practice are the needs of the dominant settler minority or the metropolis. 
In short, the colonizer seeks "the expropriation of economic surplus from 
the many, and its appropriation by the few, the polarization of the 
capitalist system into metropolitan centre and peripheral satellites". 
31 
This assault does not simply require the indigenous populations 
to be ousted from ownership of the means of production; it also entails 
associating them with the colonizer's enterprise, mainly as providers 
of labour but also to an extent as consumers. This association poses 
a total threat to colonized society both in the form of direct social 
engineering - confiscation of land, transfer of population, forcible 
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sedentarization, mobilization of labour, and new ownership and usage 
legislation - and through the following shock-waves of indirect social 
revolution - development of industry, towns, and wage-labour; decline 
of traditional crafts and agriculture; improvements in communications; 
and growth of new consumption patterns. The ramifications of this 
threat to indigenous social life are endless. The generation of 
social mobility, the development of new 'class' interests, and the 
wholesale attempt to prise the individual away from his traditional 
social group, 
32 
are aspects of a structural and attitudinal assault 
which amounts to "social surgery". 
33 
b) The Politico-Administrative Attack. Socio-economic revolution is ---------------------------------- 
backed up by and channelled through a politico-administrative framework. 
The implantation of this in itself challenges the colonized 
population's world. "Pacification" - the disarming of indigenous 
groups - has immediate consequences. Forcible sedentarization for 
reasons of security and surveillance involves direct social manipulation. 
34 
Pacification entails indirect intrusion by hampering the settlement of 
violent conflicts within colonized society, and establishing the 
colonizer's monopoly of physical expressions of force. This weakens 
social cohesion, especially among segmentary communities held together 
by external antagonisms. 
35 Under such circumstances, larger-scale 
units of traditional organization tend to decline; fragmentation of 
authority takes place, and effective social organization survives mainly 
at small-scale village or clan-fraction level. 
36 
The colonizer seeks to move beyond the phase of constant military 
'presence'. A cheaper, less painful, and ideologically more comfortable 
method of extending and consolidating authority, is to obtain the 
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cooperation of existing authority-figures within the colonized society. 
Surviving institutions of indigenous social control can be built upon 
if incorporated within the colonizer's supervisory framework. Such 
'indirect rule' usually means acknowledging local leaders, yet attempting 
gradually to transform them into agents of change. 
37 
But the colonizer's drive for domination typically goes deeper than 
the supervision and incorporation of formerly independent traditional 
authority structures. Slowly, elements of a European-style civil 
administration develop, alongside this traditional organization, with 
the eventual aim of supplanting them. The colonizer, instinctively, seeks 
to create an administrative environment within which he can feel at home. 
Such an environment is, in any case, usually regarded as a fulcrum of 
effective domination, and a key to socio-economic development. Capital 
formation, the spread of technology, the establishment of regular 
taxation, and the organization of education cannot with full effectiveness 
be channelled through indigenous structures which arose to meet different 
needs; a more appropriate system of control and domination seems necessary. 
Consequently new, artificial territorial divisions are often established, 
deliberately designed to cut across and transcend old ethnic divisions. 
The overall scale of administrative organization is generally enlarged. 
This network transmits such European values as bureaucratic and judicial 
'neutrality', in as far as kinship loyalties ('nepotism'), conventions 
of hospitality and reciprocal respect ('corruption'), and considerations 
of social status ('unfair influence'), are frowned upon and eschewed in 
the administration of native affairs. This threatens to sap indigenous 
sources of authority and cohesion, weaken ethnic loyalties by 
9o 
juxtaposing hitherto separate groupings within a common framework, 
and generate a crisis of confidence in traditional political values. 
The essential project of the colonizer is "depoliticization". 
38 
The colonizer reserves to himself responsibility for the political; 
no direct contestation of the basis of his domination is permitted. 
Indeed, only a small elite is normally allowed access even to the 
administrative sphere. 
39 
The majority of the native population is 
regarded as too 'backward' for regular access to the administration; 
instead a paternalistic programme of technical improvements may be 
instituted on their behalf' including agricultural projects, and the 
building of roads, schools and hospitals. 
40 
Controversy surrounding 
these projects is treated purely as a matter of administrative 
efficiency. 
41 
As a corollary, colonial administrators themselves 
tend to undergo 'depoliticization'. The political initiatives 
expected of the early, energetic local 'contact agents' are gradually 
stultified by supervision and bureaucratization. 
42 
Another corollary 
is the lack of any positive effort to mobilize consensus, or even 
canvass opinion, among native groups. Some 'mixed' representative 
institutions may be established, with concomitant civil rights, but 
the aim is usually less their transformation into effective political 
bodies than the fostering of acquiescence, the erection of facades, 
and the submergence of political issues under administrative ones. 
c) The Ideo_Cultural Attack. The colonizer tries to embed himself 
by seizing and monopolizing the realm of ideas and 'values'. The 
spread of European schools, Christian missions, European communications, 
European mass media, European languages, and European products, are 
manifestations of this attempt. Hovering above these are 'myths' and 
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justificatory ideologies with which the colonizer explains his 
domination: racial myths particularly, which hymn the physical, 
mental and spiritual superiority of the, colonizer. Ramifications 
of these myths preach the superiority of colonizer science, medicine 
and technology; the greater efficiency of his political organization, 
military prowess, and economic management; and the higher sophistication 
of his literature and art. Every concrete object seems a vehicle of 
such assumptions, down to the smallest details of clothing, hairstyle, 
furniture and food. 
43 
Converse]., y, indigenous cultural forms 
whether agriculture or art, government or medicine - are negatively 
defined. They are 'primitive', 'superstitious', 'irrational', 
'archaic', or 'pagan'. History becomes colonizer history, embroidered 
with heroic tales of the process of conquest; the colonized population 
is cut off from the values of its own past. Geography becomes 
colonizer geography, decked out with conquered mountains and now- 
blooming deserts. 
The colonizer oligarchy, in fact, develops a "Nanichaean 
ideology". 
44 
Literally, it assumes a black and white conflict 
between values. 
45 
This is systematically inculcated into the 
colonized population; its only escape from collective doom is to 
emulate the European model. Yet a double bind operates; attempted 
emulation is vain, for Caliban remains eternally Caliban. 
As a result of these racial, religious, cultural, political 
and economic rationalizations of exploitation, the dominant minority 
stands closed off and remote from colonized society. Separation may 
be overtly institutionalized, through physical segregation, colour bar, 
or taboos and laws against miscegenation. Yet an attack is implicit 
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in such avoidance. Its twin is obsessive interventionalism whereby 
the colonizer renames towns and streets, converts mosques into 
churches or museums, transforms festivals into touristic folklore, 
and digs up antiquities. In the "elan which the colonizer brings 
to the search for and destruction of all that is diverse in the 
world". 
46 
academics, artists and priests are as deeply involved as 
soldiers and tax inspectors. 
This ideo-cultural assault threatens the innermost soul of 
the native; it seeks to 'de-nature' and 'de-humanize' him; it 
'de-values' his culture; it des/crates and undermines his traditional 
morality; it cuts off son from father, and individual from group. 
47 
In this sense, the native is "globally alienated", 
48 
and "materially 
and spiritually dispossessed". 
49 
The individual even loses touch 
with his own "self-hood", 
50 
and symptoms present themselves in 
psychiatric disorder. 
51 
d) The Total Assault. If we describe the dynamics of the colonial 
situation purely in terms of these threats, it is difficult to see 
how indigenous society can avoid utter destruction and humiliation. 
Deprived of his land, his social structures shattered, politically 
a dependent invalid, and spiritually at sea, the native haunts a 
society which "no longer contains causality within itself". 
52 His 
future lies beyond this dying world, perhaps in the colonizer's 
mother country in aid of whose predestined ascent he acts as 
'sherpa'. 53 Fanon's description of the fate of colonized is 
moving, but Berque's account of this alienated world is also 
eloquent: 
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"It had itself become a thing for others. Everything within it 
and around it had been reified. ... At that moment, the native lost 
his warm contact with beings and things. He was cut off from 
everything: from the landscape around him, being transformed by 
'exploitation' to which he contributed only as a labourer or, at 
best, as a consumer; from the sequence of cause and effect, whose 
internal law escaped him, since another handled it or invented it; 
from the knowledge of his history, of his language, of his very 
soul since the colonial period imported its efficiency and its 
prejudices into ethnological investigations". 
54 
-ii. The Restraint of the Colonizer. 
However, the impact of the colonizer is rarely as 'fatal' 
in practice as has been implied. The assault is not systematic and 
straightforward, nor is the dispossession total. Berque himself 
quickly admits that his picture is "exaggeratedly dark". 
55 Part 
of the explanatinn lies in the inevitable delay and unevenness 
of colonial implantation; Rome cannot be destroyed in a day. 
56 
The colonizer has only limited resources at his disposal, whatever 
his ambitions. In the interstices thus provided, indigenous 
society can take refuge. Deliberate strategies on the part of 
the colonized, to be discussed later, effectively ward off much 
of the threatened impact. But in addition to these factors, 
another explanation lies in the ambivalent goals and deliberate 
restraint of the colonizer. His straf g is more complicated and 
ly 
contradictory than kmight at first seem, 
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These ambivalences of policy will be examined under three 
separate headings, socio-economic, politico-administrative, and 
ideo-cultural, but they are intimately intertwined. 
a) Socio-Economic Restraint. The colonizers form an entrepren- 
eurial oligarchy. They use their dominant political position to 
develop capitalistic enterprises, from which in turn they can 
derive economic power. Yet they justify their presence by such 
'universalistic' tasks as 'development' and 'modernization'. 
Economic self-interest, and the residual thrust of ideology thus 
necessitate active socio-economic interventionism. It is equally 
true, however, that the security of the oligarchy, and indeed 
effective economic exploitation, require the colonial setting 
to remain socially stable and predictable; excessive social 
disturbance creates urgent demands which distract the colonizer 
from his tasks. The problem is that economic 'valorization' 
inevitably generates social instability - crises within traditional 
agriculture and crafts, for example, uprooting of population from 
the land, emigration to major towns, demographic explosion, 
unemployment, or decay of kinship support mechanisms. Such 
problems are difficult to ignore. The colonizer is thus confronted 
by a major policy dilemma, which Worsley has neatly summarized as a 
choice between "dynamic exploitation" and "conservation of 
tradition". 57 
To push ahead with 'dynamic exploitation' means allowing the 
long-term capitalistic revolution to proceed unchecked; the 
colonizer attempts to transcend short-term social crisis with 
measures designed to integrate the colonized population fully 
95 
within the money economy. In other words, a crash programme of such 
projects as urban construction, job provision and welfare support is 
implied. In the long run, this amounts to "setting up the new 
economic and social system which would integrate the contradictions 
resulting from the original intervention by going beyond them". 
58 
However, this is no small matter to contemplate. Massive economic 
and-human resources are implied, inevitably beyond the slender means 
of the colony itself, and no doubt at too high a price for the 
Metropolis. The few colonial development 'plans' which colonizers 
hastily concoct in times of crisis - invariably proposing too 
little, too late - indicate that the real dimensions of the problem 
cannot be understood by a colonial regime. 
Even if the Metropolis has the foresight and flexibility of 
mind to conceive of the enormous effort required, and even if it 
has the necessary economic resources, it cannot summon the political 
will to commit such resources to such a problem. For the whole 
purpose of colonization - whom is it designed to benefit? - would 
be called into question. If reminder of this is needed, any 
settler group in situ quickly mobilizes to provide it, for its 
oligarchical status is at stake. Thus, in a colonial situation, 
the policy of 'dynamic exploitation' comes up against a series of 
built-in restraints. As Bourdieu and Sayad explain, "it is 
inherently impossible for colonial interventionism to foresee 
and base its actions upon the consequences which it provokes itself, 
because that would be tantamount to challenging the very principle 




An alternative strategy is 'conservation of tradition'. This 
means reining in, and muffling the impact of the socio-economic 
exploitation ofdcolonized by colonizer. It entails a serious 
attempt to isolate the indigenous environment from the colonizer's 
harmful "contagion". 
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It also entails reparative action - to shore 
up declining subsistence farming, for example, or to develop new 
craft industries. Contradictory pressures abound here too, however. 
The question of allocating scarce resources arises, though in a less 
acute form than with 'dynamic exploitation'. In addition, such 
protective action assumes a concern for and knowledge of the 
indigenous milieu which, typically, only a few sections of the 
colonizer oligarchy demonstrate: "they are not, and do not wish 
to be, aware of the logic of the society upon which they act, and 
indeed..... this ignorance and contempt is the very condition of 
their action". 
61 
Furthermore, a policy of conservation calls into question the 
very point of the colonial enterprise. As Mus says of just such a 
French strategy in Vietnam: "There was virtually no excuse for 
our coming, at huge expense, to disturb Vietnamese society and ruin 
its moral structure, if all we were eventually to offer them was 
Confucius". 
62 
A policy of 'conservation' is also subject to the 
criticism that it deprives the native of the benefits of economic 
development, and masks indirect exploitation. "The rural masses", 
Mus writes, "must be integrated into a modern economic cycle...... 
A return to traditional peasantry... might justly be regarded as an 
exploitation of man by man, by means of an essentially urban, 
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administrative, and capitalist. cycle grafting itself again on to a 
Confucian countryside, which would furnish products and manpower 
without receiving any benefit". 
63 
A final limitation of the policy of protective interventionism 
is that no 'cordon sanitaire' can effectively prevent endogenous 
evolution, or halt change set in train by the contamination of the 
colonial presence. Attempts to preserve and prop up traditional 
socio-economic arrangements in a rapidly evolving situation themselves 
distort the social process, and sow the seeds of future disturbance. 
"Unaware either of its impact or its lack of impact", 
64 
the colonial 
regime confronts problems similar to the sorcerer's apprentict's. 
The colonizer tries in practice to ride the horns of his 
dilemmas,, "On the one hand", explains Eisenstadt, "attempts were 
made to establish broad, modern, administrative, political and 
economic settings, while, on the other hand, these changes were 
to be limited and based on relatively unchanged sub-groups and on 
traditional attitudes and loyalties. This contradictory attitude 
could be found in most spheres of social action,,. 
65 
These 
contradictory impulses are often identified with particular groups 
or interests - revealing tensions between Metropolis and local 
colonizers66 or between different sections of the local colonizer 
oligarchy 
67 
- but it is difficult to trace a consistent pattern 
over time; the same individual colonizer could be extremely 
ambivalent. 
Unresolved conflicts often result in a situation of "aborted 
modernization"68 or a "dual economy". 
69 
A 'modern sector', 
dominated by the colonizer and limited in its extent, produces for 
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the world market, while at the same time, over the hedge so to speak, 
the self-sufficient peasant ploughs his eternal furrow as best he may. 
For as long as this uneasy coexistence can last, it suits the colonizer's 
limited goals. It prevents the threatened socio-economic revolution of 
native life from materializing, at least in its straightforward sense. 
The impact of the European economy is thus often marginal; behind a 
facade of roads, public buildings, xhools and hospitals, essential iýdý9¬(OIS 
social life carries on*70 
Even within the advanced sector itself, there are inherent restraints 
on 'dynamic exploitation'. The development of 'modern' skills and 
professions is necessary, but when members of the indigenous 'elite' 
threaten to acquire them, the colonizer may restrict access to defend 
his oligarchical position. In the longer term, a decision has to be 
made whether to train natives for responsible positions, and accept 
the social consequences; or if not, where to obtain the necessary 
manpower. 
Colonial situations have many characteristics of a short-term 
economic holding operation, which the colonizer tries to 'freeze' 
as long as possible. Yet such factors as the demographic explosion 
increasingly undermine this control. Kilson interestingly likens 
colonizers to the vanguards of industrial revolution in the inter-war 
Soviet Union, though lacking their popular legitimacy and their 
knowledge of the social environment. 
71 But, equally important, they 
lack long-term commitment to the task. When the revolution and its 
uncontrollable disruption begins to threaten their privileged position, 
they try to rein it in; failing this, they are forced to 'jump off'. 
They rarely stay to wrestle with the forces which they help to set 
in train. 
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b) Politico-Administrative Restraint. Though the colonizer's 
domination is based on force, he has no desire to maintain a 
permanent standing army; he looks for means of conquest consolidation. 
"As long as the consensual element does not come to corroborate the 
material element; ', wrote a prominent colonial settler, "there is war, 
irredentism, and weak and precarious domination; there is no 
sovereignty". 
72 Worsley goes further: "Mere negative resignation 
on the part of the ruled... (is not)... a solid enough foundation of 
rule. The optimum consolidation of power depends on its transformation 
into authority, the acceptance by the ruled of the legitimacy of the 
order under which they live". 
73 
The colonizer must devise a suitable politico-administrative 
structure to generate positive consensus. Yet he is determined to 
preserve his oligarchical status. Clearly, there is latent conflict 
between these two needs. Two broad strategies suggest themselves to 
cope with this conflict: political assimilation and political 
segregation. 
'Assimilation' can be understood in two diametrically opposed 
senses: assimilation of colonizer society within the politico- 
administrative norms and structures of colonized society, or, 
conversely, assimilation of indigenous society within those of 
the colonizer minority. The first of these two possibilities 
negates the central point of most colonial undertakings (their 
oligarchical base, their intervention, -f. ist ambition), and is a 
barely conceivable strategy. The second strategy can itself be 
interpreted in different senses. 
74 
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The ultimate logic of assimilation implies that no separate 
political institutions should govern the lives of the indigenous 
populations; they should participate in exactly the same institutional 
arrangements as the colonizer. The eventual destruction of pre-colonial 
structures is thus implicit. Similarly, the adoption of European 
political norms throughout this new framework - separation of powers, 
impartiality of justice and administration, freedoms of association 
and assembly, fair elections - is implied. The threat to indigenous 
norms is unmistakable. 
However, the logic of assimilation also promises ultimately to 
undermine the oligarchical privileges of the colonizer. Even if we 
confine our interest to electoral mechanisms, it is crystal clear to 
the colonizer - invariably outnumbered - that he cannot allow the 
colonized population equal access to shared institutions. As a 
result, the logic of assimilation is rapidly diverted. 'Temporary' 
provisions to keep the colonized at bay are a permanent feature of 
colonial situations. Recourse is constantly made to "emergency 
powers", for the situation is one of permanent suppressed emergency. 
The terminology of assimilation may still have to be employed for 
various reasons, but a gamut of constitutional devices defuse it; 
and prevent the indigenous population from obtaining political 
power within the colonizer's framework. These devices range from 
restricted franchise, 'gerrymandering', and intimidation, to two- 
college representation and confinement of elected bodies to a 
purely consultative role. These mechanisms of exclusion are an 
integral part of the colonial system. As Bernard suggests, "What 
one calls the 'abuses' of colonization are merely the by-products 
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of its normal functioning". 
75 'Mixed' participation is largely a 
facade; to give such institutions real life would ensure the 
liquidation of the colonial regime: "any partial reform of the 
abuses of an absolute regime threatens the whole of the system"076 
The sub-ideology of 'transition' is often used to reconcile 
this sylematic exclusion with the theory of assimilation. The 
native must first qualify for full political rights by giving proof 
of evolution towards European ideals. Voting rights, for example, 
are based on possession of individual property, literacy, army 
service, abandonment of 'personal status', urban residence, or even 
such vague criteria as 'acceptable attitudes'. A small and docile 
elite might gain admittance to 'mixed institutions' on this footing, 
and indeed a sizeable slice of the colonized population may eventually 
be involved, but there are informal upper limits beyond which this 
process threatens the colonial situation itself. Settlers spring 
up to barricade these points, even if the Metropolis shows itself 
willing to move beyond them. 
In the meantime, the ideology of assimilation serves as a smoke- 
screen behind which political domination is entrenched. To the 
colonizer, 'assimilation' often means no more than his own 
assimilation into Metropolitan political arrangements. Even 
this demand for 'full political rights' is largely instrumental; 
it gains specific advantage, at particular times. To obtain other 
privileges at other times, he demands 'exceptional arrangements', 
'special institutions', and 'local autonomy'. The ideology also 
conveniently appears to reconcile theories about the need for 
'modernization' and 'consensus' with the maintenance in practice 
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of political privilege; the argument that natives have the same 
potential rights as their 'fellow European citizens' is used as a 
lever to extract the same duties. The 'assimilated' native may thus 
be liable to taxation, military service, and European property laws, 
despite very real differences in social structure, political 
culture and constitutional power. 
77 In addition to imposing 
these liabilities, the colonizer tries to 'depoliticize' the administration 
of native affairs. In the words of Eisenstadt, the colonizer hopes 
"that the native population would accept certain broad, modern institutional 
settings organized according to universalism, specificity, and common 
secular solidarity, and would perform within them various roles - 
especially economic and administrative roles - while at the same time 
they were denied some of the basic rewards inherent in these settings. 
They were denied above all full participation in a common political 
system, and full integration in a common system of solidarity". 
78 
A policy of assimilation is often accompanied by, but is by no 
means the same thing as, 'direct rule'. Direct rule favours the 
implantation of a European-style centralized administrative hierarchy, 
extending in theory right down to the lowest level of indigenous social 
life. In its fully developed form, it entails ignoring and deliberately 
cutting across all pre-existing ethnic boundaries. It also implies the 
inculcation of European bureaucratic norms, and the stifling of 
indigenous norms. This is justified in terms of the need for 
'political development' and 'modern consensus' centred on new symbols 
of loyalty. Revolutionary socio-economic projects appear to require 
a revolutionary kind of politic-administrative superstructure for 
effective implementation. 
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Taken at face value, direct administration requires an intensive and 
widely-spread network of administrators. These need to be well-trained, 
well-paid, and well-equipped. Generous resources must be placed at 
their disposal. They should be efficiently supervised from central 
headquarters. Yet, as with socio-economic undertakings, such a 
thorough-going programme would both entail a committment of 
human 
and financial resources far beyond the colonizer's means, and challenge 
the oligarchical nature of the colonial enterprise. As a result, 
systematic restraints are imposed upon the real impact of colonial 
administration in the indigenous milieu. Direct administration 
is 
never taken to its logical extremes; the organizational network is 
more loosely flung and shallow rooted than the theory implies. 
The very novelty and foreign-ness of this administrative 
framework, which seems most to threaten existing indigenous values, 
assists their defence. Its deliberate impersonality cuts it off 
from effective contact with potential 'administrees' and makes a 
less efficient channel for socio-economic projects. To generate 
real involvement, the colonial administration has to understand and 
adapt itself to the norms of the communities with which it works. 
79 
Even so-called direct administration has to come to terms with 
local customs, local authority structures, and local expectations. 
Decisions thus made are not only more cheaply and speedily implemented, 
but perceived as more 'just' by the local community. 
8o 
However, it is 
not a simple matter for the machinery of colonial control to immerse 
itself in indigenous norms. The effort and expense of training a 
sufficient number of administrative "contact agents", and instilling 
a reasonable understanding of local custom, culture and language, is 
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considerable. It also presupposes an energy and belief in the value 
of their role which is difficult to legislate fore Unless organized 
on a lavish scale, a system which allows its local administrators 
sufficient time to develop an intimate knowledge of their administrees 
is unlikely to perform the other routine tasks expected of such 
institutions. Many conscientious district commissioners are caught 
between the urge to develop contacts with local communities, and the 
increasingly bureaucratic demands from above which cut them off. Direct 
European administration pan only be 'humanized' to a limited extent. 
In trying to reconcile these contradictions at the heart of 
'direct administration', many supposedly assimilative colonial regimes 
settle into a 'holding' position. They concentrate the major resources 
of direct administration into those zones most closely associated with 
the 'modern' sector; they allow the other, less 'valorizable' areas to 
hibernate under a loosely woven blanket of European control. This 
strategy shades imperceptibly into 'indirect administration', attempts 
to graft the machinery of colonial domination on to traditional 
authority structures, rather than to replace them. 
The origins of 'indirect rule' lie chiefly in the economy of 
effort which colonizers practise in the colonial situation. During 
the initial process of pacification, for example, rather than conduct 
total war, the colonizer seeks potential collaborators and offers 
them support in return for acknowledgement of his suzerainty. Such 
tactical considerations stretch into longer-term strategies after 
conquest, to save personnel resources and administrative expense, 
and to avoid unnecessary social upheaval and discontent in submitted 
zones. The policy of loose containment is pursued above all in 
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those areas outside the immediately 'valorizable' parts of the colony. 
It is designed to keep the former quiet, while the latter are 'developed'. 
causes 
This strategy is more complicated than might appear. It , conflicts 
with colonizer groups and enterprises which seek, under the banner of 
destroying 'backward feudalism', to open up such areas to exploitation. 
Taken to extremes a 'protectorate' policy calls into question the 
rationale of occupation: who is protecting whom from what? It also is 
difficult to reconcile with the intervention-ist strand of colonial 
ideology. The colonizer observes many native social arrangements not 
merely with incomprehension but with utter indignation. Mus cites 
colonial jurists who, despite injunctions to respect native moral 
codes, "could not accept the exorbitant powers given by local custom 
to the councils. of notables. They felt strongly that the right of 
arrest, detention in communal prisons, the right to impose fines and 
even corporal punishment, without proper enquiry or due process, by 
mere decision, violated the most elementary principles of our law and 
of any justice concerned with human dignity"81 In such circumstances, 
to renounce the drive to"modernization' and 'civilization' was to 
stand accused of depriving the native of political emancipation, of 
pursuing a policy of "conservative segregationism". 
82 
In any case, indirect rule provides little effective defence 
against endogenous social change. As Mair points out; "Behind the 
Native Authority system was a belief that.... nothing would change 
except under the direction'of the European rulers.... This vision 
did not take account of the dynamic nature of social relations". 
83 
Indeed, the strategy actually contributes to social upheaval. It 
is not easy, for example, for the colonizer to locate the appropriate 
106 
indigenous authority structure on to which to graft his administrative 
control. Colonial situations encourage schematic thinking about the 
indigenous reality, and overhasty judgement may result in serious 
miscalculation of the locus and nature of authority. Segmentary 
communities, for example the Maý, konde of Southern Tanganyika typically 
have no 'ruler' who can be abstracted from the kinship milieu: 
"Although there were senior men who played an arbitrativa and 
advisory role in group affairs, ". here were no specifically political 
authorities". 
84 
To 'recognise' a 'chief' in this context is to erect 
an anachronism, and distorts the sociil. process. 
85 
Even where 
communities have identifiable foci of authority, these may be 
seriously misunderstood. "Sacred" authority cannot be treated in 
the same way as "secular" authority, 
86 
though the colonizer often 
does so. 
$? 
Far from expressing a 'ruler-ruled', or 'administrator- 
administree' relationship, much of traditional government is "the 
result of a continuous interaction in which some sort of balance was 
struck between the claims of the ruler and the expectations of the 
ruled". 
88 
To superimpose a colonial regime is to destroy this 
equilibrium. 
The very fact of pacification - the disarming of indigenous 
groups - falsifies the balance. It artificially 'freezes' the 
particular state of forces existing at the time of conquest. Certain 
notables, certain communities, have achieved an ascendancy of power 
at that juncture. The counter-wailing pressures of other rivals, 
internal fission, and 'demands of reciprocity', would, under other 
circumstances, eventually reduce this ascendancy, but the colonial 
situation inhibits their operation. Indeed, the ascendant groups 
107 
often act as accomplices of pacification, and hoist themselves above 
their rivals on the colonizer's back. 
89 
The nature of traditional authority is distorted and transformed 
by the presence of overarching colonial control; relations between the 
two are marked by great problems and contradictions. 
go The colonizer's 
ultimate power to recognize or depose individual 'chiefs' eats away at 
the 'reciprocity' in customary bonds. 
91 
Dependence on external 
support short-circuits the traditional checks and balances. Thus, a 
traditional leader may acquire powers - to tax, for example, or to 
imprison - which he never had before colonization, and which have 
no legitimacy in the eyes of his fellow-kinsmen. 
92 
The result is 
either chaos, and the rapid collapse of attempts to assert authority, 
93 
or the development of an artifidal and exploitative social caste. 
94 
Conversely, some traditional leaders are stripped of former sources 
of power, sacrality and prestige, and thereby lose effective authority 
over their communities. 
95 
The result in either case, is that a chief 
can "enforce only that allegiance which Government, in its desire to 
rule through Chiefs, would make his people render". 
96 This thwarts 
a fundamental goal of indirect administration: mobilization of 
existing reserves of loyalty. 
The colonizer is like Midas: whatever he embraces changes and 
falls useless at his touch. Traditional authorities cannot be 
agents of the colonizer, enforcing rules which they do not accept, 
97 
and at the same time remain effective representatives of their 
communities. All bureaucracies bureaucratize those with whom they 
come into regular contact. The colonial administration heaps on 
traditional authorities such routine tasks as tax collection, local 
io8 
police, and the implementation of petty colonial regulations. Yet 
these eat away the roots of their real effectiveness. 
98 Lineage 
and bureaucracy, Fallers has demonstrated, are fundamentally 
incompatible. 
99 Either these authorities perform alien tasks 
according to alien norms, and lose legitimacy in the eyes of 
indigenous society, or they retain legitimacy and do not effectively 
fulfil the tasks. A French colonial administrator succinctly 
summarized the problem: "We are confronted with opposing and 
mutually contradictory necessities: on the one hand, we are 
well aware that it is essential to preserve the native character 
of the canton chief and make use of the traditional feudal spirit 
which still survives in him; on the other hand, the very fact of 
colonization forces us to shape him to our administrative outlook". 
100 
'The very fact of colonization? also generates social processes - 
some despite, others because of indirect rule - which call into 
question the status of traditional authorities. This confronts 
the colonizer with an insoluble dilemma: "how to rationalize local 
administration in the face of basic socio-economic change, while 
preserving the authority of the chiefs as the legitimizing force". 
101 
Massive administrative intervention is required to shore up indirect 
administration. Reliance on traditional authorities who have lost 
their traditional authority is "a makeshift arrangement, inherently 
contradictory"; 
102 but this is true of most of the colonizer's 
strategies in the colonial situation. 
c) Ideo-Cultural Restraint. Ambivalence and consequent restraint also 
characterize the colonizer's strategy in the ideo-cultural sphere. The 
threatened assault on the social values and self-hood of the colonized - 
log 
not just to satisfy the colonizer's sense of superiority, but also 
to lay foundations for socio-economic and political undertakings - 
never fully materializes. The assumption that the 'backward' 
native culture will ineluctably give way to the 'advanced' culture 
of the colonizer implies that the colonizer's role ("the white 
man's burden") is to accelerate the transition. The logical 
conclusion of this process is the assimilation of the native, one 
day, within the minority's culture. However, such assimilation, 
together with social, economic and political corollaries, clearly 
threatens the minority's distinctive status. Systematic restraints 
prevent this abstract danger from becoming real. 
The colonizer oligarchy throws itself into the 'mission 
civilisatrice' with an overwhelming lack of enthusiasm. The 
resources devoted to education(particularly language teaching), 
missionary work, development of mass media, and other cultural 
'assaults' on the colonized population, are very limited. This 
is partly a question of expense. A serious and thorough effort 
at cultural assimilation would require tremendous reserves of 
energy, finance, and manpower. The cultural advancement of the 
indigenous masses is not however, regarded as a major priority 
for expenditure, and is frowned upon as a drain on precious 
assets. At best the assimilative effort concentrates on a few 
small areas of native life. 
Restraint also stems from attitudes. Successful assimilation 
requires a broadmindedness and flexibility in the colonizer which 
is inconceivable; it would imply a sophisticated knowledge of, 
interest in, and respect for native culture. The few colonizers 
who develop such sensitivity at the same time lose that untroubled 
confidence in the superiority of their own culture which one-way 
assimilation requires. In any case their efforts - that of some 
missionaries for example - are regarded with suspicion by other 
members of the colonizer oligarchy. Because of their attitudes, 
the vast majority of colonizers, even those involved directly in 
education, are ineffective 'agents of acculturation': "this role 
is beyond the resources of those who take it upon themselves, when 
they are unable to see in front of them anything other than pupils, 
or beneficiaries, or, in short, imitators". 
103 
Serious attempts at assimilation are further inhibited by 
fears of disrupting traditional society. Religious proselytism, 
for example, often provokes serious, indeed violent resistance from 
established indigenous institutions and leads the colonizer rapidly 
to curtail such activity. Other facets of the cultural attack - 
attempts to stamp out, 'barbarous superstitions' for example - 
threaten to undermine the social cohesion of traditional communities, 
and for this reason are curtailed. A widespread effort at European 
education may also threaten to create new, unsatisfiable expectations, 
Rather less self-interestedly, many colonizers working among native 
groups value the strength and humanity of traditional morality, 
communal cooperation, and social control; they seek to defend these 
from the 'corruption' of European individualism. They try to shore 
up the former to ward off the latter. For all these reasons, there 
are strong impulses towards 'cultural segregation'; the 'dual economy' 
phenomenon is echoed. Though there are a few scattered initiatives 
in particular areas of native life, sometimes far reaching, the 





The colonizer minority typically moves beyond indifference, and 
erects cultural barriers to discourage acculturation. To emphasize 
his distinctiveness, the colonizer stands aloof. Social taboos 
restrain individual colonizers from mixing with natives more than 
is strictly unavoidable; other taboos deny real acceptance to 
Europeanized natives. 
105 
Reinforced by protective taboos erected 
by the indigenous community itself, these inhibitions result in 
stereotyped group images and behaviour. 
lo6 But this situation is 
dangerous for the colonizer. A colour-bar marks out a visible line 
of potential schism; cross-cutting relationships cannot divert the 
latent conflict. 
107 
By constantly reminding the native of his 
dominated status, segregation widens a gap which conquest consolidation 
must eliminate. Furthermore, since the colonizer and colonized speak 
different languages, (literally and metaphorically), mutual incomprehension 
is endemic. The colonizer cannot really find out what is happening 
within indigenous society. On the one hand, the colonizer wishes to 
explore every nook and cranny of native reality with his 'rational' 
intellect; ideological domination is at stake and "colonial society 
is constantly on guard for the appearance of any cultural innovation 
within the population it controls". 
108 On the other hand, opaque 
cultural barriers and aloof attitudes make it difficult for the 
colonizer to acquire more than a superficial grasp. 
-iii. The-Colonizer in the Colonial Situation. -------------------------------------- 
As these strategies suggest, the colonizer's world is riven by 
ambivalence; he faces several directions uneasily. 
log Though his 
aim is to 'normalize' (_ 'depoliticize') the colonial situation, he 
112 
actually politicizes it at each turn. 
110 Every sign of social 
survival, resistance, change or renewal within colonized communities 
appears to the colonizer to threaten his political domination. 
Social relations are a minefield; difficulties reveal built-in 
contradictions rather than 'temporary misunderstandings'. This 
world, as much as that of the colonized, is alienated. 
Though they occasionally burst into the open with misleading 
suddenness, the conflicts in the colonial situation, are often no 
more than latent. By various mechanismsa temporary equilibrium 
is established. 
ill The colonizer is often unaware of the contradic- 
tions in his position; his social isolation, and internal group 
solidarity, artificially save him from confronting them. What 
characterizes the colonial situation is frozen crisis, but though 
force prolongs this, it cannot do so indefinitely. The colonizer 
group itself is paralyzed by the latent crisis; it blocks the 
only possible solutions to its own contradietious. 
112 
Contradictions in the colonizer's position are spelled out 
in the differing conceptions, needs, and concerns of the different 
groups in his total society. Colon farmers, conscript and 
professional soldiers, missionaries, traders, metropolitan 
politicians, technicians, local administrators and teachers, all 
have different outlooks and press for different emphases in policy. 
Though the crisis of the colonial situation forces them to stand 
together, and adopt a common policy, this 'bloc' unfreezes during 
4 
the process of decolonization. The same section of the colonizer 
community, indeed the same individual, may be riven internally. 
113 
Local administrators particularly come to mind: "Contradictory aims 
could inspire different officials at the same time, and the same 
official at different times", 
113 
B. The Strategies of the Colonized Group 
The ambivalence of the colonizer's strategies greatly limits 
his impact on colonized society. But to understand the dynamics 
of the colonial situation, we must also examine the strategies of 
the colonized population. There is no single, unified, or 
consistent reaction to the colonial situation; different groups 
and levels of indigenous society, in different spheres of life, 
cope more successfully with it than others. Various strategems 
are adopted, often contradictory, at different times, according to 
local circumstances. Some of these reactions show conscious 
determination; others are unconscious and instinctive. They are 
difficult to classify 
114 
but a few strands can be picked out from 
the interconnected web. Violent opposition, physical retreat, 
institutional duplicity, sociological withdrawal and social 
persistence are examples. Each of these strategies illuminates 
the nature of the colonial situation and sheds light on the concept 
of 'nationalism'. 
n. -i. Vi2_222 
The physical resistance of indigenous society to the colonizer 
is frequently underestimated. Violence should be reinstated as a 
crucial and constructive feature of colonized society. 
115 It is a 
thread running through and connecting a number of social phenomena 
114 
which are often artificially separated by theorists, particularly 
primary resistance, post-pacification revolts, endemic tension, 
social banditry, and wars of decolonization. 
a) Primary Resistance. Colonial historiography often underestimates 
initial armed opposition to European implantation. 
116 Where violence 
is described, it is labelled 'xenophobic' and 'irrational'3117 iiith 
the implication that it does not authentically express colonial 
relationships. The latter, by this view, only develop once early 
expressions of blind hostility have been exhausted or suppressed. 
Yet resistance to conquest is often exceedingly violent. It 
inflicts considerable losses on the invader, but also on the resistants. 
Conquest often takes years or decades, and a large-scale military 
committment. In the long run the superior technology of the European 
usually beats down such resistance with greater or lesser expenditure 
of money, effort, and human life. But the very imbalance of weaponry 
obscures the violence of the native reactions. The resistance of the 
colonized populations should be measured in terms of their own 
resources and forms of social organization, rather than those of the 
colonizer. 
118 
A border skirmish in the eyes of the colonizer may be 
a total war from the viewpoint of the colonized population. Sometimes 
the violence of resistance in the face of superior armament verges on 
group suicide. 
119 Such "naked and disinterested refusal" involves 
"honour" as much as narrowly-calculated interests. 
120 
Armed opposition is shaped by the social structure from which 
it emanates, and varies in intensity accordingly. Where indigenous 
groups lack the apparatus of a centralized, mobilizing state, and 
115 
have little other than segmentary lineage structures, resistance 
though fierce generally lacks coordination over a large area. 
121 
The colonizer may manage to insert himself into the play of segmentary 
conflict by locating potential collaborator groups and attempting to 
divide and conquer. A common stand of total armed resistance - "the 
forcible, instinctual attempt of an unmodified traditional structure 
to extrude a foreign body"122 - is comparatively rare. Instead, 
segmentary forces resist in the manner of guerrilla warfare, with an 
alternation of violent attacks, small-scale clandestine sabotage, and 
disarmed evasiveness. In such circumstances, as Evans-Pritchard 
suggested of Cyrenaica, "there seemed to be no enemy forces to fight, 
yet attack was incessant. There were no fixed points of opposition. ' 
123 
The wholesale marshalling and expenditure of physical resources, 
and the failure of certain institutions to provide adequate defence, 
may result in major social upheavals within colonized groups. The 
collaboration of traditional leaders or their destruction by the 
colonizer may provoke internal social revolution; the mobilization 
of resistance by new leaders may also bring major structural changes 
in colonized society. 
12.4 
b) Post-Pacification Revolts. Once related to the native social 
context, submission seems tactical rather than fundamental. It 
postpones a damaging confrontation, rather than abandons it. The 
'submitted' population often gives secret material help to 
resistant groups which are still active; it never fully disarms. 
The looseness of the European military presence and administrative 
framework in such areas renders 'conquest' tentative; if the balance 
of force shifts in favour of the colonized - if the colonizer is 
116 
involved-in a European war, for example - the framework of control 
is liable to weaken. Revolts, insurrections, uprisings or mutinies 
may break out. If the power-situation seems ripe for an attempt to 
'extrude the foreign body',, 125 other indigenous groups are tempted 
to join the insurrection. The threat of violence does not lie far 
beneath the surface; it is simply buried until more favourable 
circumstances arise. As Mus suggests for colonial Vietnam: "There 
was no renunciation, only a truce. Insurrectional movements were a 
constant reminder of this. We should neither underestimate nor 
exaggerate their importance or their extent; popular aspirations 
were always liable to refer to them, even when their conduct met 
with disapproval". 
126 As with primary resistance, post-pacification 
revolts involve and are vectors of social change; 
127 they reveal 
the strongpoints and weakpoints of colonized societies. Though often 
compartmentalized, and of uneven depth, they provide sources of social 
fusion as well as fission. 
c) Endemic Tension. Violence smoulders near the surface of the 
colonial situation, or "just below the skin". 
128 It finds expression 
mainly in sullen and proud disdain, 
129 
or in dreams of the European's 
overthrow on a day of reckoning. 
130 Simmering violence ranges from 
imminent revolt - as with the often dormant Islamic pre-disposition 
(holy war) 
to 'jihad'&- to chiliastic despair of a quietistic nature. Consequently, 
the colonizer fluctuates between confidence that the spirit of revenge 
has been quenched, and hysterical 'frissons' about "those who lie in 
wait". 
131 
Sometimes, settlers cynically exploit endemic tension to 
justify the maintenance of special repressive powers; at other times, 
117 
theirs seems a realistic assessment of the impending threat. The 
dividing line between their own fantasies and the native reality 
is blurred, a characteristic feature of colonial situations, 
exacerbated by the colonizer's use of force to 'freeze' tension. 
132 
"His preoccupation with security", says Fanon of the colonizer 
"makes him remind the native out loud that he alone is master. 
The settler keeps alive in the native an anger which he deprives 
of outlet... But... inwardly the settler can only achieve a pseudo- 
petrification". 
133 
As a result, the native "is overpowered, but 
not tamed; he is treated as an inferior but he is not convinced of 
his inferiority. He patiently waits until the settler is off his 
guard to fly at him. The native's muscles are always tensed". 
134 
This tension marks even those cultures with a reputation among 
Europeans for 'gentleness' and 'fatalism'. In Vietnam, for example, 
according to Mus; "The violence of primitive reactions still simmers 
in the villages.... Mystical violence.... underlies everything.... What 
spirit of war and guerilla shelters behind this chiaroscuro of 
beliefs, this Confucian glaze! ". He warned of "the hidden tension 
of a peasant society full of violent feelings". 
135 These feelings 
underlie sporadic and (to the colonizer) inexplicable outbursts of 
destruction and outrage which punctuate colonial situations; they 
tap a level of frustration which subsequent colonial 'Commissions 
of Enquiry' cannot reach. 
The atmosphere of suppressed violence signals the colonized 
population's total rejection and incomprehension of the colonizer's 
political culture. The indigenous community remains "untutored in 
118 
the rational norms and procedures of central colonial government 
and pditics". 
136 Such recalcitrance threatens the colonial order 
for, as Kilson suggests, "this pattern of political expression... 
can hardly be tolerated in a modernizing colonial system. It must 
be transmuted into a more predictable factor in political change". 
137 
Yet there is a paradox, for the colonizer's oligarchical position, 
sustained by threat of force, sharpens the atmosphere of violence. 
The colonizers, Fanon points out, "have never stopped saying that 
the only language he (the native) understands is that of force... "; 
during the process of decolonization, therefore, "by an ironic 
turning of the tables, it is the native who now affirms that the 
colonialist understands nothing but force". 
138 The colonizer 
argues that native political culture is inherently violent, yet 
simultaneously and anxiously listens for language which is more 
'predictable' in terms of his own political culture. However, as 
Fanon explains, "the native's challenge to the colonial world is 
not a rational confrontation of points of view. It is not a 
treatise on the universal, but the untidy affirmation of an 
original idea propounded as an absolute". 
139 
d) Feud and Social Banditry. Many manifestly violent reactions 
to the colonial situation take place within indigenous society 
rather than between indigenous society and the colonizer. 
Raids, blood-feuds and vendettas, for example, are important 
mechanisms for maintaining stability in many segmentary societies. 
140 
Conflict of this kind, paradoxically, maintains communal peace; it 
is a "form of self-help" and a "recognized means of maintaining 
law in default of superior judicial authority'ý. 
141 "What is sought", 
119 
as Beattie suggests of the blood feud, ".... is not to punish a 
guilty individual, but rather to restore a disrupted balance". 
142 
The bloodshed involved is regulated by intricate rules of honour; 
indeed it is often ritualized. 
The colonizer, anxious for security, is apt to treat such 
manifestations as breaches of his 'peace' or attacks on his 
'system'. This misrepresents their significance, which is 
frequently limited to the indigenous context, providing an 
outlet for intestine disputes, rivalries and solidarities which 
are 'outside', and unaffected by, relations with the colonizer. 
One colonial law court, for example, treated the refusal of a 
tribal 'fraction' to pay taxes to a European-appointed official 
as "rebellion"; the murder of this official during a brawl 
appeared to justify this interpretation. In fact the tax- 
gatherer was killed not qua collaborator, but as a member of 
a rival 'fraction'; the 'rebellious' fraction demanded to pay 
its taxes direct to the French. 143 
The colonizer's campaign to stamp out or disarm such mani- 
festations may provoke serious social disturbance. Frequently 
it simply drives them underground, where they continue to 
regulate social life. This. violent behaviour threatens the 
colonizer not because it is aimed directly at him, but precisely 
because it ignores him. It indicates his lack of impact on a 
world he seeks to dominate. 
"IDacoiety", or what Hobsbawm calls "social banditry't, 
144 
has similar implications. It is difficult, indeed, to differentiate 
the robbery, kidnapping, ransom, and revenge-assassination activities 
120 
of social bandits - "peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regard 
as criminals, but who remain within peasant society, and are 
considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, 
fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and 
in any case as men to be admired, helped, and supported" 
145 
from the razzias and blood-feuds endemic in all segmentary 
societies. They appear to be symptoms of crisis, social distortion, 
and tension in traditional relationships, but these extend beyond 
the colonial situation and to this extent represent the continuity 
of traditional dynamics. They are a closely entwined part of the 
economic and political structure of certain regions, 
146 
and 
operate according to a fairly strict code of honour. 
147 
It is possible, however, to relate social banditry more 
directly to the colonizer's presence. According to Fanon, for 
example, the 'pseudo-petrification' of interaction between the 
European and the colonized community forces the latter to direct 
hostile feelings into self-destructive channels. Social banditry 
is thus a therapeutic outlet, at communal level, analogous to 
"behaviour patterns of avoidance" in individual psychology: 
"It is as if plunging into a fraternal blood-bath allowed them 
to ignore the'obstacle, and to put off till later the choice 
nevertheless inevitable, which opens up the question of resistance 
to colonialism". 
148 By this interpretation, developed in relation 
to the later phases of decolonization, indigenous 'banditry' is a 
social distortion provoked by the particular crisis of the 
colonial situation. 
121 
e) Decolonization. The importance of violence in decolonization 
struggles is generally acknowledged, and frequently analyzed, in 
Third World literature. "National liberation, national renaissance, 
the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever 
may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonization 
is always a violent phenomenon", proclaims Fanon at the outset of his 
major work. 
149 
The intensity of that violence, the forms it takes, 
and the levels at which it penetrates indigenous social life, vary 
from one colonial situation to another. Full-scale wars of independence, 
nascent guerilla movements, and sporadic campaigns of disorder, are 
unmistakably violent strategies of colonized peoples. But the violence 
implicit even in apparently 'freely negotiated independence' is often 
underestimated; the threat of violence leads the colonizer to seek an 
immediate, accord with 'predictable' collaborators who are more likely 
to safeguard his remaining post-independence interests. 
150 
Where violence is analyzed this tends to be within a narrow 
temporal and sociological context, as if it were a sudden and unique 
development of the years before independence. The particular 
circumstances of the immediately preceding years, especially the 
obstinacy of the colonizer's tactics, are frequently adduced to 
explain political disorder. The orthodox interpretation of nationalism 
links this with the concept of 'mobilization of the masses': swallowing 
a few scruples the modernizing elite encourages 'mass action' in order 
to pressurize the colonial regime. Repression by the colonizer 
simply deepens and widens the violence. A threat of mobilized 
violence thus provides a lever to obtain political concessions and 
to ease out the colonizer. 
122 
More extensive conflicts are also often interpreted within a 
restricted theoretical framework. Recent years have seen a vogue 
for theoretical accounts of guerilla strategy. A great deal of 
such literature has come on to the academic and popular market; 
Mao Tse Tung, Giap, Guevara, Castro, Mondlane-are some of the more 
prominent names. 
151 
These have been accompanied, particularly in 
Western military circles, by a flood of writings on counter-insurgency. 
152 
Most imply that guerrilla warfare is rather a novel form of activity, a 
violent response to colonialism developed since the Second World War. 
It has been regarded as a form of higher politics, a strategic 
innovation requiring great theoretical refinement. This is particularly 
true of Debray's "REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION" as its very title 
implies. Such books treat guerilla warfare as an advanced stage on to 
which revolutionary politicians move after rejecting the compromises, 
betrayals, dead-ends, and hopelessly abortive tactics of conventional 
urban political pressure. The disabused radical moves out to the 
countryside from the town as his thinking becomes more sophisticated. 
He decides to act; he reconciles himself to physical violence; he 
resolves to stimulate violent resistance among the peasantry. As he 
moves out, he has engraved in his mind, or tucked in his pocket, the 
writings of the great postwar gue lleros. These manuals are loaded 
with organigrammes, and analysis of when ýo establish 'focos', and 
when not to risk battalion-sized confrontations. They discuss 
weaponry, and sensitive targets. They stress the need for total 
clandestinity in formative stages, the necessity for watertight, 
vertically-integrated command units, and the dangers of horizontal 
contacts. They suggest how to involve the whole community in 
123 
guerrilla effort, and how to insert the first elements of that 
'parallel administration' which will eventually undermine the 
authority of the occupying power. As with 'elite mobilization 
of the masses', something very new seems to be proposed. 
But violent aspects of decolonization should be placed in 
the perspective of the colonial situation as a whole. They are 
inseparable from that situation from the outset; they do not 
suddenly spring full-bodied from the fertile brains of small 
groups of 'nationalists'. Fanon's comparison of decolonization 
to the 'unlocking' of tension suggests that pent-up violence 
has long characterized the world of the colonized. Decolonization 
cannot properly be understood apart from this. Primary resistance 
and post-pacification revolt, for example, - commonly relegated to 
the pre-history of colonial relationships proper, and regarded as 
last convulsions of the old order - share several of the features 
153 154 
of decolonization strugglesi especially guerrilla characteristics. 
Both partake of and contribute to a common stock of social myths. Not 
infrequently, the same areas which offered the greatest 'primary 
resistance' contribute most to the decolonization struggle; colonial 
relationships then move full circle, casting doubt on the sense in 
which certain groups ever'disarmed'. 
Similarly, endemic tension and social banditry is frequently 
underestimated, and links with decolonization obscured. The 
violence unleashed by colonized society during the decolonization 
phase is often 'self-destructive', involving the settling of 
intestine scores. More targets are attacked within indigenous 
society than among the colonizers. These manifestations constitute 
124 
a debate as much within colonized society as with the colonizer. 
Areas most marked by social banditry and tension often coincide 
with those areas prominent in the decolonization struggle. 
155 
All these manifestations of violence are alternative reactions 
to a common situation. They reveal a consistent set of strategies 
on the part of colonized society. Although they have important 
differencesl56 these phenomena draw on age-old forms of indigenous 
political life, which extend far back beyond the colonial situation 
itself. 
f) Violence and Social Change. Violent reactions to the colonial 
setting are rarely regarded as other than negative or destructive. 
In the colonizer's eyes they are evidence of the 'irrationality' 
and 'primitivism' of indigenous norms. Even more liberal observers 
doubt their positive contribution to long-term social construction. 
When, in a famous passage, Fanon praises the 'liberating' and 
'cleansing' potential of violence, 
157 this is generally regarded 
in the West, as, at worst, a proto-fascist incitement to bloodthirsty 
revenge, and, at best, a disturbed metaphor thrown up by the aliena- 
tion of the colonial nightmare. 
Many social anthropologists, however, have come to view violence 
as an integrative and regenerative force in communal relationships. 
Violence in the colonial setting needs similar treatment. It does 
not simply express static norms and structures, as such epithets as 
'xenophobic' and 'primitive' imply. It. may give outlets to dynamic 
pressures within colonized society, and reveal potentialities for 
change. 'Primary resistance' often results from and gives rise to 
new elements of cohesion and unity; armed opposition to Italian 
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implantation in Cyrenaica led by the Sanusiyal58 and to Italian 
implantation in Ethopia led by Menelik 11,159 are illustrations 
of how violence furthers social adaptation. Similarly, 'post- 
pacification revolts', such as the Maji-Maji uprising in East 
Africa, may be vectors of social crisis and reconstruction. 
Violence brings into the open alternative possibilities of 
development within traditional structures - both regenerative 
and degenerative - and aids their resolution. The process of 
decolonization continues this active debate of society within 
itself, often in an acute form such as that described during the 
Algerian war of liberation by Fanon. 
160 This is not a uniquely 
revolutionary phase; it reveals social processes and conflicts 
which have long been embedded in the colonial situation. 
-ii. Physical Retreat. 
---------------- 
The guea+illa tactic of violent resistance involving whole 
communities is an instinctive reaction to the colonial situation. 
So, too, is the guerilla tactic of elusiveness, melting away, or 
physical withdrawal. Often this is merely a short-term reaction 
to physical invasion, but it also reveals a longer-term strategy 
in the colonial situation: a visceral determination not to be 
surrounded, or forced into full-scale confrontation. 
161 There 
are several aspects of this strategy, including retreat of indigenous 
groups before the invading army, 'submission', withdrawal in the face 
of administrative controls, and persistence of migration and nomadism. 
Each will be examined separately. 
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a) Retreat before Military Force. In the face of the superior 
resources of the colonizer, full-scale entrenched military resistance 
is a hopeless tactic. It renders eventual subjugation more thorough- 
going. A more effective reaction is to give way, to eschew full-scale 
resistance, to retreat, and thus offer little foothold for immediate 
and effective physical control. This is the instinctive reaction of 
many segmentary pastoral and semi-nomadic communities. The Bedouin 
of Cyrenaica, for example, pursued this strategy when threatened by 
the Italian army in the 1920's: "it was of little profit to occupy 
towns and villages, for they retired to less accessible regions, or 
circulated gaily between Italian garrisons". 
162 Similarly, the 
Berbers of the Moroccan Central High Atlas reacted to the arrival 
of French troops in the 1920's by "abandoning 'ksours' (hamlets) 
and farms at our approach, and plunging into the most inaccessible 
mountainous regions, taking with them their livestock, which was 
generally their main source of wealth". 
163 Again, as French 
military columns invaded the Saharan fringe of Tunisia in 1882, 
they marched through 'ghost hamlets' deserted by the retreating 
inhabitants. 164 
Retreat takes place from areas of relatively easy access to 
remoter areas which the colonizer finds difficult to penetrate; 
deserts, forests, mountains, and even caves provide shelter, at 
least temporarily. Where the natural landscape offers little 
protection, small groups can melt into the 'human landscape'. 
165 
The success of this strategy largely depends on the' persistence 
and penetrative resources of the colonizer. Some indigenous groups 
are chased from retreat to retreat, finally to be tracked down and 
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encircled. 
166 In other circumstances, where there are limited 
military resources, poor communications, and no immediate economic 
incentive, the colonizer is content with pushing back populations 
from 'useful' coastal lowlancs. He does not attempt thoroughly to 
subjugate withdrawn groups unless they actively threaten the security 
of the 'useful' zone, This tactic may prove viable for a considerable 
time. 
Physical withdrawal is a defensive rather than a defeatist 
tactic; its rationale is "reculer pour mieux sauter", to await 
favourable conditions which make it practical to return and eject 
the intruder. 167 Yet communal retreat is frequently short-lived; 
once the colonizer is clearly implanted, many groups filter back 
from their hiding-places through economic necessity to reoccupy 
their lands. In many instances, this return is too late, for the 
lands may have been appropriated by the colonizer, or by groups of 
collaborators. Other forms of physical withdrawal are permament, 
and create a 'refugee' problem in neighbouring territories. 
b) Submission. At some point during the process of being threatened, 
pursued, cornered and finally overpowered by superior force, most 
indigenous groups proffer their 'submission', often ceremonially. 
Yet 'submission' to the colonizer should be regarded merely as a 
tactic within an overall strategy of passive resistance, rather 
than a seal of permanent acceptance. When the colonizer's troops 
are active in a particular territory, it is a wise tactic to issue 
assurances of loyalty. This is token acquiescence in what is 
temporarily inevitable, a ploy which buys time to 'wait and see'. 
During Italian attempts to conquer Cyrenaica nomadssfor example, 
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"When they claimed to have pacified a district, and to have received 
the submission of its tribal Shaikhs, it often meant no more than 
that the Bedouin of the district had made formal submission while 
their sons and food continued to go to the support of the guer±llas". 
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Once the immediate danger has passed, 'submitted' populations are 
liable to turn again to dissidence. 
It is not necessary to beat every indigenous group into 
submission. Many sections of the population, or their leader 
hip, 
having assessed the overall balance of power, and their own immediate 
tactical advantage, actually seek out the opportunity to submit. 
Just as the colonizer may "show force in order to avoid using it", 
169 
many colonized communities adopt a complementary tactic: "submit in 
advance to greater force in order to ward off its impact". Some 
sections of the colonized population actively collaborate with the 
colonizer, and aid his conquest of recalcitrant groups, in an attempt 
to safeguard traditional privileges, or establish new ones at the 
expense of neighbours. They exploit the colonizer's presence and 
draw him into the play of traditional segmentary rivalries. 
170 
Though some colonized groups and individuals invest their future 
heavily in such collaborationist undertakings, 'submission' of 
this kind is essentially instrumental; it rarely provides a 
dependably permanent power base for the colonizer. 
171 It still 
represents a kind of 'withdrawal'. If the colonizer himself 
retreats, or weakens, 'submitted' groups are ready to come out of 
hiding and attack. The shift from withdrawal, to violent resistance, 
and back to withdrawal, involves only a change of emphasis. A policy 
of "wait and see", as Mus argues for Vietnam, is a form of "larval 
dissidence". 172 
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c) Retreat before Administrative Implantation. As a result, the 
------------------------------------------ 
colonizer has to transform token 'submission', brought about by 
ephemeral shows of force, into effective control. The colonizer's 
strategy is usually to encircle rather than 'roll back' the 
population, 
173 for, as Guillaume suggests for Morocco, "Experience 
was to prove that only a complete and effective occupation of the 
territory of a tribe can force it eventually to submit". 
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Military columns try to establish "organisation en marche", with 
permanent posts, and ancillary administrative networks, to prevent 
dissidence reviving once troops have returned to base. However, 
indigenous groups have further strategies to frustrate this aim. 
Administrative controls often meet with physical retreat. 
"As soon as a post is set up in a populated region", reported an 
administrator in Gabon in 1911, "a void is immediately created 
around it". 
175 'Hidden villages', marked on maps, often vanish 
from the ground; or existing on the ground, are never registered 
on administrative maps. Whole groups in various ways thus take 
refuge from administrative control. When agents periodically 
appear, seeking the payment of taxation, the mobilization of 
compulsory labour, the registration of property, or the conscription 
of soldiers these groups take temporary retreat in less accessible 
zones, and perhaps cross colonial boundaries. Such reactions of 
evasiveness, elusiveness, disengagement, avoidance, or escape 
(Balandier calls them 'derobades'), represent "the most elementary 
form of flight in the face of economic and administrative demands, 
which were sometimes very heavy". 
176 Occasionally, particularly 
in the Middle Bast, 177 these demands provoke the wholesale and 
permanent emigration of large communities. 
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d) Nomadismand migration. Physical elusiveness in the face of the 
colonial administration is not necessarily a novel or deliberately- 
conceived strategy on the part of the colonized. Often it simply 
reflects traditional patterns of social life. Certain characteristics 
of indigenous society are ill-fitted for colonial control, and their 
persistence frustrates the colonizer. For example, it is an 
inescapable feature of the 'game' of segmentary communities, in 
be 
the face of superior force, to "divide that yerieed not ruled", 
178 
or "divide in order not to break". 
179 Faced with the invasion of 
the colonizer and his administration, such groups tend to fragment 
into their smallest units of organization. Although this hampers 
coordinated resistance, it also hinders firm implantation by the 
colonizer. A population which lacks aggregation, and which is 
extremely mobile, makes permanent control difficult. The impact 
of the colonial situation on such communities is reduced by their 
lack of institutional levers of control. Thus, for village India 
under the British Raj according to Karve, 'survival became possible 
through its very structural looseness". 
180 Mus advances a similar 
proposition: "the very rusticity of the Vietnamese village seems 
to have made it an inviolable sanctuary for the nation. Not that 
it had the strength to resist in isolation; but this national 
pattern was found everywhere. It was not concentrated at any 
one point where an enemy could lay a hold on it, as it might seize 
a town, depose a dynasty, or subject a court't. 
181 
Transhumance and nomadism, too, are inherent characteristics 
of many Third World communities. 
182 Larger-scale migrations of 
population are endemic in other areas: Apter argues that "as a whole, 
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the history of the Gold Coast peoples is a mosaic of recent migration, 
strife and settlements. Most of the present occupants have not been 
there much longer than the first white man". 
183 Colson extends this 
more widely: 'Large-scale migrations have been a feature of African 
life for many centuries, both in the form of conquering hordes 
acquiring new territories, and in the more peaceful form of a slow 
infiltration of small groups seeking new land as old land became 
exhausted". 
184 This mobility, so alien to the colonizer's social 
norms, frustrates his attempts to cordon off, supervise, and control 
crucial sectors of indigenous life. Balandier notes that Belgian 
administrators in the Congo constantly complain how difficult it is 
to get "a real and complete grip on a society which slips away, and 
is not organized in such a way as to permit even indirect control"* 
185 
"Recriminations against the mobility of lineages, 'migratory mania', 
evasions, vagabondage, and the 'floating population', together with 
attempts to locate 'hidden villages' in inaccessible regions"she 
explains, "illustrate the colonizer's desire to establish a physical 
basis for political domination, and, in their words, to keep all 
social groupings 'well in hand"'. 
186 
Thus the colonizer places great stress on the sedentarization 
of native populations, as a means of fixing them in situ and 
rendering them 'predictable'. As well as aiding economic valorization, 
social revolution is sought to establish military security, The 
villagization programme of the early 1950's in the Kikuyu areas of 
Kenya is typical of these projects; it combined concentration of 
population to combat Mau Mau infiltration, with a land consolidation 
scheme designed to inject 'ownership' of compact landholdings into 
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the widely-scattered traditional pattern of usufruct. Overall it was 
an attempt to "replace dispersed settlement by nucleated settlement". 
187 
Throughout Africa, indeed, as Colson suggests, "the colonial era was 
marked by an attempt to tie people to given areas of land as their 
permanent hömes, and thus to perpetuate the population distribution 
that existed when the European powers took over. Permanent migration 
was discouraged by administrative regulations, and by a freezing of 
the rules under which land was held". 
188 
These constants of the colonizer's policy, which culminate in 
electrified borders, booby-trapped demilitarized zones, and strategic 
hamlets, are simply corollaries of the constant strategy of the 
colonized population. 
189 Their determined physical elusiveness, their 
'larval dissidence', and their persistent mobility challenge the 
colonizer's ability to dominate the world he has invaded. 
-iii. Institutional Duplication. 
Unable fully to ward off the physical presence of the invader, 
the colonized population has several methods of warding off the full 
impact of his politico-administrative institutions. Formal respect 
for the governmental apparatus of the colonial power is difficult to 
avoid, as it usually has sufficient power to enforce its writ. Taxes 
are gathered and public order maintained. But other evasions are 
possible. These are facilitated by the phenomenon of 'under-administra- 
tion' - the colonizer's failure to devote sufficient or relevant 
resources to the integration of indigenous society within his 
organizational framework. But whatever effort the colonizer does make 
meets with reactions of institutional 'withdrawal' or 'duplication'. 
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a) Boycott of colonial institutions. The indigenous population reacts 
-------------------------------- 
to the local governmental apparatus of the colonial power - administrators, 
law courts, police, social services, and 'representative bodies' - in 
various ways, ranging from passive acceptance and indifference to passive 
resistance. One theme emerging from reports of colonial administrators 
is their sense of 'only skimming the surface', of working in a vacuum, 
of not 'biting deeply into the everyday life' of their communities. 
Even those who conscientiously ensure that 'the door to the office is 
always open' tend to find their administrees reluctant to walk through 
it. In the administrator's eyes, this informal boycott is inexplicable; 
it deprives the native of specific benefits available under the colonial 
regime. Civil courts are less frequently used as a channel for native 
litigation over land, personal status, and inheritance than the best 
interests of the population seem to warrant. Non-registration of births, 
marriages, and deaths also puzzlesand exasperates conscientious officials. 
The colonial police are denied information, often on the pretence that 
the native 'does not understand'. This can amount to passive sabotage; 
crimes are not reported; 
i90 incidents in broad daylight are not seen; 
'bandits' are not betrayed and indeed are actively sheltered. Elections, 
ostensibly organized for the benefit of the indigenous community, 
attract a derisorily low turn-out. 
There are several reasons for this 'refusal to engage' with the 
colonial administrative apparatus. One is a shrewd sense of self- 
protection; a community which learns in practice the meaning of land 
and pasturage laws, labour controls, disciplinary codes, and taxation 
regulations, develops a healthy distrust for the organs and agents 
which patrol them. Such suspicion often appears blind and instinctive; 
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the Zulus of South Africa, for example, "regarded even measures which 
the Government appeared to intend in their interests as being designed 
to take from them their land and their cattle". 
191 
It is usually 
based, however, on a canny understanding of the short- and long-term 
implications of administrative measures, despite the ideological 
smokescreens of the colonizer. Even peoples who appear to profit 
by the colonizer's presence, the Baganda of Uganda for example, 
retain a fundamental scepticism towards colonial institutions and 
policy. 
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Where colonial institutions would clearly benefit the native, 
other considerations make him reluctant to have dealings with them. 
Though individual administrators may prove honest, disinterested and 
sympatheticythey are alien. To deal with the European administration 
is to enter another world, where the native is handicapped and 
intinkäted by ignorance of rituals and norms; often he is literally 
tongue-tied by the alien language. The very emphasis on impersonal 
bureaucratic rationality, independent from kinship or sacral 
considerations - the supposed guarantee of unbiased colonial 
administration - deters rather than encourages native participation. 
Social status, family ties, face-to-face contact and religious 
obligations - all of which are "irrational" to the European administration - 
are precisely the major elements of 'rationality' in the indigenous 
context. Without them, colonial institutions lack legitimation. 
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The decisions and practices which these institutions generate are 
unjust, and often, literally, 'incomprehensible' to the native. 
Expense also deters participation, for colonial administration 
often involves costs and delays which the informal mechanisms of the 
colonized community do not impose. 
194 
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Passive boycott of the colonial administrative framework is often 
reinforced by social ostracism of those who do turn to it. Individuals 
who seek for example, to establish land ownership through colonial 
courts threaten communal solidarity -a solidarity with which native 
society cements its walls against colonial attack. They are therefore 
shunned socially, or even physically intimidated. 
195 While the colonial 
regime monopolizes physical power, active collaborators - those who man 
the European institutions at the local level - usually have to be 
tolerated. The danger for them, however, isAwhen the balance of power 
shifts, particularly during decolonization; colonized society will 
'settle its accounts'. But even when the protection of the colonial 
regime is effective, open collaborators forfeit the respect of the 
native community, thus reducing their effectiveness as 'contact agents'. 
Thus, despite the energy of conscientious administrators, true 
communal sap rarely flows through imposed colonial structures. Attempts 
to supplement local administration with elective councils have little 
success in mobilizing active support and involvement, either. Those 
not already disqualified from participation by the colonizer's 
restrictive regulations often disqualify themselves by refusing to 
stand for office. Apathy and active boycotts of the polling booth 
render those who do stand extremely unrepresentative. 
The colonial administration is imposed from above; it does not 
grow naturally from below. Mus's observation on the administration 
of colonial Vietnam can be widened to include most colonial 
situations: "Local society, as a whole, was not fundamentally 
disturbed by this superimposed and fragmentary organization". 
196 
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b) Self-Administration. The legitimation withheld from colonial 
institutions continues to flow through traditional political and 
judicial channels. Authentic native social institutions - chiefs, 
elders, holy men, assemblies, aid judges, for example - retain much 
of their control over the everyday life of the population. "The 
political life of such areas during the colonial period", Fallers 
suggests, "tended to combine acquiescence in the superior power of 
the colonial government when this was unavoidable, with a continued 
de facto settlement of local disputes through the traditional 
contingent political systems". 
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Beneath or alongside the colonizer's 
administrative hierarchy, imposed from above and outside, a 'shadow 
sector' thrives, 
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which has roots in and gives outlet to indigenous 
political realities. 
Content with the operation of his own administrative facade, the 
colonizer often remains unaware of the true importance of this1shadow 
sector'. To an extent he accepts such 'survivals' as inevitable given 
his limited physical resources, though their eventual demise is expected. 
In other respects, duality is actively welcomed; it saves expense, and 
regulates affairs which the colonizer neither wishes nor is qualified 
to control; the colonial administration and surviving indigenous 
institutions appear to perform complementary functions.. Yet, at 
other times, this 'dualism' is viewed with great concern. "Enlightened" 
administrators regard it as an obstacle to 'modernization' and 
'civilization'1199 and security-minded colonizers see it as a threat 
to European implantation. 200 A latent desire to smother the shadow 
sector with the colonial framework occasionally breaks to the surface, 
and stimulates bursts of administrative energy. 
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When assimilative pressure poses a serious threat, indigenous - 
communities take deliberate action to retain mastery of their own 
affairs; "real power strives to escape administrative control". 
201 
The colonized society sets up, or disguises the survival of, 
"duplicate" or "parallel" institutions. "Effective though unseen", 
these are the real regulators of social life, despite the presence 
of various "administratively-recognized authorities". 
202 The 
operation of the latter gives the colonizer "a purely illusory 
satisfaction". 
203 Delavignette describes this widespread process 
in French West Africa, where villages appointed 'straw chiefs' as 
decoys, to fulfil the formal requirements of the European administration, 
while quite different leaders - real chiefs - continued to perform the 
genuine political functions. 
2o4 Similarly, in Vietnam, Mus relates 
how, when the colonizer required village councils of notables to be 
elected in the European manner, "the customary chiefs.... allowed 
unrepresentative men to be elected, controlled by them, so that 
without themselves coming into the open they could conduct an 
undercover opposition to all the measures put forward by the central 
admkiistration". 
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c) Bifurcation. The institutional structure of the colonial 
situation is thus riven by fundamental 'dualism'o 
206 by 'split 
authority'. 
207 "The coexistence of an official power and a real 
power12o8 - of two parallel hierarchies - results in situations 
where "the lowest village-level government official and the man 
whose word carries the most weight in the village are rarely one 
and the same person". 
209 Local communal institutions do not in 
any meaningful sense constitute 'sub-units' of a centralized colonial 
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administration. No single, integrated political system exists; it 
is truer to talk of the "coexistence of two systems". 
210 The 
colonial poliky is fundamentally "bifurcated"; its congenital 
feature is the "rude dissociation" between "the symbols of legitimacy, 
the loci of power, and the instruments of authority". 
211 
The colonial situation is a situation. It is a field of 
relations, or a context within which a social dialectic unfolds. 
It cannot usefully be regarded as a political system.: According 
to Easton and to Nettl, 
212 
a political system forms a whole rather 
than a mere aggregate, consists of interactions rather than random 
contact, and has internal as well as external factors of cohesion. 
The chronic inability of colonial regimes to develop such character- 
istics without calling themselves into question, is their chief 
hallmark. Wallerstein strains terminology in calling the colonial 
situation "a political unit under the sovereignty of a European 
power which assured order within its bounds 11,213 To go further, 
and treat it as just one particular form of 'homogeneous equilibrium 
system', 
214 is extremely misleading. 
The work of Bernard on North African decolonization provides an 
interesting illustration of such an approach. 
215 He argues that all 
political systems, in differing proportions, involve a network of 
consensus and force. A colonial regime is not a unique, unclassifiable 
type of political organization - it is not "structurally peculiar" - 
but merely combines consensus and force in a special way. It is 
"a regime of occupation tempered by the always revocable consent of 
the colonized, and by the limitations which, in its own interests, it 
216 imposed on its inherent arbitrariness and force". Although this 
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regime "is designed.... to resist massive losses of consensus, it 
does not presuppose them". 
217 Thus, in Bernard's view, there is 
one political system, within which two rival forces - colonizers 
and colonized - compete and bargain for power and authority. 
The 
development of 'nationalism' among the colonized is treated in 
terms of 'loss of consensus'. "Decolonization, " he argues, "brings 
the passing of the colonial system from an initial state characterized 
by the unchallenged authority of a regime solidly based on the consent 
of the whole body of the governed, to a final state characterized by 
the victory of the indigenous population gathered under the banner of 
local nationalism - this change of regime coming about by means of 
a continual growth in the authority of the nationalist leaders, and 
of a parallel. decline in the authority of the colonial leaders . 
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But in the colonial situation, an 'initial state' characterized 
by 'consensus' never exists empirically. Passive acquiescence is 
not equivalent to consensus. Indigenous authority structures are 
not effectively integrated into an 'unchallenged' politico-administrat- 
ive colonial framework. Though Bernard identifies important 
contradictions within the 'system', - for example, the regime's 
inability to broaden its consensual base without undermining its 
effective force - he does not regard them as structurally significant. 
Without grasping the duality at the heart of the colonial situation, 
however, it is impossible to understand the political reaction of 
the colonized. 
Bifurcation, resulting from both the colonizer's restraint and 
the native's strategy of withdrawal, is built in to the colonial 
situation from its outset. Some apparently 'novel' forms of counter- 
I 
colonial political action, particularly guerrilla warfare, need to 
be set in this wider context. Classic guerrilla theory, for 
example, enjoins resistants, as an initial goal, to undermine the 
authority of the colonial administration, and sap its self-confidence. 
The creation of chaos with impunity, and the generation of an 
atmosphere of insecurity by assassination of collaborators, are 
means to this end. Boycotts of administrative services can then 
be arranged. At a later point, as the colonizer begins to lose 
contact with key sectors of indigenous life, resistants can erect 
and insert 'parallel institutions' - courts, taxes, welfare agencies, 
and schools, for example - which eventually replace the colonizer's 
institutions. This phase is accompanied by intensive political 
propaganda and training to develop the people's confidence in 
'self-government'. But this theoretical approach overestimates 
both the power and the task of 'resistants'. Indigenous political 
activists do not move into a vacuum; they move through the dense 
undergrowth of communal structures which thrives behind the colonial 
facade. Their task is to recognize, utilize, and shape this 
concrete political reality. 
d) Collaboration. The existence of parallel authorities offers 
colonized communities tactical alternatives. Total boycott of the 
colonial framework is frequently impossible, and remains only one 
of a complicated set of reactions. Particular groups or individuals 
exploit the colonial situation in various ways, with different 
degrees of 'resistance', 'adaptation' or 'collaboration', to 
further their interests. 
140 
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An initial reaction to the colonizer's presence is often to 
draw his resources into the traditional interplay of alliances and 
rivalries. 'Submission' may be calculated to enlist the colonizer's 
support in this. Some groups gain political or economic suzerainty 
over other groups as a result of such 'collaboratiön'. However, 
this kind of reaction is not mere opportunism; it does not imply 
naked detachment from traditional loyalties. It needs to be under- 
stood as an extension of indigenous political values - whether 
' 219 segmentary', 'feudal', or 'dynastic'. 
Some groups or individuals later seize other opportunities 
within the colonial framework. Use of European education, religious 
conversion, enlistment in the colonial army, provision of wage 
labour, and even wholesale emigration to the Metropolis, are 
reactions of this type. To suppose that such 'collaboration' 
creates permanently 'evolved' sectors, however, is mistaken. 
Rather it represents a single strand within a bundle of extremely 
ambivalent reactions. Many groups and individuals Splay a 'double 
game', 
220 
extracting maximum advantage from the colonial situation, 
but in an instrumental manner, retaining their suspicion of the 
colonizer. On occasion, the native attempts to use the colonial 
administration openly to frustrate the goals of the colonial 
administration. Use of European courts to prevent encroachment 
by colonizers on native land, for example, or attempts to buy 
back lost territory, may achieve limited success. Participation 
in colonial elections may, in certain circumstances, restrain the 
colonizer with his own weapons. Such reactions are highly ambivalent, 
never straightforward. 
142 
The colonial polity is a divided world, full of hypocrisy, 
equivocation, and deceptive facades. This extends the native's 
range of potentialities rather than restricts it. He may, in 
certain circumstances, play off traditional chief against colonial 
administrator, and administrator against chief. 
221 He tries to 
get the best of both worlds. 
222 It should not be assumed, however, 
in the manner of some colonizer military strategists, that colonized 
populations are 'disengaged' and equally susceptible to the bland- 
ishments of the European and the 'nationalist'. Their double game 
is a device to ward off impact; it implies visceral resistance to 
alien imposition, of which the colonial invader is the most immediate 
and glaring embodiment. And the dominant mode of this 'game' y 
which the colonizer rarely comprehends - is clandestine withdrawal. 
-iv. Sociological Withdrawal. 
--------------- 
The physical power of the colonizer obliges indigenous society 
to divert resistance into secret or indirect channels. 
223 
Sociological withdrawal is thus part of the strategy of colonized 
communities. As Balandier remarks, "the 'sociology of conflict 
needs further development, but the sociology of refusal of established 
social order and 'official culture' has yet to be created.... We need 
to elaborate a whole sociology of the antagonistic, withdrawn part of 
these societies". 
224 Avoidance of exogenous contact, enhancement of 
indigenous values, clandestinity, and duplicity, are characteristic 
features of withdrawn communities in the colonial situation. 
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a) Avoidance of exogenous_contact. Deliberate shunning of social 
contact with the colonizer is an instinctive reaction to conquest. 
"Colonial domination", according to Fanon, "... gives rise to and 
continues to dictate a whole complex of resentful behaviour and of 
refusal on the part of the colonized. The colonized exerts a 
considerable effort to keep away from the colonial world, not to 
expose himself to any action of the conqueror". 
225 This aversion 
has the power of social taboo; "to the scandal of military occupation, 
he opposes a scandal of contact". 
226 Distrust of the White Man, or 
of the Christian, goes deeper than the mere neglect of colonial 
institutions mentioned in the previous section. All areas of 
involvement with the colonizer are riddled with suspicion, fear, 
and guilt. His company is eschewed; 
227 his products and habits 
are treated as potential snares. 
228 'Organized boycotts' which 
mark certain phases of 'nationalist activity' thus tap aversive 
instincts which are inherent in the colonial situation. 
The colonizer frequently characterizes this reaction as 
'xenophobia' or 'fanaticism'. Yet it has a positive, defensive 
value. Xenophobia, for example, "neatly combines into a single 
reflex all the apprehension, grievances, and bitterness caused by 
contact with the outsider"; 
229 it helps to consolidate resistance. 
Religious fanaticism, too, is "neither vain, nor anachronistic", 
but inextricable from the political committment of colonized 
society. 
230 
These mechanisms of social avoidance are partially reinforced 
by taboos operating from the colonizer's side. The physical 
separation of native town and European town, the existence of a 
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formal or informal 'colour bar', and the practice of job reservation, 
reduce contact between the two communities. But in other respects, 
the colonizer positively seeks to contact and 'engage' indigenous 
society, and the native finds himself "hounded,., driven out of all 
his successive hiding-places by a hostile effort backed by the 
mighty weight of modern times, and simultaneously ashamed of the 
retreat to which a pretence of submission has relegated him". 
231 
Under such pressure, he has actively to fight for survival. His 
"determined maintenance of social personality'1232 involves various 
techniques or mechanisms; "from all eternity, by means of manifold 
tricks and through a system of checks and balances reminiscent of 
a conjurer's most successful sleight of hand, the country people 
have more or less kept their individuality free from colonial 
impositions". 233 
Self-preservation initially entails staking out an area of 
privacy; the aim is "to hide from outside eyes as many activities 
and events as possible.... and to preserve one's 'self-hood' - to 
escape the colonial situation where feasible". 
234 Threatened by 
the colonizer's drive to know, conquer, and 'consume', native 
communities hide their secrets. 
235 They reply to egoism with 
'unintelligibility'. 236 The native deliberately makes himself 
and his behaviour appear 'stupid' or 'irrational'. 
237 Resistance 
of this kind frustrates the progress of 'civilization', and confuses 
its agent, the colonizer. "I seek literally, " writes Berque, 
"to appropriate this 'native' and all that belongs to him; his 
food, his field. But there is always some part of him that escapes 
me, even though he has become my servant, my batman, my workman, 
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my fatma. He resists alienation, maintaining his personality in 
regions of himself to which I have no access; his faith, his sexual 
life, his ever-watchful aggressiveness, his hope'. 
238 
b) Enh n ement of indigenous values. "Sociologically withdrawn" 
communities fall back on their innermost resources. It is, writes 
Bourdieu, "as if this society had chosen to remain tightly closed 
upon itself; as if it had taken great pains to set up a thousand 
invisible, impregnable barriers against the intrusion of new methods 
and ideas". 
239 Heightened importance attaches to key areas of 
social life; they become moral sanctuaries, into which the native 
retreats, and into which the colonizer is either reluctant or unable 
to penetrate. 
240 
Where colonized societies resist as groups, they take refuge 
in what they have in common: shared values, the shared past, shared 
language, shared institutions. Often these centre around religion, 
whose sacredness grows rather than fades. The significance and 
observance of feast-days, ceremonies, and dances may change as 
they come to symbolize determined survival. Meeting places - 
shrines, places of public worship, public baths, markets, cafes - 
may form physical nodes of social resistance. Driven from the 
broader public arena of self-expression, the native falls back, 
above all, on the home, the family, the woman. 
241 Even traditional 
dress may act simultaneously as refuge and badge of refusal. 
242 
As Fanon suggests, in a brief sketch of the process, "this withdrawal, 
this rejection of an imposed structure, this falling back upon the 
fertile kernel that a restricted but coherent existence represents, 
constituted for a long time the fundamental strength of the occupied", 
243 
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c) ClandestinitZ. The behaviour of colonized communities is deeply 
imbued with clandestinity. Social action takes place 'undercover', 
244 
out of the colonizer's sight. "Strong external pressure and internal 
resistance tend to send customs underground"* 
245 
The 'secret life' of the native is protected by what Balandier 
terms "collective autism". 
246 The 'mystery' of indigenous customs 
masks the realities of social survival and reconstitution from the 
colonizer. "Hiding behind 'tradition ", Balancer suggests, "constitutes 
one of the best tactics for protection from or refusal of the grasp of 
colonial society". 
247 Where traditional rites and practices are under 
attack as 'barbaric' or 'primitive' - from European missionaries, 
administrators, or jurists -a 'conspiracy of silence' surrounds 
them. 
Thus slavery, circumcision, witchcraft, ecstatic cults, blood-feuds, 
and other manifestations of indigenous life, may simply survive in 
secret. As Charnay points out, this kind of "subterranean traffic" 
is "a classic phenomenon in any occupied society where no fusion has 
taken place". 
248 
Such reticence may persuade the colonizer that his 'civilization' 
is advancing. To the extent that this illusion gains credence, it 
frees indigenous society from interventionist '; pressures. Camouflage 
brings tranquility. As a result, "behind a facade that reassures the 
colonizer, the essential part of social life often carried on. The 
most effective social relations are found outside the formalism which 
is expressed on the surface"'. 
249 
Several factors in the colonial situation facilitate subterfuge, 
and indeed make it inevitable. Words erect a particularly opaque 
barrier. The two communities literally speak a different language, 
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and what is said in one tongue is difficult to translate into another. 
Colonized populations deliberately rely on their separate codes of 
communication; European jokes about 'the jungle telephone' - the 
mysterious and rapid way that news travels - are not far from the 
truth. 25° In a more general sense, "the foreign nature of the 
dominated culture acts as a screen helping colonized society". 
251 
The colonizer cannot establish what the native is really doing or 
thinking. Without direct, intimate experience of the native's 
religion, domestic life,. political attitudes, and social organization, 
he cannot understand even what he observes. As Balandier indicates, 
"the colonized peoples often used, with great skill, the cultural 
gap that separated them for the colonizer"* 
252 Often this exploit- 
ation seems unconscious. 
The subterfuge characteristic of decolonization struggles is 
thus rarely a novel departure for indigenous communities. Theorists 
of guerrilla warfare stress the need for underground communications 
networks, anonymous leaders, oaths, silence under torture, and 
boycotts; they speak of using traditional institutions and events 
as 'shields', and of taking refuge in 'inviolable' sanctuaries. 
But none of these tactics is born 'sui generis' during the brief 
period of pre-independence struggle. , They are aspects of a 
consistent reaction to the colonial situation. Their success 
largely depends on the degree to which "the peasants have never 
stopped clutching at a way of life that was in practice anti- 
colonial". 
253 
Indeed, clandestinity is an endemic feature of 
many Third World societies long before the advent of the European 
colonizer. The "closed-in nature of communal life", and its 
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"ability to keep a secret", noted by Chaliand in Vietnam villages, 
254 




and oath-sworn cults is well attested in 
earlier periods. Similarly, magico-religious veneration of secret 
caves, trees, wells or mountains is often a unifying factor in social 
life. Dissimulation in the colonial situation may signify the 
persistence and: heightened importance of age-old reactions. 
d) Duplicity. Clandestinity distorts colonized-colonizer 
relations. Systematic prevarication is endemic. "In the presence 
of the occupier", Fanon explains, "the occupied learns to dissemble, 
to resort to trickery.... Every contact between the occupied and the 
occupier is a falsehood". To the White Man's "forked tongue", the 
native opposes his own: "the colonized.... is hardly ever truthful 
before the colonizer". 
257 Hostility, distrust, disingenuousness, 
and deceit underlie most behaviour. What Apter notes in colonial 
Uganda. is fairly typical: "The political postures and cleavages in 
the society have had far-reaching consequences for the behaviour 
of the Baganda. They have affected outlook as well as social 
structure, beliefs as well as organization. Shrewdness becomes 
tantamount to wisdom. Deviousness becomes a form of shrewdness. 
Politeness becomes a form of deviousness... The expressions of warm 
and faithful regard that each group had for the other, and which 
the British and the Baganda expressed for one another, served to 
disguise both the sources and strengths of an antagonism made 
more anguished by the knowledge of deceit". 
258 
The 'withdrawn' life of colonized populations is thus rarely 
straightforward; it is complicated by the pressures of the colonial 
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situation. "Colonial domination distorts the very relations that 
the colonized maintains with his own culture'. 
259 
-v. Social Persistence. 
The obstinate persistence of indigenous community organization 
is a fundamental feature of the colonial situation. The limited 
impact of the colonizer, and the evasive strategies of the colonized, 
establish . large interstice$within which social survival 
is possible. 
This persistence has numerous facets, including intact continuity, 
inertia, change and reconstruction, which shed light on the 
phenomenon of Third World 'nationalism'. 
a) Intact Continuity. So far from collapsing under the body blows 
dealt by the European presence, native society stubbornly endures. 
The obsessive 'fatal impact' theme of much Western analysis is 
symptomatic of ethnocentrism. "Colonialism", Fanon remarks "wants 
everything to come from itself". 
260 "We give ourselves", says Mus 
of Frenchmen in Vietnam, "an exaggerated place in the natural 
perspectives of the country. We instinctively relate its preoccupa- 
tions to ourselves ...... Seen from the ricefield, in the shadow of 
centuries, the Vietnamese universe looks quite different. Its 
villages centred everything around themselves. The pre-war 
Frenchman imagined himself at the centre of this picture, but in 
fact he stood against a world backdrop which appeared hazy, and 
indeed, to their quasi-Chinese ways of thinking, barely humanized. 
Removed from the European context to which they related themselves, 
261 
our compatriots came quite peripherally on to the village horizon". 
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A shift of perspective is needed to appreciate the continuity 
of the indigenous universe. "Investigation", complains Berque, who 
is prominent in calling for this shift, "at best has only concerned 
itself with change, and this relative to the action of the colonizer, 
and purely in terms of mechanical determination" , 
262 Analysis 
should not content itself with the external layer of the colonial 
dialectic; it should investigate how it is experienced by the 
colonized populations themselves. 
263 "The colonial relationship", 
he argues, "... did not influence everything it affected, nor on the 
otherhand can it be held responsible for everything.... Many human 
beings, things, situations, and events remained unconnected, or 
apparently unconnected, with the colonial system, despite its 
tendency to ubiquity. It is characteristic of colonialism that 
although its methods are grandiose, and its consequences all-embracing, 
it has only partial mastery or understanding of itself.... Thus one 
cannot interpret solely in relation to its vicissitudes an existence 
of far wider significance". 
264 
The areas of life untouched by the colonizer are at least as 
important as those which are affected. "Imperialism", Berque 
admits, "was able to modify or change the more or less extensive 
zone which it touched. But it rarely reached the depths". 
265 
His own work stresses the "immense regions" which "had remained 
intact"; these, he believes, are - "statistically and logically" - 
more important than the penetrated zones. The native's experience 
of the colonial dialectic includes "the permanence, or internal 
mutation, of what is inviolate". To understand this, we have to 
analyze the ingredients and forces of persistence: "such it had 
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been before colonization, and such it would remain after independence ". 
266 
b) Inertia. "The communities which enter the modern world", suggests 
Lloyd, "are not ones in which the traditional social structures are 
collapsing, the people avidly seeking new interests and values. They 
tend to be ones in which indigenous associations have maintained 
considerable cohesion". 
267 Study of the resistance, stubbornness, 
or 'drag' of indigenous associations helps to explain social persistence. 
Balandier likens the colonial situation to an experimental solvent, 
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whose action lays bare the strongpoints of indigenous societies; 
it 
reveals "the bedrock". What survives the process are "the points of 
resistance of colonized societies, the fundamental structures and 
behaviour". 
269 
Even apparently 'inert' areas of community 
life, 
precisely because they are inert, make a strategic contribution 
to 
persistence. 
The colonizer is frequently exasperated by the seeming 
imperv- 
iousness of native groups to new ideas and institutions. 
He 
explains this in terms of 'inertia', 'obstinacy', 'laziness', 
backwardness', and 'inadaptability'; he characterizes the native 
as 'unwilling to learn' or 'unable to change'. 
270 But this 
resistance is designed precisely to weather the crisis of colonial 
implantation. As Balandier suggests, "there is a sort of delay 
which we might call functional". 
271 The 'drag' opposed to the 
colonizer's projects is a 'coping mechanism' rather than a 
'pathology'; it preserves the duality of the colonial situation, 
and provides the wherewithal for later emancipation. The apparent 
'sclerosis! of tradition, as Fanon points out, 
272 
often masks 
energetic revival. We can speak of "oppositional traditionalism11273 
or of the "traditionalism of resistance". 
274 
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Some aspects of 'inertia' which most madden and alarm the 
colonizer - for example, the native's 'inability' to control 
his 
own demographic growth - serve actively to sharpen contradictions 
at the heart of the colonial situation. Duclos illustrates this 
point well: "We might conceive of a kind of biological nationalism 
corresponding at species level to the mental defensive reflex 
which reacts against attempts at collective depersonalization. 
Thus the growth of the birth rate... might be a numerical reply 
to the pressures of the external, technological, colonizing world. 
In any case, the resultant demographic density is an objective 
aspect of the national reality. Internally, it imposes 'shoulder 
to shoulder' social solidarity on the nationals; externally, 
because of the pressures it creates, it makes the reality of 
barriers more noticeable. Thus, if not a reflex of nationalism, 
it is at least one of its agents". 
275 
Ability and determination to 'persist' is not uniform or 
consistent at all levels in all areas of indigenous life; there 
is differential drag. Survival depends on internal as well as 
external factors. Different components of different socio-cultural 
systems put up "unequal resistance". 
276 But above all, these 
points of resistance are nodes of a dynamic process. When Berque 
urges that "we should not argue that inviolate zones were inert", 
277 
he is opposing the conventional view that 'traditional' life is 
"fixed" in "timeless continuity". 
278 The idea that traditional 
society is "static, prescriptive, closed and nonrational1"279 is 
part of the schematic 'phoenix' theory of change. It implies that 
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the only alternative to 'modernity' is either "atavistic withdrawal" 
or "a prolonged period of severe strain, instability and conflict". 
280 
The corollary is that where dynamic social process occurs, this results 
from the intervention of external forces, particularly those unleashed 
by the colonizer. This obscures the conflict and change implicit in 
all traditional life. Consequently, if we speak of inertia at all, 
it should be of dynamic inertia. 
c) Change. Dynamic change in the colonial situation is generated 
"from below and within" indigenous society. 
281 Developments in 
social anthropological theory illuminate this process. The structural- 
functional approach, from Durkheim. to Malinowski, encouraged a rigid 
view of traditional social organization in the Third World, playing 
down the importance of internal conflict and change, and treating 
social myths as embalmed social experience. This reinforced some 
of the schematic generalizations of European political science. A 
more dynamic approach to social anthropology, notably that of 
Gluckman and Leach, 
282 
opens new perspectivd. It exposes the 
limitations of such static concepts as 'functional integration', 
'cultural uniformity', and 'structural equilibrium'. 
283 It treats 
conflict as intrinsic to social action; social process, the dynamics 
of change, is generated by the interplay of basic inconsistencies, 
incompatibilities, and potentialities within social "systems". 
Even to conceive of a continuous "system", according to some 
such theorists, injects misleadingly rigid notions of 'structure'. 
Leach argues that "the social dynamic is not merely cyclical flux 
within an overarching 'system'; it is not "simply put of the process 
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of structural continuity", nor "merely a process of segmentation 
and accretion". "It is a process involving structural change". 
Static myths about social organization should not be confused 
with the social process itself; "since the facts at the end of 
the cycle are quite different from the facts at the beginning of 
the cycle, the 'system on the ground' is not in equilibrium in 
the same way as the 'system of ideas"'. 
284 This kind of thinking 
has cast doubt on the value of any systemic typology for certain 
societies. Balandier, for example, insists that "the political 
field must be seen in all its extent and complexity, even at the 
price of the vulnerability of any typology of segmentary political 
systems". 
285 
In practice, the dynamic approach has had to retain some 
kind of concept of 'balance', 'equilibrium' or 'system'* 
286 
Though Gellner, for example, declares that the operation of a 
traditional 'system' is an "optical illusion", he nevertheless 
speaks of "patterns" which transcend systemic "breakdowns". 
287 
Yet 'system' has lost its associations with rigid structure. By 
persistence we must understand the continuity of a dynamic 'game' 
rather than a static 'edifice'. 
288 With its: emphasis on flux, 
tensions and crisis in pre-colonial 'systems', dynamic social 
anthropology thus paradoxically helps to explain how they manage 
to adapt to and survive the colonial situation. Flexible, open, 
changing societies are less vulnerable to exogenous change than 
rigid, closedjunchanging societies. 
The process of decolonization in the Third World also 
contributed to the overthrow of conceptual shackles concerning 
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tradition. "It has overturned habits", according to Balandier, 
"and given rise to terminological prudence (with regard to such 
epithets as 'archaic' and 'primitive'), and cast doubt on the 
present direction of anthropological research. In one blow, 
societies which were considered static or stuck in 'repetitive 
process' have rediscovered a history; they have left the sphere 
of passive objects. This resumption of initiative is also to be 
found in the fields of political and social thought". 
289 Balandier's 
own fieldwork in fact resulted from a colonial administration's 
growing awareness that indigenous communities were 'on the move': 
"We had been asked to draw up a kind of balance-sheet on two 
peoples - the Fang of Gabon and the Ba-Kongo of the Congo - 
which were attracting the attention of the administration by 
their 'retaking of the initiativeland innovatory enterprises. 
After periods of 'tolerance' of different duration, these two 
ethnic wholes were clearly reacting to the colonial situation, 
by striving to re-organize themselves". 
290 In this adjustment 
of sights from the decay or rigidity of colonized society, to 
its renewal or dynamism, Balandier cites Fanon as a key figure. 
The importance of this shift of perspective is indicated 
by Lloyd: "Looking at African rural areas, one may choose to 
stress either the force of change or the persistence of 
traditional institutions. The observer whose framework of 
analysis is a rather static image of traditional society will 
point to the 'cracks' in the structure effected by mission 
education, colonial government, or greater affluence. His 
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comments seem more predictive of disintegration that of the 
development of new structures. If on the other hand, one sees the 
traditional institutions in terms of conflict and competition 
between. individuals, and groups, one is more likely to stress the 
persistence of these groups as changing conditions are exploited 
to achieve the goals of the indigenous society". 
291 
Indigenous reactions to the colonial situation are not merely 
externally provoked; they include 'endogenous evolution' or 
'internal mutation'. 
292 An illusion that traditional society 
is static, homogeneous, and consistent may be created by the 
temporary dominance of one potentiality within the 'game' at 
the moment of colonial conquest. But this should not be mistaken 
for a permament or total statement of that game. "What is seen 
today and labelled as 'traditional society' is often itself a 
product of change", Gusfield points out, 
293 
and this change 
continues. Nor, similarly, should we mistake idealized beliefs 
about social equilibrium, associated with one social stratum, 
for an exhaustive and authoritative statement of the rules of 
the multiplex game. "We must", Gusfield suggests, "avoid 
accepting the written and intellectualized versions of a culture 
as only the literate form of a common set of beliefs and 
behaviour patterns". 
294 Sets of myths are not equivalent to 
sets of behaviour; we must distinguish "myth" from "social 
reality"295 or "culture" from "society". 
296 In any case, there 
are alternative cultures to the "dominant" culture, and alternative 
stresses within the dominant cultures. 
297 
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WitMn'traditional' societies, there are "contradictory and 





the interaction of which generates social change. 
As Leach argues "the overall process of structural change comes 
about through the manipulation of these alternatives as a means 
of social advancement". 
301 To understand the colonial situation - 
and therefore 'nationalist' phenomena - from the 'inside', we must 
analyze "those sectors of traditional society that contain or 
express potentialities for. change from dominant norms and 
structures'". 
302 
We need, for example, to examine "the diversity of content 
in specific traditions which influence acceptance, rejection, or 
fusion of modernist forms". 
303 But this diversity relates to 
endogenous crises, not just to the question of "modernism". 
"Classes and castes", the Rudolphs suggest for India, "religions 
and sects, statuses and roles that represent deviations from 
dominant motifs; stresses within dominant ideologies; and 
recessive themes in cultural patterns and psychological makeup 
that can be mobilized by somewhat changed historical circumstances, 
become grist for the mill of social change ". 
304 We need to 
examine, too, endogenous potentialities for wide-scale unity 
and schism, as expressed in patterns of fission and fusion; it 
should not be implied that exogenous forces - transmitted by 
'nationalism,, for example - were necessary to breathe new life 
into a disintegrating body. Similarly, we should study 
spontaneous sources of social reconstruction. "The potential 
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for activism and mastery of the environment had always been there", 
the Rudolphs suggest of India; 
305 
so-called 'nationalist' reactions 
mobilize this dynamic potential against a (temporarily dominant) 
passive potential. 
3o6 
d) 'Social PatholoEy'. The traditional dynamic does not operate 
undisturbed in the colonial situation. The 'debate' of indigenous 
society 'within itself' continues under distorting conditions. The 
colonizer prevents some potentialities from direct or open 
expression. In such circumstances', as Fanon argues, "the practice 
of tradition is a disturbed practice". 
307 Bourdieu and Sayad speak 
of "pathological traditionalism" and "traditionalism of despir". 
308 
If the concept of a traditional 'system' is valid at all, such 
manifestations appear 'dysfunctional'. 
Recent developments in the study of 'messianic' movements, 
however, suggest that apparent manifestations of social degeneration 
often transmit powerful energies for social reconstruction. 
The 
colonizer, confused by such developments, treats millenarianism as 
irrational, wild, superstitious, suicidal, or xenophobic; in general, 
he sees it as evidence of the 'inability on the part of the natives 
to integrate into new and more productive forms of economy". 
309 
Marxists, and some self-styled 'nationalists', frequently view it as 
"a force diverting the energies for resistance.... from the arena of 
the material struggle.... into a region of religious myths" 6310 
Social anthropologists often stress the renunciatory self-destruction 
or "quietism", 311 the "defeatism" and "frustration it t 
312 
and the 
"utopia of escape", 
313 
expressed by such movements. In these 
respects, they seem pathological. 
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Yet they have several constructive aspects. They represent a 
defence against the threat of the colonizer, an active attempt to 
throw off the shackles of control. The colonizer himself is quick 
to detect the direct challenge to his authority; they represent, 
at the very least, "a refusal .... to integrate", 
314 
and in a sense 
"the first organized opposition to colonialism". 
315 Given the 
economic structure, many Marxists concede, it is "the only possible 
form of resistance". 
316 
Social anthropologists also show how this 
kind of resistance harnesses dynamic forces within indigenous 
society. It represents a "resumption of the initiative", 
317 
leading not just to 'moral regeneration' but to socio-political 
reconstruction. 
318 Even in its utopian aspects there is "a utopia 
of reconstruction". 
319 
Many such movements are 'activist' and 
revolutionary, revealing possibilities of social cohesion, and 
unity within the traditional 'game', and exploiting them to ward 
off the colonizer's impact. 
320 The intense religiosity of such 
movements connotes more than escapism and frustration. It 
follows from the inseparability of political and sacred in 
these societies; any notion of a purely 'secular' reaction 
to the colonial situation is anachronistic. In any case, where 
the colonizer blocks overt political channels, recourse to the 
sacred is inevitable. 
C. Contradictions in Colonial Dynamics 
Colonial dynamics are thus inherently contradictory. The 
colonizer both threatens wholesale disruption of colonized society, 
and systematically restrains his impact. Potential crises dog 
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indigenous society at every point, yet its persistence is a constant 
feature of colonial dynamics. The native avoids "total alienation"; 
he is "dispossessed of the world" only in the sense of being forced 
to adopt defensive and indirect strategies. 
As a result of the ambivalent strategies of the colonizer, 
and the defensive strategies of the colonized, the colonial situation 
is fundamentally dual. It is i'a world cut in two"; 
32' "a colonial 
elite and culture coexist,. but separately; with a colonized society 
and culture which feels threatened". 
322 The two societies make 
little contact; 
323 they are "walled off" from each other by barriers 
of social avoidance. As Clzarnay suggests of Algeria: "With both 
societies confirmed in their respective attitudes - European society 
in its good conscience, its authoritarian paternalism, and its 
sometimes clumsily expressed desire to 'civilize'; moslem society 
in its inert, distrustful, unreasoning and occasionally backward- 
looking resistance - there was really no dialogue between them't. 
324 
This dualism is an inevitable feature of any colonial situation, 
and the only mode in which it can persist. Yet paradoxically it 
constitutes a standing threat to its stability, a fatal flaw 
hampering its consolidation; "the existence of two blocs, of 
watertight compartmental. ism.... keeps a perpetual menace of internal 
rupture hanging over it". 
325 This contradiction lies at the very 
heart of the dynamics of the colonial situation, and should be 
central to any discussion of 'nationalism'. 
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III. 'NATIONALISM' IN THE COLONIAL SITUATION 
The orthodox interpretation of 'nationalism' in the Third 
World has glaring deficiencies. To rectify these, the social 
dynamics of the colonial situation must be approached 'from 
inside and below'. This non-orthodox approach seems to entail 
abandoning the concept of nationalism as such. The hallmark of 
most dynamic theorists is not open contestation of the orthodox 
definition of 'nationalism'; most ignore it, and refuse to use 
the term at all. In this sense, we have manufactured a clash 
of interpretations which rarely takes place in practice. Yet 
a direct clash does occasionally occur; some non-orthodox 
theorists redeploy 'nationalism', give it a more malleable 
meaning, in order deliberately to shift the focus of interpretation. 
A. The unusability of the concept of nationalisms 
It is not surprising that social anthropologists closely 
focussed on intimate particulars of a small community should 
neglect such wide-ranging concepts as 'nationalism'; as an 
explanatory tool, it is not fitted for this level of social 
reality. But the concept has also been ignored by social 
anthropologists concerned with developing broad generalizations 
and comparative categories about social process. There are many 
reasons why it is inappropriate. 
-i. It implies a homogeneous, consistent and uni-directional 
movement. In fact the social dynamics of a colonial situation 
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are complex, multi-directional, and often contradictory; they 
operate differently at different levels and among different 
groups. To lump such processes into a universal category such 
as 'nationalism' (or indeed 'modernity') is grossly misleading. 
As Bonnaf( suggests: "In view of the very considerable 'fluidity' 
of nationalism, which can be used to cover extremely dissimilar 
realities, one wonders whether such broad concepts are of much use. 
Perhaps at this point it would be more fruitful to employ simpler 
operational concepts to grasp what common processes are at work, 
at different levels of expression, beneath the heading of 
nationalism". 
326 The idea of nationalism obstructs perception. 
Less unwieldy 'middle-range' sociological concepts, such as 
'unifying dynamism' and 'structural renewal'1327 or 'internal 
fission', 'decompression', and 'fusion's 
328 
may be helpful. 
Balandier rarely refers to 'nationalism', at least in the singular; 
he speaks of "so-called 'nationalist' reactions" generally preferring 
to call them 'reactions to the colonial situation'. 
329 He describes 
such processes as 'degradation', 'reconstruction', 'unifying 
reactions', andre-formation'. 
330 
It is important that such 'middle-range' concepts should not 
be too naive or vague, however, otherwise they too obscure 
perception. Occasionally, Berque's concept of "resumption of 
spontaneity" or Balandier's concept of "retaking the initiative" 
run this danger; they cease to be explanatory tools. 
331 Berque's 
proposition that "the excess of the attack summons the energy for 
a later effort at reconstitution" is too neat, 
332 
as is BalandLar's 
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idea of "a veritable threshold of tolerance to cultural denaturation" -- 
beyond which there is "a tendency to reorganization". 
333 As Stokes 
suggests, the notion of automatic compensatory mechanisms is 
simplistic. 
334 
-ii. It is heuristically flabby. 'Nationalism' can be used to 
describe "any form of organization, even rudimentary, which escapes 
the control of the dominant authorities". 
335 All manifestations of 
political life not actually dictated by the colonizer, all untrammeled 
survivals of the indigenous social process - even thorn seemingly 
inert -, can be regarded as aspects of nationalism. Because large-scale 
social persistence is built into all bifurcated situations, it is 
impossible to set definitional bounds. To label this vast range of 
phenomena 'nationalism' adds nothing to explanation, indeed clouds 
it; it is "a misuse of terms" 
336 To stretch one word to cover 
and explain multiplex dynamics, Bonnafe suggests, is to run 
"a great risk of seeing the very object of research evaporate"'. 
337 
Nationalism becomes indistinguishable from the entire social process; 
} 
it provides no independent explanation of it. Rather than blunt our 
perception in order to cling to a word, we should jettison the word 
in order to sharpen our perception. 
-iii. It obscures the nature of the colonial situation. The basic 
duality of the colonial setting ensures the existence (persistence) 
of self-contained social life among the colonized. The reactions 
called 'nationalism' are thus endemic features of colonial situations. 
Yet the word 'nationalism' implies novelty. The colonizer, often 




social life among the colonized population, in the belief that they 
are a new phenomenon, deliberately subversive of the prevailing 
order, and thus deserving condemnation and repression. But, as 
Balandier points out, the label "does little more than express the 
anxiety of the established European minorities who are faced with 
black societies in the process of total transformation. They 
consider the maintenance of their dominant position to be a 
function of their own direct control over changes affecting 
indigenous society. Hence their particular sensitivity to the 
slightest sign of reaction or initiative ". 
338 The point is not 
that the colonizer is mistaken in treating native 'initiatives' 
as long-term threats to his domination; they constitute precisely 
such a menace. But they should not surprise him; they are not 
novel. They stem from contradictions at the heart of the colonial 
situation. The colonizer, who rarely grasps these structural 
contradictions, only deceives himself in invoking 'nationalism' 
to explain short-term problems. 
iv. The term 'nationalism' is inextricably entangled with the 
narrowly-focussed connotations of orthodox 'elite nationalism'. 
It is arguable, therefore, that the non-orthodox viewpoint 
should concede the word to nation-builder theorists, and concentrate 
on establishing that such 'nationalism' is of purely marginal 
relevance in Third World contexts. This kind of approach, 
particularly in Marxist hands, stresses the thin social roots of 
'elite nationalism'; it does not represent the whole society, 




restricted associations of elite-led "modern nationalism" should 
not be confused with the whole social process in the colonial 
situation, at its different levels and in its different forms. 
Such statements as Halpern's-i'Nationalism is the principal 
political manifestation of social change in the Middle East"340_ 
suggest that there is a real danger of this. 
B. Attempts to redefine nationalism 
For these reasons, the abandonment of the concept of 
'nationalism' as an analytical tool seems inevitable if the 
pitfalls of the orthodox approach are to be avoided. However, 
some non-orthodox theorists are reluctant to relinquish the 
word; they fight to retain it by redefining it. 
There are several reasons for this. The first is the need 
clearly to signal disagreement with the orthodox tradition which 
otherwise, by default, goes unchallenged. Only by actively 
redrawing accepted definitions can important differences be 
brought out. 
Hodgkin's is a partial attempt at this. 
341 He tries to 
loosen the meaning of 'nationalism' in order to do justice to 
the diversity and complexity of colonial dynamics. Although 
important, he argues that the activities of the 'elite' are only 
one aspect of nationalism; they are "mixed up"-, with diverse 
organizations and movements at various levels of society, "each 
in its own way expressing opposition to European control and a 
demand for new liberties". 
342 'Nationalism' thus comprises "any 
166 
organization or group that explicitly asserts the rights, claims, 
and aspirations of a given African society (from the level of the 
language-group to that of 'Pan Africa') in opposition to European 
authority, whatever its institutional form and objectives". 
Hodgkin's definition, based on "explicit assertion", and with 
"language group" as its minimum scale of social organization, is 
still fairly restrictive, but it represents a considerable widening 
of the orthodox definition. 
Kilson's is a rather more radical attempt to redefine 
nationalism. ' 
3 Though holding that the activity of the modern 
elite is the "highest form" of nationalism, he stresses that it 
represents the interests of a very narrow stratum of society, not 
those of the rest of the 'nation' which it purports to speak for. 
He also stresses the role which the threat of peasant direct action 
plays-in persuading the colonial regime to treat elite nationalism 
seriously. 
The approach of both Hodgkin and Kilson is terminologically 
loose and pragmatic. They shift the focus of orthodox study of 
nationalism; we hear more of specifically indigenous and non-'evolved' 
ingredients, and more about the dynamics of the particular colonial 
situation. There are fewer assumptions about the 'nation-to-be', 
and less discussion of evolutionary universals. In retaining the 
word 'nationalism', they give it a transformed sense. 
A further reason for continuing to discuss colonial dynamics 
within the framework of 'nationalism' is that the term has acquired 
positive value-associations in some contexts. As 'nationalism' 
lost its respectability in post-war Europe, it began a vaunted 
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career in the Third World. It connotes 'patriotism' 
344 
and authenticity. 
Social processes which obstruct or thwart the so-called nationalism of 
the urban elites appear patriotic and inauthentic. Colonizers, or 
elite 'nationalists', invariably establish myths condemning such 
manifestations on these grounds. 
"' 
It is thus tempting to establish 
the authentic community aspirations behind such 'anti-nationalist' 
activities - and the inauthenticity of the 'nation-to-be' of the 
elite - by outlining the "specific national identity" which they 
express and defend. 
'Nationalism' also appears, in some contexts, to connote 
'constructiveness'. 'National integration', -is often treated as a 
goal worth pursuit in itself, as if freed from the vested interests 
of different social strata. To link elite goals alone with 'nationalism' 
carries the suggestion that the alternative (non-'modern' or anti-'modern') 
goals of other social sectors are 'destructive' and 'backward-looking'. 
"Traditionalism" and "tribalism" have both tended to register this kind 
of negative image. To associate them with 'nationalism' might help to 
underline their positive contribution to social construction. 
346 
For all these reasons, recent years have seen the growth of 
'populist' or 'dynamic' studies of nationalism, in reaction to the 
'mental cramp'347 of orthodox definitions. Several writers and 
politicians have retained and transformed the concept of nationalism 
to help describe the Third World social process. 
348 Duclos' concept 
of "rural nationalism" is a particularly stimulating attempt. 
349 
He drafts a definition of nationalism which he claims is "rather 
unadventurous", but "best suited for an understanding of a phenomenon 
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which.... is fragile, elusive, and multiple". 
35° Nationalism is 
"the consciousness shared by the population of a given territory 
of constituting a political community whose originality is itself 
a cherished value. A demand for sovereignty almost always results". 
351 
The aim of all nationalist movements, he suggests, is "to reconstitute, 
safeguard, and extend a collective personality of sufficient scope and 
unity to satisfy man's need to share social, cultural, and political 
identity with as many others as possible". 
352 He argues that, although 
the phenomena he describes are fragmentary, inarticulate, and 
contradictory - "fragile, elusive, and miltiple"r353 - they can be 
usefully treated as 'nationalism'. 
But it is possible to share this 'populist' approach - according 
significance to similar phenomena - without sharing identical 
terminology. The work of Mus, Lacheraf, and Fanon, for example, 
illustrates this. 
Mus alternates between writing of 'nationalism' and 'patriotism'. 
354 
He characterizes "Vietnamese nationalism" as "both a reaction of 
primary instincts, born of the land, the climate, and their violence, 
and a distillation .... of an age-old morality in which these elementary 
forces of earth and blood elaborate and institutionalize themselves 
into a civilization". 
355 Elsewhere he writes of "this patriotism, 
which is also a form of humanism". 
356 
between 
Lacheraf differentiates more firmlyA"rural patriotism" and 
"nationalism". 357 The former is 'defensive', 'combative', 'traditional' 
and 'instinctive'; the latter, exclusively urban, is based on new 
classes (proletariat and bourgeoisie) with new demands. However, not 
1 *^'R 
until these two social realities interact and irrigate each other 
can there be a truly "revolutionary" movement of national liberation. 
Both are crucial ingredients, and one of Lacheraf's dominant stresses 
is on the persistent 'patriotism' of the peasantry, and their crucial 
role in any socialist revolution. 
358 He sidesteps the issue of 
whether such rural reactions are truly 'nationalist'; "whatever it 
was", he argues, "nation-state or nation-community, or simply 
fatherland acting in solidarity (and by that very fact 'national'), 
something existed which allowed Algeria for 130 years to oppose a 
great imperialist power and finally force it to capitulate". 
359 
He suggests that this "firm or instinctive .... defence of a country, 
which was spontaneous and natural" transcends questions of "their 
level of consciousness or social formation; their nomadic or sedentary 
way of life; the traditionalism and culture of their old cities; 
their frequent contact with or withdrawal from the modern outside 
world; their hostility, reticence, or loyalty towards a regime 
which had become theirs; their integration into or independence 
of its state structure... " etc. 
360 Lacheraf's emphasis on the past 
and future role of the peasantry thus transcends terminological 
disputes about nationalism. 
Fanon similarly stresses the role of the peasantry in 'national 
liberation'. But he looks beyond 'national liberation' to "man's 
liberation"; 361 what is needed, he argues, is a social revolution, 
harnessing the potentialities of the whole community. It is the 
peasantry's contribution to this that Fanon emphasizes more than 








alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything 
to gaintt. 
362 He is deeply sceptical about the representativeness of 
most "nationalist political parties" during the anti-colonial struggle, 
and about the neo-colonialist aspirations of the "nationalist 
bourgeoisie". 363 Neither are guardians of the true national conscious- 
ness. The scope of Fanon's analysis thus extends even further beyond 
the 'nationalist' phenomenon than Lacheraf's. "Nationalism", he writes, 
"that magnificent song that made the people rise against their 
oppressors, stops short, falters and dies away on the day that 
independence is proclaimed. Nationalism is not a political doctrine, 
nor a programme. If you really wish your country to avoid regression, 
or at best halts and uncertainties, a rapid step must be taken from 
national consciousness to political and social consciousness't. 
364 
C. Characteristics of 'nationalist' reactions to the colonial situation 
A variety of writers have thus fundamentally reassessed colonial 
dynamics. Whether the concept of 'nationalism' is totally abandoned, 
or redefined, is in the last analysis unimportant. In either case, 
they highlight features of reactions to the colonial situation which 
the orthodox interpretation of Third World nationalism obscures. The 
basic elements of a coherent non-orthodox interpretation of Third 
World 'nationalism' include the following: 
-i. 'Nationalism' is a reaction, or a series of reactions, to a 
colonial situation. It constitutes the assertion of what is specific 
within colonized societies in the face of threatened political or 
cultural absorption by the dominant minority. The fact that the 
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colonizer's impact is in many respects limited does not negate 
the overall proposition that 'nationalism' must be related to 
the colonial situation. The nature of the colonial situation, 
with its in-built bifurcations, explains the paradox, since one 
prong is precisely the persistence of indigenous social processes. 
Since persistence is inevitable, 'nationalist' reactions are 
directed "not merely against the Other.... but outside the 
Other"; 365 they are reactions not only to the colonizer, but 
also to various potentialities within indigenous society itself. 
They are part of a process which is "beyond time and outside the 
colonial situation". 
366 
-ii. 'Nationalism' is inarticulate in DzroUan political terms. 
To some theorists, the idea of non-explicit nationalism is a 
contradiction in terms; Kelman asserts that "an ethnic group 
becomes a nation when it begins to ideologize its customs and way 
of life", implying that inarticulate reactions cannot be nationalist. 
However, these reactions have their roots not among 'Westernized' 
sections of the population, but in traditional, predominantly 
rural, community life. They necessarily express themselves in the 
traditional political language. This, as Morris-Jones suggests, is 
usually "more important as behaviour than as description; it is by 
comparison with modern politics inarticulate, acted upon rather 
than spoken about. This is for the simple reason that on questions 
outside the little worlds, it has nothing to say, whereas within 




Small-scale societies do not act in relation'to 'abstract' 
ideas but in relation to "particularistic interests of their own 
social group". 
368 Their behaviour is "affective or implicit", in 
contrast to the "ideological, explicit, or conventional nationalism" 
of the Westernized urban elite. 
369 As a result, certain groups 
adopt 'nationalist' strategies "without being aware of it". 
370 
Beliefstthough firm, are "instinctive", stemming from a strong 
sense of the concrete and the familiar; "one only gets involved 
in things one recognizes". 
371 
'Nationalism' of this kind is usually intensely sceptical of 
the so-called ideological 'nationalism' of the urban elites. 
Duclos likens this suspicion to "the concrete bank against which 
artificial ideologies regularly break". 
372 Intensely realistic 
and prosaic, it is impermeable to theoretical argumentation. 
Its rejection of 'inauthentic' ideologies helps to ward off 
disguised exploitation; it constitutes a "defence of local 
freedom, hence protection of fundamental social characteristics 
against the onslaughts of a 'domestic colonialism' devoid of any 
political point". 
373 
The inability, or refusal, of these 'nationalist' reactions 
to ideologize themselves does not make them a-political or 
incomprehensible. The "seemingly chaotic, aimless and undefined 
nature" of many reactions is misleading. Their consistency, 
strategic goals, and indeed philosophy, are expressed in factual 
behaviour. The 'national identity' at stake can be more readily 
grasped by studying the pattern of targets attacked and institutions 
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defended, than by poring over articulate treatises. Kilson suggests 
that "by considering the objects of populist violence one may gain 
insight into both the goals of the populist groups and the cause of 
their violent behaviour". 
374 Similarly, we have to analyze the 
rallying points around which the native organizes his "anonymous 
cohesion and extremely tenacious survival". 
375 
-iii. 'Nationalism' is extremel localized. It is not predicated, 
as the orthodox interpretation suggests, on a far-flung and abstract 
'nation-to-be'. It reflects indigenous social realities, which are 
"narrow in focus", 376 intimate, and small-scale. The same close 
face-to-face group tends to focus loyalty for all political activities; 
the hierarchies of group membership that exist in the West do not 
operate effectively. 
377 As a result, it is entirely wrong, as Saul 
points out, to imply the existence of "a monolithic, primarily 
peasant block". 
378 The issues, grievances and aspirations which 
stimulate behaviour in the colonial situation are part of everyday 
community life. 
379 The reactions of individual local groups thus 
vary in form and intensity from one another. These limited 
horizons, this 'latent autonomism', appear to militate against 
unified, 'national' consciousness. However, variations are part 
of a shared 'game'; though "certainly incompatible with the idea 
of the State", , Duclos suggests, they are "not with that of the 
Nation (Patrie)". 380 Such behaviour provides "a constant reminder 
of deep-rooted social realities", 
381 
and thus helps to "disseminate 
national values". 
382 We should not dismiss it as 'anti-nationalist', 
'backward-looking', or 'xenophobic' simply because it resists the 
I.. 
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claims of an externally-projected 'nation-to-be'. In as far as it 
resists such alien concepts, indeed, it is "the guardian of national 
orientation". 
383 The particularistic grievances and problems, 
expressed by each small-scale group, voice an instinct of conservation 
and community solidarity "upon which national, spiritual, and moral 
concepts were based". 
384 
Moreover, the fragmentation of these responses is partly 
illusory. In the face of the colonial crisis, they express alternative 
solutions and potentialities within the traditional 'game', "the 
conjunction of which added up to a response on the national level". 
385 
Common religious, cultural, political and economic experience is 
reinforced by the presence of the colonizer. Charnay insists, for 
example, that "one must not conclude, as is too often done, that 
this 'localism' meant 'atomization'.... for though superficial 
observation might identify picturesque differences, visible but 
external, in the series of cells and individual groups, one can 
also observe profound similarities of mentality, desires, and 
behaviour. (These).... societies contained in themselves likeli- 
hoods of coagulation". 
386 
-iv. 'Nationalism' is_inspired-from withiný_not-outside. The 
orthodox view implies that 'nationalist reactions' draw their 
strength and inspiration from structures and values originating 
outside indigenous society. 
38 By contrast, the non-orthodox 
interpretation roots nationalism in the strongest, most authentic 
indigenous structures and values - those which survive the acid 
fest of the colonial presence. It constitutes the assertion of 
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what is specific within that society, as against the outside threat 
of political and cultural absorption. The major resource in this 
defence and reformation is what has remained inviolate within the 
colonized community. As Berque suggests, "the real strength of 
the national uprising lies in its recourse to what is 'integral' 
and what is a continuation, however relative the sense we give to 
these terms, and even if such recourse is effected by rupture and 
innovation". 388 
'Nationalism' thus represents the persistence of the indigenous 
political game. The orthodox theory of nationalism implies the 
impending decay of all things traditional; their role in the genesis 
of nationalism is unimportant. Thus Emerson remarks: "In the 
degree to which the rural population was left to its own devices, 
it escaped the direct impact of precisely those forces which were 
most significant for the new elites. Nationalism is essentially 
and in the first instance an urban phenomenon". 
389 But a totally 
different conclusion can be drawn from this 'escape' of the rural 
population, namely Fanon's: "The peasants threw themselves into 
the rebellion with all the more enthusiasm in that they had never 
stopped clutching at a way of life that was in practice anti- 
colonial". 
390 'Nationalism' is not a unique explosion, occurring 
just before independence; it represents continuity. It is not 
concerned simply with constructing a new nation from nothing; as 
Berque points out, "it already has a past". 
391 Seen in this light, 
the persistence of indigenous community life is not incidental to 
the dialectic of decolonization; it is crucial to its unfolding. 
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The fulcrum of 'nationalism' is the refusal of the society to 
disintegrate. It signifies intact survival and spontaneous 
reconstitution of a traditional 'game' which is neither uddirect- 
ional nor consistent; it contains a variety of alternative 
potentialities and is played at several social levels. 
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I. THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERPRETATION 
To understand the dynamics of the colonial situation in Algeria 
under French rule, we need firstly to identify the major components 
of the indigenous political process or 'game'. This chapter tries to 
- ýstablýshed do this by telescoping detectable patterns of behaviourAbefore the 
French occupation. The result, necessarily, is compressed and schematic. 
One of the most striking features of Algerian society was the 
bewildering variety of its demography: townspeople of old centres of 
learning and handicraft5like Tlemcenand Constantine; tradesmen and 
artisans of more recently established coastal ports at Algiers and 
Oran; sedentary cereal-growers of the'Cheliff and Mitidja plains and of 
the Tellian Atlas; village tree-cultivators in the Dahra, Trara, and 
Greater Kabylia mountains; transhumant forest pastoralists on the 
Oranais Plateaux, and in the mountains of Lesser Kabylia, the Ouarsenis 
and the Hodna; semi-nomads of the Steppes and the Aures Massif; sendentary 
cultivators of the Saharan oases; and nomads of the desert and the pre- 
Saharan Atlas. Superimposed on this population jigsaw, on the eve:. of 
French occupation, was a small Turkish military caste, based on coastal 
towns but claiming suzerainty over the interior, living from the proceeds 
of trade, piracy, and levies from the surrounding tribes. 
However, beneath this apparent diversity lay a foundation of shared 
social, economic, and cultural patterns, which extended far beyond the 
confines of 'Algeria' to the whole of the Islamic Far West (Maghreb) - 
including 'Morocco' and 'Tunisia'. In discussing the socio-political 
structure of Algeria, we must expand our frame of reference outside the 
narrow confines of the Turkish Regency or the French colony. The indigenous 
'game' both transcended and undermined these territorial definitions. 
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. 
One possible starting point for discussion of this world is an 
extremely rudimentary distinction drawn by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 
between 'primitive state' societies and 'stateless' societies. They 
differentiate between 'Group A' societies, "which have centralized 
authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions - in 
short a government - and in which cleavages of wealth, privilege and 
status correspond to the distribution of power and authority", and 
'Group B' societies, "which lack centralized authority, administrative 
machinery and judicial institutions - in short which lack government - 
and in which there are no sharp divisions of rank, status and wealth". 
1 
In these terms, the North African situation could be described as a coexistence 
of networks of quasi-Group B systems with nuclei of quasi-Group A systems. 
In some respects, this coexistence amounted to mere juxtaposition. 
Those nuclei of 'centralized authority' - the Alawite dynasty in Morocco, 
the Turkish regencies in Tunis and Algiers - had effective control over an 
extremely limited portion of the territory and population, despite greater 
pretensions. The political life of the tribes of the interior continued 
undisturbed, for most of the time, by the presence of these 'authorities'. 
The disjunction between the two forms of political organization was often 
so great that they require treatment as separate systems. 
Yet there also was a significant degree of interpenetration. The 
fiction of overall suzerainty frequently asserted by these"'cehtral 
authorities' was tacitly respected by most tribes, at least in its 
spiritual aspects; this was so even when, in overt practice, they manifested 
independence or recalcitrance. In a sense, too, the 'Group At authorities 
drew their legitimation and practical power from the segmentary dynamics of 
the 'Group B' communities. In important respects, therefore, these two forms 
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of political organization must be viewed as parts, or extremes, of a 
single political interaction. 
Historiography and political analysis of the Maghreb has too often 
adopted the perspective of the 'central authority'; it has looked 'from 
the top down'. One reason is that the indigenous written tradition has 
invariably been associated with the central dynasties; this has been 
reinforced by Eurocentric interest in 'nation-buildingt. The result has 
been to distort the nature of the "central authority", of the "stateless" 
tribes, and of their interrelationship. Geertz's remark about Morocco - 
"its cultural centre of gravity lay not, paradoxical as this may seem, in 
the great cities, but in the mobile, aggressive, now federated, now 
fragmented tribes, who not only harassed and exploited they but also 
shaped their growth"2 - can be extended with even greater emphasis to 
Algeria, where the urban tradition was shallower than in the rest of the 
Maghreb. 
Most of the initial European investigation of Algeria's tribal centre 
of gravity was closely tied to the military and administrative goals of the 
French colonizers. It was largely conducted by soldiers and administrators, 
not by trained anthropologistb. 
3 Their practical concern was to locate 
indigenous sources of authority, in order to facilitate the conquest and 
control of the local population. A considerable number of case studies 
were ammassed, of variable quality, on individual 'tribes', 'villages' or 
'regions', on powerful families, or on religious brotherhoods. These raw 
accounts lacked overall theoretical coherence. The generalizations which 
emerged were vague: 'Berber anarchj , 'Berber republics', 'tribal empires', 
'clannishness', 'patriarchal family', 'feudal nobility', 'Lords of the 
Atlas' and 'xenophobic brotherhoods'. 
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Some of these generalizations contained a Eurocentric, or more 
specifically colonialist bias, and functioned as 'myths', determining 
research priorities. One of these was the myth of the Islamic veneer. 
According"to this, Islam was an alien imposition on the Maghreb; the 
North African reality lay beneath its shallow roots. Many observers, 
as Berque suggests, "instinctively sought the facts, the forces, which 
were a stage deeper than Islam". 
4 
Research tended to look for the age-old 
'pagan' customs underlying the 'token' practice of Islam. 
5 Maghrebology 
tended to be cut off from Islamic Studies, from the Middle East. "We thus 
ended up, "Berque suggests, "with a right view - that of a man determined 
above all by his environment - and a wrong one - in that it cut him off 
from his age-old culture: exotic to us, unknown or antagonistic, but the 
raison d'e re for him, and the refuge for a national home". 
6 
The general 
consequence was serious underestimation of the role of the moslem religion 
in everyday communal life, and neglect of the Maghreb's place in the total 
moslem world. 
Another interpretative drift has been described as the 
'Algerian vulgate'.? This sought to distinguish between the Arab-speaking 
and Berber-speaking populations of the Maghreb, largely on pseudo-racial 
and cultural grounds. It led observers to look for differences in communal 
organization and spirit, which typically revolved around the notion of 
hard-working, thrifty, sedentary Berbers, and indolent, vain, and 
destructive Arabs. 
8 
The Arab was the outsider,. the Berber the native, 
with the implication that the two 'communities' were hostile to or 
divisible from each other. This 'Kabyle myth' often coincided with the 
'Islamic veneer myth'; the Berbers were regarded as less deeply islamicized, 
and perhaps more open to conversion to Christianity. 
9 
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A further tendency has already been mentioned: that whereby the 
central government constituted a natural focus of indigenous political 
processes. Duclos calls this the "makhzen complex". 
10 It was rather 
less prevalent in Algerian historiography than in Moroccan or Tunisian 
research, for the French were not seeking retrospectively to justify the 
establishment of a 'Protectorate' for this central regime. Indeed, a 
more typical generalization about Algeria asserted that it was merely 
"a geographical expression", and that traditional tribal society was 
chronically incapable of establishing wide-scale political structures. 
11 
It was only gradually and occasionally that the findings of French 
colonial investigators were systematized, liberated from myths, and brought 
into contact with the 'structural' insights of social anthropology. 
12 A 
striking contribution was made in the 1930's and 1940's by Montagne. 
13 
He extended a detailed observation of South Moroccan community politics 
into a wide-ranging account of the historical process of political change 
and continuity in the Maghreb. He greatly neglected the Islamic factor, 
and many of the inferences which he drew from his material were overconfident 
and misleading. 
14 On the other hand, many of his themes foreshadowed much 
later and extremely important developments in social anthropological 
research, particularly those relating to the dynamics of conflict and 
games theory. 
The work of Berque in the 1950's and 1960's stands out in 
importance. 15 His is an extremely subtle structuralist approach, which 
defies the Eurocentrism of most social anthropological categorizations. 
He exhaustively revises and reassesses the cruder generalizations current 
in Maghrebology, and in particular brings back Islam into social analysis. 
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His masterly combination of intimate observation and far-sighted analysis 
enables him to manipulate facts and anecdotes as 'signs', 'alternations' 
or 'moments' to illuminate a many-facetted overall 'structure'. 
Until the 1960's, study of the Maghreb tended to be out off not only 
from Islamic research, but also from work being done south of the Sahara. 
This was one effect of the divergence between French-speaking and English- 
speaking social anthropology, for Maghreb studies were almost exclusively 
a French domain. As a consequence, Maghrebologists long remained 
uninfluenced by theoretical advances relating to the dynamics of segmentary 
societies being made by anthropologists in the rest of the continent. 
16 
Until this cross-fertilization took place, North African ethnology was 
"badly hampered". 17 The major recent advances in North African studies in 
recent years have resulted from the use of segmentary theory as a central 
interpretative thread, and, in a more general sense, from the association 
of Maghreb data with political analysis from other areas of the Third World. 
Early credit for this, albeit indirect, belongs to Evans-Pritchard, 
who published his study of "The Sanusi of Cyrenaica" in 1949. This 
described the pattern of patrilineal segmentation operating Northiof the 
Sahara, in a society undergoing dynamic change. However, the implications 
of this work were digested much more by anthropologists of Sub-Saharan 
Africa than by French-speaking Maghrebologists. The publication, in 1958, 
of Bourdieu's small outline "Sociologie de 1'Algeria" was the first sign 
of segmentary theory being actively studied and directly applied within 
the framework of French Maghrebology. 
18 
Much of the direct credit for introducing the perspectives of 
segmentary theory to North-West Africa lies with Gellner. Like Montagne 
and Berque, his detailed research has centred on the Moroccan High Atlas, 
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but like them he extends his conclusions to the Maghreb as a whole. His 
combined interest in Moroccan politics, and in the philosophical 
ramifications of dynamic social anthropology, has proved enormously 
fruitful. 19 His work has had considerable influence on a growing school 
of Anglo-American social-anthropological research into North Africa,, 
Drawing from and contributing to findings from other countries, this 
school's central interest has been segmentary theory, especially its 
dynamic variants. 
20 Several French scholars, too, now share this 
perspective. 
21 
Segmentary theory has been unable, however, to provide an exhaustive 
account of traditional political processes in the Maghreb. Its more 
abstract aspects need to be tempered with some of the factual material 
and explanatory concepts generated by earlier French-speaking ethnologists. 
II. SEGMENTATION 
A sample of working classifications used-by Twentieth-Century 
European observers to describe the socio-political organization of 
North African communities provides both striking diversity and overall 
uniformity: 
Bourdieu: ' Algerian Arabs in general22 - 
a. Conjugal family b. Extended family c. Fraction (or 'clan') 
d. Tribe e. Confederation. 
Bousquet: Berbers throughout the Maghreb 23 
a. Nuclear family (or 'hearth') 'b. Extended family c. Fraction 
d. Tribe c. Confederation. 
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4 
Tillion: Algerian Berbers, from the southern Aures mountains 
24 
a. Extended family (or simple fraction) b. Complex fraction 
c. Tribe. 
Hoffman: Moroccan Arabs in general25 - 
a. Nuclear family (or 'hearth') b. Extended family c. Minor 
lineage d. Sub-section (or village) e. Division (or 'section') 
f. Tribe g. Confederation. 
Bourdieu: Algerian Berbers, from the Kabylia mountains26 - 
a. Extended family (or 'house') b. Lineage (or 'simple clan') 
c. Complex clan d. Village e. Tribe. 
Montague: Nomads throughout the Maghreb 
27 
a. Patriarchal family b. Subfraction c. Fraction d. Tribe 
e. Sub-group f. Group g. Sub-division h. Confederation. 
Despois: Semi-nomads of the Tunisian Low Steppe 
28 
a. Tent b. Extended family c. Fraction d. Tribe 
Latron: Moroccan Berbers of the Meknes plains 
29 
a. Tent b. Extended family (or 'douar') co Fraction 
4d. Tribe 
Evans-Pritchard: Nomadic Arabs of Cyrenaica30 - 
a. Extended family b. Sections (clan, primary section, secondary 
section, tertiary section... etc. ) c. Tribe. 
Both the nomenclature and the density of structural rungs vary 
considerably in these classifications. It is difficult to gauge 
the extent to which variation lies in the mind of the observer, or 
in substantive reality. Clearly a common pattern underlies the 
differences. 
Theories of segmentary opposition have been developed to 
explain this kind of baffling unity in diversity. What they offer 
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initially is two figurative ways of representing the logic of the 
social process. The first model transcribes and modifies the 
genealogical tree by means of which these communities themselves 
explain their origins31: 
Confederation SAT T A2) 
Tribe Al A2 
Tribal Segment B 
Clan DF 
Extended Family HIJKLMN0 
Household PRSTUVWXYZ .0. 
The modification is to view this model not as a kind of lineage 
map (implying descent from an ancestor As for example), but as an 
indication of the levels, or segmentation points, at which groups 
and sub-groups might potentially come into operation. Thus, in terms 
of social action, households P and Q would be distinct from each 
other when issues arise at household level, over the distribution 
of seed corn for example. But they would act as one over issues 
occurring at extended family level - rights to water, for instance - 
and would jointly contend with the claims of households R and S. 
Households PQR and S would have a common interest, however, at 
clan level, where they form a rival group D against households 
TUV and W (group E), say on a question of grazing land. On wider 
questions, such as regulation of transhumance, the whole segment B 
might be ranged against segment C, and iii the case of invasion of 
tribe A's territory, both these segments would unite in face of the 
common enemy. 
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The second method of demonstrating the logic of this kind of 
social system is by means of a nest, or series of concentric circles, 
each of which represents a rung of potential loyalty, or division of 




4. Tribal Segment 
3. Clan 
2. Extended Family 
1. Household 
The significant feature of both these idealized representations 
of segmentary structure is not the specific levels at which communities 
organize themselves, but the fact that each level can only be 
understood in relation to the overall system. The operation of this 
system is characterized by chronic fission and fusion. 
Viewed through the filter of these idealized schemata, many 
features of Maghreb socio-political life fall into an intelligible 
pattern. All Maghreb social groups were segments of larger social 
groups, and themselves contained several potential mutually-exclusive 
sub-groups. There was a constant disposition to fragmentation or 
differentiation. Conflict between groups was endemic, and often 
institutionalized as feud. Units were defined through opposition 
to each other: a 'tribe' only became an effective political body 
when in conflict with another 'tribe'; a 'village' or 'group of tents' 
acted as a coherent 'village' or 'group of tents' when it clashed 
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with other 'villages' or 'groups of tents'; an 'extended family' 
mobilized itself to protect and promote shared interest when these 
were threatened or blocked by rival 'extended families'. Within each 
group and sub-group, there existed an endless number of points of 
likely schism. "This principle of division and sub-division", Gellner 
suggests, "generates all the groupings which are to be found in the 
society". 
33 
Built-in competition generated fission, but it also promoted 
fusion. For each subsection, the higher segmentation point also 
represented a level of possible unity or confederation with other 
subsections, in opposition to an equivalent rival grouping. Each 
moment of segmentation thus expressed solidarity as well as cleavage. 
Disputes were settled by the mobilization of equivalent rival segments 
to ensure an overall, eventual 'balance' of power. These segments 
were "ever ready, they exist' potentially all along the line, available 
'in all sizes', and their rivalry, even if latent, ensures the 
activation of the relevant groups when a conflict does crop up 11.34 
This meant that the solidarity of groups was contingent rather than 
inherent; it stemmed from external menace. "Cohesidn", as Gellner 
indicates, "is maintained not by agencies of coercion at home, but 
by a threat from outside; and hence at every level of size for which 
there is an 'at home', there must be a corresponding 'outside"1.35 
Once this outside evaporated, once the source of dispute was removed, 
groups split up through internal assertions of sub-group 'solidarity' 
or 'independence'. 
Perhaps the major contribution of this segmentary theory to 
Maghrebology has been its patterned explanation of the otherwise 
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bewildering variety of levels and forms of social organization. Attempts 
by earlier ethnologists to locate or set up institutions of control at 
the level of 'tribe' were constantly baffled by the appearance of 
'confederations' which transcended them, or 'clans' which undermined 
them. Imprecise terminology made reality even less comprehensible. 
There was no agreement on how to distinguish a 'tribe' from a 
'confederation of tribes', or from a 'fraction of a tribe'. The term 
'confederation' was casually bestowed on temporary hegemonies or 
alliances which occasionally mushroomed in response to an external 
threat, or to the ambitions of an influential leader or strong clan; 
Bourdieu, for example, describes 'confederations' as "vague and 
ill-defined organizations that usually stem from war, when a coalition 
may bring together two or more tribes threatened by a common danger. 
A weaker tribe may then seek the protection of powerful strangers ab 
the price of its own submission, or groups of equal power may join 
together to oppose a-common enemy or make new conquests. It sometimes 
happens that a vast confederation will be formed around a particular 
great family which holds the weaker tribes in a state of loose 
vassalage". 
36 But tribes themselves often seemed little more than 
temporary coalitions of fractions: "most of the great tribes", 
wrote Marcais, "are really only disguised confederations". 
37 
French ethnologists long clung to the notion of the 'tribe', 
without ever squaring up to the pointed question asked by Berque: 
"what is a North African 'tribe'? " They abstracted one social 
level - one which early colonizers believed they had witnessed in 
action, mobilized to resist their conquest - and {reotc1. " rj 
it as a corporate entity, the key to social action. "The framework 
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of knowledge, the objective of action", Berque complained, "has always 
been the tribe". 38 Attempts were made to list and enumerate tribes, 
to plot their boundaries on 'tribal maps'. 
39 This was done amid a 
welter of contradiction and anachronism; Berque cites French surveys 
in Morocco which listed the same social group in some places as a 
'tribe', in other places as a 'fraction', and in several places as 
an 'agglomeration'. 
40 
These timeconsuming activities were as 
confusing and essentially sterile as computing the number of angels 
dancing on a pinhead. As Berque suggested, a tribe was a figure of 
speech; it had no concrete structure or fixed characteristics; it 
was "a secondary phenomenon, and partly artificial". 
41 
It was 
incomprehensible if isolated from the total structure of social 
interaction. "The more the analyst tries to pin down the components 
of the .... system", he declared, "the-more aware he becomes of their 
transience. This is because their originality. lies not in the facts 
themselves, but in the system .... It is not the facts themselves 
which are important, but their disposition, their level, the function 
which they perform in the overall context". 
42 
Other, similar, attempts to treat 'clans', 'groups of tents', or. 
'villages' as if they had a fixed corporate existence were equally 
fruitless. In the segmentary environment of the Maghreb, Gellner 
argues, "it was a mistake for French ethnography to be tempted by the 
search for the crucial group". 
43 
The mistake lay in not understanding 
that "however one may define political units or groups, they cannot be 
treated in isolation, for they always form part of a larger social 
system.... The designation of autonomous political groups is always to 
some extent an arbitrary matter". 
44 
At any one time in Algeria, the 
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scale of effective political organization differed considerably from 
one geographical area to another; conversely, in any one area of 
Algeria, the scale of effective political organization fluctuated 
considerably from one era to another. 
One minor contribution of segmentary theory to the understanding 
of North Africa was its confirmation of the continuity between the 
social systems of 'Berbers' and 'Arabs'. Both were of the same 
segmentary type, and fitted within a common framework of interaction. 
This reinforced the view that Berber-Arab differences were purely 
linguistic, a view towards which the consensus of Maghrebologists had 
long been tending. 
The segmentary model also offers an explanation of the paradox 
of "ordered anarcl jt, noted among others by Montagne45: within a 
fairly stable pattern of long-term social interaction, individual 
political formations were chronically unstable, and conversely, despite 
chronic fractionalization of social organisms, far-reaching political 
hegemonies could form with surprising ease. Classic segmentary theory 
offers to reconcile these apparent contradictions by positing that, 
over time, counter-vailing forces of 'assimilation and differentiation' 
result in approximate equilibrium; it suggests that "the tendency of 
tribes and tribal sections towards fission and internal opposition 
between their parts is balanced by a tendency in the direction of 
fusion, of the combination or amalgamation of groups"* 
46 
However, the formal simplicity of the segmentary model is, 
deceptive. One reason is that real groups in the Maghreb were not 
characterized by monadism, that situation whereby nesting segmentary 
groups mirror the characteristics of all higher and lower level groups. 
47 
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At the base of the model, of course, the unit individual is indivisible, 
but in fact even the nuclear family, or 'hearth', had no separate group 
existence, for the North African 'family', and the physical building or 
tent in which it dwelt, incorporated the kin of at least three generations. 
More importantly, it is arguable that groupings up to the size of (say) 
the clan should be regarded as domestic rather than political in nature; 
they performed different functions from higher groups, and perhaps should 
not figure in political analysis at all. Evans-Pritchard, for example, 
explained that "we regard the family, the household, and the hamlet as 
domestic rather than political groups, and do not discuss them further 
in detail". 
1 
By contrast, Middleton and Tait treated the extended 
family as the 'nuclear group', as both "the largest purely domestic 
unit" and - through its head - the lowest "political unit". 
49 
On the outer edge of the segmentary nest, too, there are problems 
as to what constituted the widest effective political unit. The tribe 
itself, by certain definitions of that term, often provided only a weak 
or sporadic focus of behaviour; according to Sahlins, "the tribe (as a 
whole) is often the weakest link in the segmentary chain". 
50 Certainly 
beyond it, such vague layers of loyalty as super-confederations and 
regions had a spurious existence in terms of political action; they 
represented levels of behaviour "only in a cultural sense". 
51 
Between these two structural extremes, the range and density of 
intermediate groupings varied considerably. 
52 The logical premiss that 
there exist an infinite number of potential segmentation points needs, 
however, to be confronted with factual situations and realities of 
Maghreb modes of life. In any one environmental, at any one time, the 
possibilities for political organization were finite, and the formal 
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fluidity of the segmentary ideal type distorts reality. Special 
topographical and socio-economic conditions among the densely-populated, 
tree-cultivating communities of the Greater Kabyliä highlands, for 
example, made the clan -a subfraction of the village, but grouping 
together extended families -- the most regularly mobilized and 
effective political unit. As Bourdieu suggests, "among these segmentation 
points there are some... which mark out true thresholds defining more 
stable groups. So it is that the most vital unit is the simple or 
complex clan (takharroubt or adroum)". 
53 Similarly, Hart argues that 
the 'self-contained tribe' is in practice the "terminal unit" in the 
Rif Mountains of Northern Morocco. 
54 
III. LINEAGE AND NOMENCLATURE 
Social segments in the Maghreb typically defined themselves in 
terms of patrilineal descent; they called themselves "the sons of... " 
(in Arabic "Ouled"... or "Beni"..., in Berber "Ait"... ) a common ancestor. 
Some early ethnologists tried to chart these genealogies back through 
the vicissitudes of time - through conquests, conflicts, migrations, 
alliances and intermarriages - relying both on oral and written legend, 
and on etymological inference. 
55 Such undertakings were thankless, 
given the variety and repetition of nomenclature throughout the Maghreb. 
The accumulated mass of overlapping and contradictory detail gave little 
idea that there was a coherent process at work behind the myriad of 
names. The inaccuracies and inconsistencies which such studies revealed 
appeared only to show that the illiterate tribesmen were ignorant or 
confused about their actual origins. Members of the same community 
228 
often used different agnatic classifications; Montague noted that they 
"do not describe the complex ensemble of tribes to which they belong in 
the same way. They include in it a greater or lesser number of elements, 
or alternatively arrange them in different ways. The result is that 
after a great deal of work, and after comparing the extremely precise 
observations of numerous informers, one finally draws up a picture which 
is still liable to constant modification and full of contradictions". 
56 
Uusually, these communities used only agnatic labels. Tillion 
pointed out that they seldom used abstract generic names among 
themselves - 'clan', 'fraction', 'tribe', or 'fifth' - except under 
pressure from the central administration or visiting anthropologists. 
57 
"The Berbers", Montagne observed, "hardly apply distinct names to the 
various organisms which our administrative needs oblige us to 
differentiate..... The 'Ihahan' describe by this name what we call the 
'confederation' of the Haha.... (and) the 'Isouktan' what we call the 
'tribe' of the Souktana.... without use ever being made of any name 
describing the social organism of confederation or tribe". 
5$ 
Elsewhere he attributes this dearth of generic terminology to their 
"lack of a sense of the abstract". 
59 In fact, however, as he implied, 
and as Tillion stressed, only the colonizer needs this abstract 
grammar; "for the native, born and brought up within his tribe, the 
latter's protocol is above all a living reality: he knows exactly 
what his relations are with each individual before knowing what 
determines these relations". 
60 
Some abstract self-descriptions were employed, though usually 
they passed from higher segments downwards rather than rose 
spontaneously from below. Their flexibility and imprecision 
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hindered rather than helped the understanding of European observers. 
Variants of the Arabic word 'arch or the Berber word tagbilt - 
itself a derivative of the Arabic aq bile - were occasionally employed, 
and translated as 'tribe'. However, it was a mistake to apply static 
logic and assign this 'tribe' a fixed position in a precise hierarchy 
of social formations. 'arch and tagbilt were used to designate the 
widest tribal group at the moment and in the context where they were 
employed. The formations which they referred to might range between 
'clan', 'fraction', or 'confederation' levels. Similarly, labels 
like ferga (Arabic) and takharroubt (Djurdjura Berber), though- 
invariably translated as 'fraction', were affixed to all levels of 
segmentation between extended family and tribe; in Kabylia, as 
Bourdieu explained, they "designate social units of a size that 
varies both with the region and with the social structure and history 
of the villages. This is because the transition takes place in a 
gradual and continuous manner from the narrowest to the most extensive 
units". 
61 
Other semi-abstract terms - translatable as 'fifths', 
'fourths', 'bones' or 'groups of tents' - bore no precise meaning 
outside their particular context. 
The writings of Berque were extremely important in questioning 
the utility of patrilineal and abstract terminology as a guide for 
charting the origins of existing groups, or predicting their long-term 
behaviour. The nomenclature, he suggested, was largely epiphenomenal. 
Only of the immediate kinship group - three or four generations - was 
the agnatic definition of groupings likely to represent biological 
descent. The wider the group, the more the patrilineal classifications 
would be projective, and the claimed ancestors mythical. Names, he 
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argued, did not explain origins, conflicts or coalitions; they were 
tools which retrospectively rationalized existing segmentary 
relationships in kinship terms. Far from constituting evidence of 
the chaos of the 'savage mind', they were symbols or signs manipulated 
as part of an extremely sophisticated structure. Patrilineal 
ideology was a classificatory system regulating social dynamics by 
its justification of 'assimilation and differentiation'. 
62 
Sub-Saharan 
segmentary anthropology developed insights parallel to Berque's. 
Middleton and Tait, for example, came to suggest that the lineage 
model was "an abstraction, a concept used by the actors, and by 
ourselves in analysis, to express certain relations between aggregates 
of people composing local groups". 
63 
It was, in Fellers' phrase, "a 
cultural system, a system of ideas - in fact a kind of political 
theory". 
64 
Under the umbrella of agnatic ideology, economic interests 
determined the pattern of segmentation. Evans-Pritchard suggested of the 
Nuer that "relationships are generally expressed in kinship terms, and 
these terms have great emotional content, but living together counts 
more than kinship". 
65 
to which Fortes' comment should be added: 
"local ties do not appear to give rise to structural bonds in and of 
themselves. There must be common political or economic or kinship or 
ritual interests for structural bonds to emerge". 
66 
Thus, we have to 
look for "the underlying structure of the game", "the ecological, 
demographic and sociological context", of social action. 
67 
In the 
Maghreb alliances and conflicts were generated by rivalry for control 
of resources: land and raw materials, crops and livestock, wells and 
irrigation, markets and trade, routes and passes, women and honour, 
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sacredness and prestige. We have to understand the climactic, 
topographical, and technological conditions of this rivalry for 
resources. Berque provides a glimpse of this 'structure' in 
sketching the nature of land-use in the Algeria of 1830, with its 
alternating years of famine and abundance, of high mortality and 
high fertility: 
"In three-quarters of the country theft reigned an agricultural 
and pastoral society with cyclical movements. The rural group sowed 
and reaped; the rest of the time, it pastured. Cultivation and 
pasturing were usually disjointed. Between the two areas of land, 
the distance was sometimes considerable. Hence those continual 
displacements, that perpetual search for room. This kind of rhythm 
imposed upon the groups a difficult strategy of equilibriums, brought 
about by pacts or by violence. Hence a specific atmosphere of 
rapine and of accord, of patriarchal harmony and harsh competition". 
68 
Berque insists however, that agnatic ideology-was not simply a 
mask for material behaviour; it interacted with and shaped that 
behaviour. 
69 
Similarly, primordial spiritual or 'sacral' attachments 
were an indisoluble part of the structure of interactions; in a sense 
"the economic is dominated and covered over by the magico-religious". 
7° 
IV. NON-AGNATIC ALLIANCES 
In pure segmentary lineage systems, Gellner suggests, "there are 
no cross-cutting groups and criteria". 
71 In Maghreb society, however, 
a number of criteria of segmentation other than agnatic descent did 
operate. One of these took the form of factions or 'parties': in 
Algeria they were generally called soff-s, and in Morocco leff-s. 
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The study of these moieties in the Maghreb has been greatly 
marked by the work of Montague. He exaggerated their importance, 
implying that they constituted the 'efficient secret' of tribal life 
throughout North Africa - and indeed the Middle East. 
72 His account 
of their operation has subsequently been subjected to detailed 
revision and heavy criticism, 
73 
particularly in the light of 
segmentary theory. That most of this was justified should not 
obscure the significance of the social reality which he focussed on. 
Montagne's study originated in the South of Morocco, but he 
extended his findings to most of the Maghreb. According to him, a 
great patchwork quilt of group alliances was spread over the Maghreb, 
which could be transcribed as a political map. These factions were 
'transitive' in the sense that if A and C were allies, and C and E 
were allies, then A and E were allies, while conversely if A and B 
were rivals, and C and D were rivals, then A and D were rivals. 
74 
These loyalty-patterns were latent, in that, when a dispute occurred, 
"there is created, on the spot, and immediately, two alliances of 
equal strength". 
75 But they were not haphazard: "each fraction knows, 
in the case of an intestine quarrel, who its brothers and who its 
enemies are". 
76 In any situation of conflict, these two-networks of 
alliances were mobilized as a means of settling or extending it: 
"these leagues give a sort of guarantee, through the existence of 
permanent alliances, limiting conflicts, unless on the contrary they 
extend them indefinitely". 
77 
The significance of these moieties was that they were not based 
on, or justified in terms of, agnatic relationships. They cut across 
the pattern of patrilineal descent. They were 'secular' alliances 
arising out of alternated physical contiguity. 
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It was not disputed that these alliances did exist in the 
Maghreb, nor that on occasion they provided a key to understanding 
the physiognomy of conflicts. Bourdieu, for example, detected, and 
tried to describe the operation of soff-s in Kabylia: "diffused 
and abstract organizations, systems of political and agonistic 
alliances, which may divide the village, the clan, or even the 
family, and which are organized into two general leagues, an 'upper' 
league and a 'lower' league; organizations-that are primarily 
onomastic (name-related) in nature, and have a potential rather 
than an actual existence. These 'associations' (in the sense of 
'a social unit that is not based on the factor of kinship') come 
into action on every occasion and at every level, whenever a 
quarrel breaks out between members of different soffst however 
trifling the incident may be, and no matter whether it is on an 
individual or on a collective scale.... Different features lead one 
to think that these conflicts between leagues assumed an institutional 
form and that the combats resulted from the logic of the ritual game 
rather than from a proper war".? 
$ 
The main criticism of Montague is that he erected his limited 
data on leff-s into an excessively ambitious scheme for interpreting 
all conflict in the Maghreb. He implied that they were permanent, 
rigid and universal institutions. Berque and Dresch showed that the 
checkerboard pattern he had 'discovered' in one corner of the Maghreb 
was not typical of other areas. 
79 Even in the Moroccan High Atlas, 
Berque suggested, the pattern he had unearthed at one particular 
moment in time, was not necessarily permanent and unchanging. 
Montagne's insistence on binary patterns, rather than tripartite 
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segmentation for example, has also been criticized as simplistic. 
Perhaps the most telling weakness of Montagne's account is that he 
described the social process in terms of only one level of alliance 
segmentation - the clan, for example - treating it as the crucial 
focus for all political action. Dresch pointed out, however, that 
on certain occasions, on certain matters, a whole valley, described 
by Montague as fragmented into rival leffs, could act as a unit. 
80 
As Hart suggests, Montague "could not explain why or how conflict 
could occur within a lefft. 
81 
Nor could he explain how order was 
maintained within a leff: "Suppose", Gellner asks, "that each 
'square' on his chessboard represents a 'canton', a valley, or a 
group of villages. What is to keep order if a dispute breaks out 
(as it will) within this group, or within subgroups of it? There 
are, after all, no specialized political institutions within each 
unit on the board, any more than there are any between them% 
82 
Montagne's model of leff conflict and balance appears in many 
respects to be a crude and confused forerunner of the theory of 
patrilineal segmentation; his work frequently confuses leffs with 
lineage segments, 
83 
and he never made a thorough analysis of the 
basis of leff segmentation. 
84 
His major fault seems to have been 
isolating, and reifying, individual components of a total and very 
complicated system of group relationships. To an extent, he was a 
victim of his own overeagerness to generalize, for, as Seddon notes, 
"there was a difference between his formal position and his 
substantive material about the dynamics of political action"* 
85 
An example of the complications of alliance-networks on the ground 




The major 'tribes' in the Hodna mountain area, on the pre-Saharan 
fringe of central Algeria, were the Ouled Mahdi (to the West, near the 
mountains of the Ouled Nail) and the Ouled Derradj (to the South-East, 
near the Ziban oases). Together, these Hodna tribes acted as one soff 
against their neighbours and rivals to the West, the Ouled Nail; these 
soffs were distinguished by black tents and red tents. However, the 
two constituent 'tribes' of this Hodna soff (Ouled Mahdi, Ouled Derradj) 
were themselves rivals. The former belonged to the Oued Chellal Soff 
(influenced by the Mokrani clan from the Medjana in Kabylia to the North 
West), and the latter belonged to the Oued Msila soff (influenced by the 
Bou Okkaz clan of the Ziban); during the 1871 Kabylia uprising, for 
example, they were ranged on opposing sides. Moreover, each of these 
constituent tribes was internally split into rival soffs. The Ouled 
Mahdi "were too agitated and too turbulent, and the cohesion of the 
various fractions was certainly not strong enough, for them not to have 
been themselves divided into two parts, the hostility of which was 
aroused at the slightest incident, and the origin of which went back 
to 1734". 
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Fractions of the Ouled Derradj were also split by soff 
rivalries; these alliances were seemingly more contingent, however,, in 
that one fraction (Ouled Sahnoun) usually supported the Oued Chellal 
soff against the Oued Msila soff, but, when threatened by Sahari 
tribesmen of the Ben Gana Soff- who were ancient rivals of the Bou 
Okkaz soff - they called in the Oued Msila soff for help. Thus, there 
were soffs at different levels, and on a contingent basis rather than 
organized into a neatly transitive and permament pattern. 
What Montague had done with the leff is analogous to what many 
earlier French ethnologists had done with the tribe; he had transformed 
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it in his mind into a concrete organism, a crucial reality, without 
trying to understand the overall system of segmentation in relation 
to which it was a secondary phenomenon. As Berque suggested, a leff 
was a word; it was "no more than a classificatory system. It is 
normally lacking where other kinds of tension operate". 
88 
The 
grandiose leff theory took Maghrebology up a blind alley; Favret 
suggests, indeed, that Montagne's work "congealed the study of 
political institutions for thirty years". 
89 
In view of its weaknesses, 
and the development of an alternative, sophisticated segmentary theory, 
it was possible to conclude, with Nicolas, that "the gigantic 
construction has collapsed". 
90 
However, Montagne's analysis of leffs, stripped of its more 
ambitious pretensions, had left behind some useful insights. He was 
undoubtedly correct in noting that, in specific areas, particularly 
among highly sedentarized populations, the pattern of 'secular' 
alliances might prove quite stable over a period of time. Also, in 
some areas, Kabylia for example, the alliance network did tend to 
operate at one or two key levels. What his work certainly indicated 
was that patrilineal segmentation did not provide an exhaustive 
picture of competitive tribal dynamics. He illustrated a point made 
by Smith, that lineage and segmentation were not synonymous. 
91 
Other principles of organization cut across the purity of the lineage 
nest, and were manipulated in the contest for power and resources. 
Montagne's unearthing of these facilitated a more dynamic approach to 
inter-tribal diplomacy, for, in the game of accumulating clients, 
winning over tactical and strategic allies, and undermining the unity 
of enemies, there was "no single basis of recruitment or membership". 
92 
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In certain circumstances, we might even talk of "value neutrality 
regarding group membership". 
93 In this light, soffs and leffs appear 
simply as "a specific aspect of a more general and loosely defined 
phenomenon: any association of persons in a conflict situation"* 
94 
Moieties and patrilineal segmentation were not incompatible. 
As Vinogradov indicates: "it is both arbitrary and unrewarding to 
conceive of the socio-political system in exclusively segmentary 
or alliance terms. A more realistic interpretation would be to view 
it in terms of a dynamic interplay of the two models. An alliance 
could reinforce the lineage, contradict it, or even replace it 
altogether. Many times, a segment had to make a choice between 
respecting lineage solidarity or upholding its own political 
interests... The function of the different alliances was to provide 
alternatives in the case of the failure of lineage cohesion". 
95 
Often alliances were retrospectively justified in terms of lineage 
ideology: "the segmentary lineage model ... could be used as a 
rallying cry, or principle of recruitment, among others, in the 
complex and difficult game of forming, affirming or breaking 
political alliances within the 'leff model "'. 
96 
V. CONTINGENCY AND DIFFUSION OF POWER 
Divergence and convergence of interests between social segments 
was an inherent feature of Maghreb community life. "What defines a 
segmentary society", Gellner points out, explaining the ideal-type!, 
is not that this does occur, but that this is very nearly all that 
occurs! 
97 
According to this model, interactions are "situational"98 
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or "contingent". 
99 No group could be treated in isolation as an 
autonomous unit; each group is defined in relation to other groups, 
and has a latent rather than a permanent overt existence. Levels 
of segmentation only become actual in the face of outside threats; 
"the decision-making machinery comes into being only with the 
appearance of the policy problem - the dispute". 
100 When disputes 
have been settled, or transcended, or undermined by other disputes, 
the related levels of mobilization wither away. Pure segmentary 
systems contain no alternative 'associations' or 'corporate bodies, 
to complicate or obstruct this withering-away mechanism. 
This analysis clarifies the Algerian situation, in as far as 
permanent structures of law enforcement or special foci of organized 
force, were absent from its major component groups. Order was not 
maintained by such 'specialized' institutions as police, law-courts, 
prisons, or professional armies, but by the complementary opposition 
of interlocking segments in the social structure. In the same way, 
according to the model, "the stabilizing factor is not a superordinate 
judicial or military organization, but simply the sum total of inter- 
segment realtions". 
101 power, in other words, was dispersed at the 
interstices between contingent groups. Conflict signalled the 
breakdown of balancing mechanisms, but was at the same time a method 
of calling them into operation. Opposition, or expenditure of 
aggression, was part of a ritual game rather than the real attempt of 
one segment to establish permanent hegemony over others. Such 
communities could only be called 'anarchic' if order were equated 
with the presence of "specialized and permanent political institutions"; 
in fact, the system for maintaining order was extremely complex, subtle 
and effective. 
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Leadership in the Maghreb was contingent. Authority was not 
incorporated in a self-perpetuating class of 'chiefs', quite distinct 
from 'the rule, '. Inevitably, ad hoc pre-eminences arose from lineage 
position, strength of personality, and political circumstance, but 
these could not be divorced from the communities which gave rise to 
them; "political leadership", Evans-Pritchard remarked in a similar 
setting, "is limited to situations in which a tribe or segment of it 
acts corporately". 
102 North African 'elders' or 'sheikh-s' were not 
marked off from their lineage groups by special insignias of office; 
there were no extreme institutionalized differences in rank, status, 
wealth or force. To this extent the society could be called 
'egalitarian'. Leadership which emerged was inherently unstable 
over time. In some parts of the Maghreb, in Kabylia or the High 
Atlas, there were institutional restraints on pre-eminences - annual 
election, election by rival clans, rotating chieftainships etc. The, 
situation described by Gellner in the Central High Atlas, for example, 
accords with quite a pure segmentary model: "The transient nature of 
chieftaincy turns all lay chiefs into lame ducks. The conduct of the 
chief is not that of a ruler guided by the concern with the long-term 
stability and possibly increase of his power. It is the conduct of a 
citizen temporarily enjoying power, responsibility and prestige, or 
having them thrust upon him, or accepting them lest they fall into 
worse hands... ". 
103 Even where chieftaincy was less modest, the 
demands of reciprocity were important; 'leaders' had obligations, 
and if these were not performed they were likely to lose authority. 
The usefulness, and therefore acceptance of leadership, its freedom 
from internal segmentary challenge, lasted as long as the external 
240 
threat or problem which it arose to meet or solve. The threat to 
an elder's pre-eminence came less from external pressure, which might 
actually strengthen it, but from internal dissension. Effective 
leadership was rarely hereditary for more than a few generations; 
the death of a strong leader invariably led to the dispersal of his 
power and charisma among rival sons, or rival sub-clans. 
Lacking a full understanding of the segmentary dynamics underlying 
leadership, early French ethnologists had a 'corporate' mentality. 
They tried to locate ! chiefs' and 'notables' who acted as 'rulers' of 
their tribes. here the French came into contact with apparently 
established local "overlordships" - the Mokrani of the Medjana in 
Eastern Algeria, or the Ouled Sidi Sheikh of the Saharan Atals - they 
wrongly regarded them as constituting permanent structures ("feudalities"). 
In other areas - for example, the village communities of Kabylia104 - 
there were even fewer opportunities for 'elders' to elevate themselves 
above the play of segmentary lineages, and community leadership was 
embodied by series of clan assemblies ( ema'a-s). But even in such 
cases, some French ethnologists thought in institutional rather than 
contingent terms. They wrote of Berber 'republics' - drawing attention 
to communal 'budgets', 'officials' and electoral 'machinery' - and 
compared them with European municipalities. Their writings, as 
Gellner suggests, "may overstress the role of the ema'a, the assembly, 
(though rightly noting that there is a hierarchy of such). These 
accounts.... given the impression that these assemblies have a kind of 
corporate existence. But they have no existence independently of the 
social group, the segments of which they are the assemblies". 
105 
Referring specifically to assemblies in the High Atlas, he argues that 
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"they have no continuity other than that of that group; they have of 
course no kind of ). secretariat or records. On the other hand, they can, 
and generally do when larger groups are involved, consist of people who 
are delegates, who represent sub-groups". 
lo6 Such assemblies arose to 
solve problems, and disbanded when these were solved; they were 
periodically activated rather than standing institutions. When the 
French colonial administration chose one level of segmentation and 
tried to concretize administrative contacts around its assembly, it 
misread its character and potentialities. 
However, the ideal type of contingent segmentarity does not come 
to entirely satisfactory-terms with the variety and flux of mechanisms 
of leadership and authority in the Maghreb. Smith has pointed out that 
a 'pure' segmentary society is impossible to conceive, for "a society 
characterized by a government organized at all levels solely in terms 
of coordinate group corporations is not more practicable than one 
organized similarly in terms of Corporations Sole". 
107 He criticized 
segmentary theorists for erecting an ideal-typical distinction between 
centralized states and segmentary lineages into a fallacious dichotomy 
of real types. 
1o8 He argued, instead, for the study of a continuum, 
with intermediate types; in fact, segmentary theorists have not been 
backward in taking this approach. 
l09 
Ideal types must be regarded as inevitable, and useful heuristic 
tools. 110 But a more telling criticism of segmentary theory concerns 
the kind of ideal type it offers. Early segmentary theorists were 
often content with merely drawing up a typology of societies. Their 
models were static and synchronic, demonstrating neatly contrapuntal 
equilibrium. They did not comfortably fit a real world with "actual 
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competition among segments or lineages of unequal status". 
ill Any 
society with limited resources, and characterized by disposition to 
fission, inevitably breeds such competition. This being so, the 
static segmentary model fails to answer a fundamental question: 
"Given the fixity of lineage morphology, and the interdependence 
of this formal organization on segmentary process, how can the minimal 
lineage retain its fixity of character and position in the order of 
segmentation, when continually itself giving rise by fission to 
further segments of the same order? "112 
The major weakness of static segmentary theory as an explanation 
of North African political process was this difficulty in coming to 
terms with the dynamic conflicts, and tensions which characterized its 
real operation. There was a rather bland assumption that any tendency 
towards the establishment of segment hegemonies, powerful leadership, 
and wide-scale fusion, would eventually ('over time') be counteracted 
by the forces of clan particularism, egalitarianism, and fission. 
However, this obscured the fact that such hegemonies were as much 
chronic features of Maghreb life as 
their 
absence. The problem of 
conflict, imbalance, and leadership was never neatly solved. In 
certain areas, for a certain duration of time, the possibilities 
for a would-be emergent chief were drastically circumscribed; in the 
areas studied by Gellner, for example, "within the rules of the game, 
he (the transient chief) cannot aspire to becoming a tyrant, to 
usurping permanent and real power; moreover, the general situation, 
the relative strength of forces and their lay out, reinforce the 
formal rules and make any such aspiration, any hope of breaking the 
rules, vain or at any rate unlikely of fulfilment". 
113 But in other 
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areas, at other times, the contest for hegemony - certainly among 
clans, if not among-individual leaders - was a dominant mode of the 
political process. 
Montagne's work was extremely important in emphasizing this 
dynamic aspect of Maghreb politics. 
114 He showed how the disposition 
to fission and fusion could encourage ambitious individuals or clans 
to compete for ever-widening hegemony. Local. circumstances might 
enable a clan to doninate'a 'core' fraction of a 'tribe', and from 
this base, by astute diplomacy, 'to gain the adherence of other fractions 
in the tribe. Armed victory over a neighbouring tribe might then 
encourage potential rivals to join it in an alliance against weaker 
tribes. The end result of this process, short-circuiting counter- 
vailinct fnrcas_ m1oht ha fhaf the nrivinal clan and its clients WOUJJ 
entrench: tk&xx ascendancy by seizing land and property, executing 
rival leaders, building fortresses and gaols, imposing taxes - 
even the kharadj supposedly to be levied only from conquered infidels115 - 
ind4ging in various forms of 'conspicuous consumption', and setting up 
the rudiments of a standing army and networ1 of agents of authority. 
Links with, opposition to, or attempted replacement of the 'central' 
authority were further possibilities offered by this game. The 
ascendant spiral, of course, was always liable to degenerate into a 
vicious circle of fragmentation. The competition of descendantSor 
the ambitions of rival segments, and the scarcity of resources made 
this a long-term probability. "The Maghreb powers", in Berque's 
words, "- tribal hegemonies, personal chiefdoms, spiritual or dynastic 
conquests - flared up or died away like torches". 
116 
Montagne's work did not simply provide an explanation of the 
static, typological paradox wherehj jealously egalitarian clans were 
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juxtaposed with tribal 'empires'. He sketched out a dynamic, 
transformative model. 
117 Within this framework, it was possible 
to comprehend the total oscillation and interaction between almost 
'pure' segmentary communities, and approximations to 'segmentary 
states': those "delicate balances among scattered centres of semi- 
independent power, now building up under the guidance of tribal 
myth and civic ritual toward some apical point, now sliding away 
into clan jealousy, local rivalry and fraternal intrigue" *118 
Though lacking the sophisticated anthropological apparatus, Montagne's 
interpretative framework foreshadows Leach's dynamic account of the 
political process in Highland Burma. 
119 
Berque provided a subtler, less sweeping transformative model. 
Though his study focussed on the organization of Berber communities 
in the Moroccan High Atlas - the Seskawa - he did not imply 
that this 
was 'typical' of other Maghreb communities. Indeed, he stressed that 
the stability of those social formations over time was most unusual. 
Instead, he treated them as one 'moment' - 'privileged moment' - in 
an overall rise and fall of competitive groupings in response to a 
complex of environmental pressures (what he called the 'interaction 
of structure, time and space'). He treated the different types of 
Maghreb social formation existing over time and space as "the 
inequalities of an operation which in one place is coherent, stable, 
and energetic, and in another place is discordant and transitory". 
120 
There were, he declared, "strong moments and weak moments, strong 
points and weak points, in the institutional history, in the very 
being, of North Africa". 
121 Berque found segmentary language too static 
and neat to encapsulate the many-sided transformative structure which he 
envisioned in the Maghreb. 
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Gellner tried a somewhat different approach. Rejecting the 
dichotomy between 'well integrated societies' and social change, 
he injected dynamic theory into the veins of the segmentary model. 
He pointed out that the concept of perpetual fission-fusion balance - 
even 'over time' - could amount to an "optical illusion". Instead, 
he described the Maghreb political process as a complex pattern which 
constantly collapsed and reconstituted itself on its own ruins. 
Truly effective 'systems maintenance', he argued, revelling in paradox, 
would have brought the system to a halt: either power would have 
become institutionalized, and corporate features emerged, or order 
would have evaporated. "So as to work at all", he explained, "the 
system also must not work too well". 
122 The effective functioning 
of the system required its participants to fear that it would collapse; 
for this fear to be credible, the system had actually periodically to 
collapse. Thus, communal life was not blissfully balanced, but seething 
with internal contradictions. Overall, 
M 
aghreb was "a comparatively 
stable society nevertheless composed of discordant parts or traditions, 
where the uneasy stability cannot in any natural sense be called an 
equilibrium". 
23 
This model of a society constantly destroying and reinventing 
itself is not static. The danger it runs is of being too dynamic to 
offer contact with observable facts. It has been argued, for example, 
that Gellner's "obsession with fluidity and with even the apparent 
inexistence of political organization.... (leads him to)... exaggerate 
the purely ideal or logical nature of segmentarity", 
124 
and to ignore 
other stable or cross-cutting features of Maghreb political actuality. 
But in a sense this approach is useful precisely because it does ignore 
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certain 'real' facts of North African life. Gellner himself cheer- 
fully concedes that the model is abstract and excessively neat, but 
suggests that his "'pure' ideal type is useful primarily in highlight- 
ing the kinks and unevennesses of 'real' segmentary societies". 
125 
His major work in fact concentrates on precisely one of these kinks - 
holy men - and how it relates to the segmentary environment. 
The most promising vein of recent investigation of social dynamics 
in the Maghreb has been cast in terms of 'games theory'. 
126 Though 
inspired by theoretical advances made by Barth and Bailey in Asian 
anthropology, 
127 it also reclaims some of'the insights offered by 
Montagne's structural analysis. Its particular interest lies in its 
efforts to examine competition for power less in terms of the strategies 
of individual 'politicians' than in terms of the struggle of classes 
and groups for economic survival. This could eventually relate'. the 
rather abstract logic of segmentarism and dynamic conflict theory to 
the "ecological, demographic and sociological context" of Maghreb life. 
VI. SACREDNESS 
An important 'kink' or complex of cross-cutting social ties in 
North Africa centred around 'sacredness', or baraka. The structure 
of society was deeply marked by the distribution of 'blessed' authority - 
among petty local saints, special tribes, powerful religious leaders, 
and the widely-scattered moslem brotherhoods. 
Excessive concentration on the mechanics of tribal segmentation 
obscures the role of Islam in North Africa. Montagne, for example, 
painted a picture which was almost wholly secular. He focussed on 
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relations among the various tribes, and between them and the central 
administration, without examining or indicating the "moral principle 
of unity"12$ underlying these interactions. One of his critics has 
suggested that "of the tryptich - moslem sociology, makhzen (central 
authority) sociology, and Berber sociology - Robert Montagne retains 
only the latter two sections - makhzen and Berber sociology. Reading 
his BERBERES ET LE MAKHZEN, one sometimes wonders whether, in Morocco, 
one is in a moslem country at all". 
129 Transplantation of the pure 
segmentary model to the Maghreb threatens to have the same distorting 
effect. 
Much of colonial ethnography implied that Islam had shallow roots 
in the Maghreb. It was held that age-old patterns of behaviour were 
not fundamentally disturbed by Islam, despite the lip-service of the 
tribes. The mistake lay in regarding Islam as a single, institution- 
alized doctrine. In fact, Islamic civilization throughout the Middle 
East and North Africa involved constant interaction and occasionally 
conflict between different traditions: between the "folk Islam" of 
autochthonous peasants and nomads, and the expectations of "the Islam 
of the caliphs and scholanlegists", 
130 between Koranic Law (Shar'ia) 
and Customary Law ('Urf), or between Orthodoxy (Sunna) and 
Heterodoxy (Bida). 131 Apparently autonomous tribes were not merely 
linked by economic interdependence and a common lineage structure, but 
deeply impregnated with "a universalistic system of values and 
norms". 
132 They were "part of a wider Islamic civilization, and they 
identified enthusiastically and firmly with Islam. They were on the 
margin of a wider society, universalistic and non-tribal". 
133 
European observers tended to look for, and concentrate on, the 
specifically local ingredients in religious behaviour. They contrasted t 
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them with 'alien' and universalistic precepts brought from the Middle 
East and enshrined in the Koran, the ulema (jurists), cadi-s (civil 
lawyers), Ca_ liph-s (Temporal and Spiritual leaders of the Community), 
universities, and other urban 'authorities'. There was an element of 
wishful thinking in this contrast: Europeans "spotted, with the joy 
of discovery, a crack in this so-harsh reality: the undeniable contrast 
between the Islamic witness of these believers and the concrete content 
of their belief, and above all their practice. A particularism most 
incarnate here opposed ideology; concrete wisdom opposed holy 
exaltation". 
134 There was, Berque suggests, "prejudice in favour of 
the local fact against its universalist 'models', in other words of 
the friendly, the reconcilable, the analysable, against what might 
seem hostile, evasive, incomprehensible". 
135 
It was a distortion to disassociate the Maghreb tribes from their 
universalistic heritage, for the particularistic or autochthonous 
ingredients in their faith and practice represented only one alternation 
of the dynamic whereby "the tribal base constantly oscillates between 
withdrawal into itself, and enthusiastic identification with the 
larger community of faithfuls". 
136 One of the striking aspects of 
local Islamic observance was, in fact, its rigour. Within the Sunni 
orthodoxy, which the vast majority of communities observed, 
137 
a 
single rite, that of Malik, prevailed; this was the most austere of 
the four Sunni schools. Maghreb practice entailed stricter observance 
of fasting, sex segregation, and abstinence from forbidden foods, than 
in most parts of the Islamic world. Piety was deeply respected, and 
appeals to fundamentalism found a periodic and rapid echo in the faith 
of the tribes. The Islam of North Africa, even its expansive, 
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universalistic aspects, was not transmitted from above or outside; 
it was lived as an inescapable part of everyday reality. It was 
inseparable from communal solidarity and behaviour. 
Islam in North Africa, particularly in the tribal environment, 
was largely embodied in local 'saints'. 
138 These were not merely 
targets for posthumous veneration, but played an active part in the 
social process. Saints (murabit-s or wali-s) were those with divine 
blessing (baraka). Baraka was at the same time claimed and attributed. 
Ultimately this sanctity lay "in the eye of the beholder", 
139 in that 
it "needs.... to be recognized by the community of the faithful if its 
validity is to become established". 
14o Many saints claimed, or were 
imputed to have, descent from the prophet (they were thus shorfa - 
sing. sherif), but as Gellner suggests, "although sherif is defined 
genealogically, in practice it tends to be applied only to those 
(genealogically qualified) who claim the rights of and live in a 
manner befitting a sherif". 
141 
The manifestations and requirements of sanctity included 
miraculous powers - to heal the sick, provide good weather, prevent 
disasters, have predictive visions, and bring good luck to individuals 
and the community. The expected lifestyle of a saint combined 
asceticism with generosity, otherworldliness with practical diplomacy. 
In return, sanctity brought reverence, and with it donations of 
valuables, food, land, or livestock. Expectations of asceticism 
notwithstanding, the accumulation of some wealth could itself be a 
sign of baraka. 
Baraka was hereditary; it passed from one holy man to his 
kinsmen or disciples. Often, indeed, 'holy tribes' existed, inheriting 
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and transmitting diffused baraka. They usually lived near, and looked 
after, the tomb of a supposedly ancestral saint. There might, indeed, 
be saintly villages scattered over a wide area. 
142 
Holy men and holy tribes performed a variety of functions within 
the segmentary political system. They were 'outsiders' to the pure 
lineage structure; they were invariably immigrants to the area, or 
imputed so to be. 
143 Consequently, they stood apart from segmentary 
rivalries or litigation. Because they were largely pacific (did not 
feud), they were largely respected (not feuded with). The surrounding 
or neighbouring community turned to them when segmentary rivalries 
could not be settled by natural counterbalance; they became arbitrators 
or peacemakers, a crucial part of ritual machinery through which 
disputes were channeled. Holy men were "professional neutrals, 
arbitrators, mediators"; 
144 
they acted as "mediators between tribes, 
and between one tribal section and another,. 
145 
Holy men usually resided near the territorial boundaries of two 
. or more tribal sections; as well as a shrine for the veneration of a 
saintly ancestor, this provided a sanctuary for individuals fleeing 
segmentary conflict. The residence or tomb provided neutral ground 
in a more abstract sense; a location for trials by collective oath, 
for example, or elections of inter-segment chiefs. Often, a saint 
or holy tribe was entrusted with disputed property as part of the 
settlement of rivalries. 
Holy men and tribes were also often closely involved in economic 
life. Their arbitration helped to regulate transhumance and irrigation, 
for example, or the parcelling out of land or crops. They facilitated 
local trade, also. Markets often stood in the shadow of their shrines, 
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and the latter sometimes served as collective warehouses or left- 
luggage offices. 
146 They offered hospitality and spiritual protection 
to outsider tradesmen and travellers. Indeed some were actively 
involved in commercial exchange, and "travelled in desolate areas 
loaded with valuable goods, without fear of robbers". 
147 
Because of their real or supposed literacy in the language of 
the Book, saints were often scribes and guardians of written communal 
documents - genealogies or pasture rights, for example - and would 
have to interpret these in cases of dispute. They were, in a more 
general sense, custodians of unwritten communal history, custom, 
and local wisdom. They were also links with the outside world. 
They transmitted the Koran to, or made it live for, their illiterate 
fellow-tribesmen, largely through example. They acted as teachers. 
Some were pious scholars, who had travelled to the great centres of 
learning throughout the Islamic world. "They taught the tribesmen 
to respect learning and religion", it has been suggested, "and kept 
these twin lights burning, even if dimly, through the centuries". 
148 
Occasionally, a local saint proved remarkably mystical or pious, 
calling for purification of the faith, and proselytizing over a 
wide area. Other holy men, more mundane, organized routine worship 
and prayer and periodic festivals. The memory of the dead founder 
saint was particularly dear to their minds. 
149 
'Sacredness' was then closely bound up with every aspect of 
communal life, and holy men performed a multiplicity of roles. 
Some of these requirements required a fine sense of balance: active 
involvement in settling disputes and neutrality, for example, or the 
display both of abstinence and conspicuous consumption were potentially 
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contradictory. To fulfil them all effectively would have required 
a race of philosopher-kings, but in fact individual murabit-s only 
performed a few of them, with varying effectiveness. 
150 Holy men 
were viewed with "a curious mixture of respect and condescension". 
151 
Some - illiterate, living in poverty, performing mundane tasks in an 
inconspicuous manner - appeared to 
ijCLVQ something of a 'joking' 
relationship with their community; yet, by a strange reversal of 
criteria, this could become a sign of divine blessing. 
152 Gellner 
portrays incisively and entertainingly how finely poised was the 
phenomenon of saintliness and how quickly it could arise in one 
individual and peter out in a successor. Baraka was not simply 
inherited; it had to be activated. Some members of a holy family 
or tribe might effectively activate a 'genealogical' claim to 
holiness; others would be totally prevented from doing so. A 
'saint' who was not respected was ineffective, and an ineffective 
'saint' was not respected. His acceptance by the contiguous 
community thus depended on a combination of ruthless pragmatism 
and divine grace. 
Sanctity created anomalies in the pure segmentary model. 
"The marabouts in their lifetime", Evans-Pritchard suggests, "were 
regarded as standing outside the tribal system, to which, indeed, 
being foreigners from the West, they did, not belong". 
153 "They 
are not members of the tribes! ',. Gellner concurs, "They live on the 
frontiers between tribes (thereby, incidentally, helping to 
guarantee those frontiers), belonging to neither". 
154 Their 
'asymmetrical' kinship pattern was distinct from the surrounding 
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system. In certain instances they were very wealthy, living in 
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prestigious accommodation - even 'castles' 
156 
- with a lifestyle 
different from the rest of the population. They were thus, as 
Gellner indicates, "an inegalitarian organization, with uneven and 
sometimes very sharp concentrations of wealth and prestige 
(particularly the latter)"". 157 
However, though standing outside the pure segmentary lineage 
system, holy men and holy tribes were not detached from it. In 
performing their tasks and concentrating prestige in their persons, 
they contributed in fact to the egalitarianism and absence of 
political specialization in the rest of the tribal structure. They 
enabled segmentary conflict to take place and to be contained. 
Rather than as a source of division, their "moral and political 
ascendancy... served as a cementing bond". 
158 
Sacredness, prestige and wealth depended intimately on the 
confidence of the community they 'served'. They evaporated once 
legitimation evaporated. To this extent, in Gellner's celebrated 
phrase, "vox dei is really vox populi". 
159 Saints, in other 
words, were not a power in their own right; they were not a 
corporate group. A fundamental limitation on corporate pretensions 
was what Gellner calls "saintly competition". Baraka had to be 
activated, and saints had to compete for reverence and clientship 
among a limited number of available tribes. Accordingly, there 
was a marked ebb and flow, over time and distance, of effective 
sanctity. In some areas it was strongly entrenched in one family 
over a long period, and extended over a large population of 
'clients'; in other areas, it was weakly rooted, vacillating, and 
dispersed among several minor saints. 
254 
Although they provided a focus for wider loyalties to the whole 
moslem community, saints and saintly tribes closely reflected their 
segmentary environment. They were subject to processes of fission 
and fusion. Saintly competition frequently led them directly into 
fierce feuds. Miner and DeVos, for example, describe a physical 
struggle for baraka in the Algerian Ziban oases, where two maraboutic 
tribes alternately body-snatched the remains of a revered saintly 
ancestor. 
16o The baraka of holy men was often required to manifest 
itself in the armed success of their client groups in segmentary 
warfare; they became involved in, and manipulated, the rivalries of 
the 'secular' tribes. The criterion of 'pacifism' thus became a 
description less of objective behaviour than of attributed motive. 
Saints occasionally coordinated resistance to external enemies, or 
inspired raids against rival segments. Their calls for a purification 
of the faith, and intensive proselytization, were effective means of 
binding together large confederations. Their role in mobilizing 
resistance to Christian colonization was particularly active; their 
call for 'holy war' ('i7 had) aroused a higher supra-segmentary cohesion 
which transcended traditional intestine rivalries. 
161 Often, this 
kind of involvement led to the establishment of domination over a 
large area, with some appearance of "religious feudality" or 
"maraboutic state". Many of the great hegemonies in Maghreb 
history were founded by and upon holy men and 'holy' tribes. 
162 
However, like all ascendancies and manifestations of leadership, 
these were subject to countervailing forces of fission. 
Intimately connected with 'sainthood', and an extension of 
it, was a phenomenon found throughout most of the Maghreb, the 
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religious fraternity. 
163 The establishment of 'dervish' or 'sufi' 
Orders was characteristic of mediaeval Islam; they spread throughout 
the Middle East, but took particularly deep root in the Moslem West. 
They were, as Berque suggests, "born from vast spiritual propagations, 
then adopted the cornpartmentations of the Maghreb territory". 
164 
Each brotherhood propagated a particular 'way' (tari a) of practising 
and understanding the faith. Its adherents (ikhwan) sought spiritual 
ecstasy by the medium of strictly-patterned rituals and occasionally 
ascetic mortifications. Many fraternities were widely-scattered, with 
centres in many countries; other were confined to a very limited 
neighbourhood. By the early Nineteenth Century, the main sects in 
Algeria were the Tijaniyya on the Saharan fringes, The Rahmaniyya 
in Kabylia, the Qadriyya in the West, the Taibiyya in the Ouarsenis- 
Dahra mountains, and the Derkawiyya in the Centre. 
165 
Each Order was directed from a parent lodge (zawiya), usually 
the burial place of'the Founder Saint from whom its leaders claimed 
spiritual (or biological) descent. It was directed by an overall 
leader (sheikh), or possibly by a group of leaders. The parent 
zawiya was often a centre for pilgrimage by adherents of the sect. 
To it was affiliated a network of local lodges, spread throughout 
the sphere of influence. Each of these zawiya-s was headed by a 
director (sheikh, or mogaddem) appointed by the leader(s) of the 
Order. Zawiyas acted as monasteries, centres of learning, schools, 
sanctuaries, hostelries, charitable foundations and shrines. Often, 
they were closely associated with trade; in conjunction with this, 
such establishments helped to spread Islam in an organized fashion, 
particularly to such outposts as West Africa. Thus, zawiya-s 
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performed on a larger stage the role performed by local saints. 
166 
The income of the Order came from the donations of devotees, often 
collected during periodic fund-raising and missionary tours (ziara) 
by one of the leaders of the sect, or from gifts of land in trust 
(habus) from client communities. 
Many of these features clearly cut across or transcended the 
segmentary tribal structure. However, much of their corporate 
appearance was deceptive, and their universalistic doctrines must 
be firmly related to the local context. In particular, they were 
closely associated with the phenomenon of saintliness. 
Colonial. ethnography drew a sharp distinction between 
'marabouts' (saints) and fraternities. As Berque indicated, it 
treated holy men as manifestations of indigenous, pre-Islamic 
"berber anthropolatry", and religious brotherhoods as alien (Oriental) 
Islamic imports. 167 Both prongs of this dichotomy distorted Maghrebi 
Islam which, in Valensi's phrase, was characterized by "duality 
between self-sufficiency and integration into a wider whole"'168 
between intimate attachment to local custom and passionate identific- 
ation with the whole moslem community (umma). Marabouts and 
fraternities were not incompatible or rival institutions. Brotherhoods 
had their roots in saintliness; the Founder Saint of the Ordernot the 
organization as such, was the focus of adherence. "Beduin attachment 
to the Sanusiya! ', Evans-Pritchard explained of Cyrenaica, "springs 
from their personal devotion to the Grand Sanusi and his family, and 
not the other way round, and the Grand Sanusi derived his sanctity, 
and thereby his power, from the fact that he was a marabout ,. 
169 
In fact, the founders of orders were simply revered saints who 
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attracted widespread adherence through zealous peregrination and 
proselytization, and decided to establish one or several zawiya-s. 
This was one potentiality in the game of saintly competition. As 
Berque suggests, "any marabout who succeeded founded an expansive 
fraternity like the Sanusiyya or the Rahmaniyya". 
170 
He attempted 
to build up an organization on the foundation of his baraka, though 
this organization never transcended its origins in saintliness. 
We should regard holy men and Orders as "a specific alternation 
between the local and the general, between concrete localization 
and sentimental evasion". 
171 
Moreover, adherence to brotherhoods by the ikhwan was 
predominantly by ascription. 
172 Tribal segments as a whole 
tended to be associated with particular fraternities. 
173 The 
rise and fall of brotherhood influence was inextricably linked 
with segmentary conflicts and :. alliances. The rivalries between 
different Orders - between the Qadriyya and Tijaniyya in the South 
and West of Algeria, for example174 - were played out by enlisting 
the support of key tribes, and exploiting divisions between potential 
enemies. Conversely, competing tribes used adherence to particular 
Orders to extract the maximum advantage over rivals; thus fraternity 
'soffs' were developed. Brotherhoods also, in a sense, acted as 
go-betweens for central authorities and dissident tribes. The 
Derkawa, for example, pursued a determined anti-Turkish policy, 
whereas the Rahmaniyya cooperated with the Turks; the Tijaniyya. 
collaborated with the French, whereas the Taibiyya threw their 
force behind Bou Maza's insurrection in the Dahra, and the Qadriyya 
were major coordinators of AbdelKader's resistance to conquest. 
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A measure of an Order's success was its ability to push beyond a 
'core' tribe to establish trans-tribal links. However, even the 
novelty of this kind of wider unity was more apparent than real 
and "was possible only because a tribal system already existed 
uniting the different tribes, in spite of their feuds and enmities, 
into a society which, though lacking political unity, rested on 
common sentiments, a common way of life, and a common lineage 
structure". 
175 
The corporate nature of the Orders also requires to be placed 
in proper perspective. During periods of growth, under an energetic 
founder or leader, organization was often tightly controlled. 
Satellite zawiya-s depended on the initiative and coordination of 
the central zawiya; all followed the same forms of worship; funds 
flowed into a common pool. This phase was rarely long-lasting. 
With some Orders, expansion might be far-flung and deeprooted. 
The Sanusiya were unusual in this respect, a circumstance partly 
attributable to common hostility to the Turkish and Italian 
colonists. 
176 But normally, within a short time, "any fraternity 
which expanded would break up into archaic particularisms". 
177 
The authority of the Fraternity Head or Heads rapidly waned; 
descendants of the Founder Saint evolved separate spheres of 
influence and went on independent ziara tours there to finance 
their activities. 
178 The heads of the major zawiya-s did not for 
long remain closely-supervised cogs in a well-articulated machine. 
The Tijaniyya Order, for example, was split for several generations 
by an indecisive see-saw struggle for supremacy between the zawiyas 
in the Suf and Ain Asahdi oases; each elected rival supreme Heads 
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and vied for c6ntrol of the various satellite zawiyas. 
179 Lesser 
zawiya mogaddem-s could utilize these conflicts to carve out a 
measure of autonomy themselves. 
180 A zawiya chief was effective 
in the surrounding community primarily when he himself had a 
reputation for saintly qualities; his tomb might then become a 
shrine after his death, and a focus for a succession of hereditary 
zawiya directors. 
181 
In other words, Orders themselves were subject to the chronic 
tendencies both of fission and fusion. The fragmentation of the 
'Aissaoua sect in the early Twentieth Century, as described by 
Brunel, follows a fairly typical pattern: "The'Aissaoua sect 
was formerly, perhaps, a robust organism, responding to a single 
source of energy. Following the dissimination of its authority and 
intestine rivalries, this organism today is in the process of 
complete disintegration..... Every descendant of the Sheikh seeks 
to play a preponderant role in the sect; each influential 
Moqaddem similarly seeks to control his Zawiya by himself, or to 
ignore the directives of his spiritual chiefs. Everyone lets 
personal interests take priority over those of the brotherhood 
as a whole, which are totally lost sight of. As a result, the 
sect no longer has any cohesion; it is no longer a brotherhood 
grouped around a single unchallenged leader, but a multitude of 
independent or would-be independent Zawiya-s. Thus the sect is 
slowly falling apart, dismembering, fragmenting. This state of 
affairs is not confined to the 'Aissaoua... It is pretty well 
true of all the powerful religious congregations of Islam, which 
are gradually disappearing for lack of discipline... ". 
182 
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In the overall structure of Maghrebi Islam, this kind of 
'moment' offered various possibilities, but among them was the 
emergence of a 'new' holy man - perhaps even a zawiya moqaddem - 
to provide the nucleus of and drive for a nascent, expansive 
Order. 183 
VII. MARGINALITY AND CENTRAL AUTHORITY 
The classic model of segmentarism does not englobe another 
important feature of Algerian society : its 'marginalism'. 
184 
By this is meant not only the general interrelationship between 
Maghrebi Islam and the larger moslem community ('umma), but also 
the concrete interaction between segmentary communities and the 
pretensions and activities of hegemonic powers claiming to exercise 
local spiritual and temporal leadership over them. 
As Hermassi suggests, "if by tribe we mean a self-sufficient 
social unit constituting a world unto itself - perceiving itself 
as the whole of mankind and recognizing no right or obligation 
beyond its limits = then tribes do not exist in North Africa". 
185 
Wider rights and obligations in the Maghreb were cast in terms of 
the Sunni theory of the Caliphate. 
186 According to this, Caliphs 
were the successors of the Prophet. Their function and duty was 
"to look after the spiritual and temporal welfare of the Moslems 
by defending them from internal and external enemies, and by seeing 
that the revealed laws (Shari'a) were observed". 
187 Central political 
authority was not purely secular; it sought to defend the faith in a 
spiritual as well as military sense. It was the obligation of all moslems 
to obey their guide and protector, whose powers were given by God. 
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The fragmentation of the Abbasid Caliphate into separate provinces 
had resulted in separate governors claiming to exercise the authority 
of the Caliphate over their local sector of the community of the 
faithful. In the Maghreb, the tribal hegemonies which rose and fell 
competed for the exercise of this spiritual and temporal authority: 
as Caliphs, as Imam-s, as Emir-s, or as Sultan-s. Their radius of 
effective influence varied considerably. On occasions, as with the 
Almohad hegemony in the 12th and 13th Centuries, this central 
authority extended throughout the Maghreb, and indeed Southern Spain. 
At other times, for example, the rthid-15th Century, authority was 
divided between rival centres of control: at Marrakesh, Fez, Tlemcen, 
and Tunis. Often these overlordships were strongly imbued with 
Islamic fundamentalism; for example, the puritanical Almoravids from 
among nomadic tribes of the Western Sahara in the 11th Century, or 
the rigorous Almohads from the sedentarized communities of the High 
Atlas, in the 12th Century. But other pre-eminences were more 
clearly 'secular' in inspiration - for example the early Marinids 
during the 13th Century in the Western Maghreb - originating in 
little more than desire for pillage and military opportunism. 
188 
However they originated, once established these hegemonies 
stepped out from the narrow framework of pure segmentary logic and 
began to develop some sense of their special obligations as leaders 
of the local moslem community. They centred their authority on 
towns - often, as with the Idrisids at Fez, founding their own 
capital - and patronized architecture and scholarship there. They 
developed some attributes of central administration (makhzen). 
Often they designated 'ministers' and secretaries; they established 
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a Treasury and a tax-collecting network; they nominated a series of 
agents (caid-s) to represent central authority among the tribes. They 
appointed cadi-s to act as judges in matters of civil law. 
Other features of these hegemonies suggest the development of 
absolute, personalized power.. They invariably evolved into quasi- 
dynasties, based on a small inner tribal core. 
189 They developed 
'households', with a 'palace mentality'. All of this was underpinned 
by violence: a standing bodyguard, a swiftly-mobilizable auxiliary force 
of makhzen troops involved in regular and ruthless punitive expeditions,. 
prisons, executions, and expropriations. The combination of this 
physical power to repress resistance, and the spiritual veneration with 
which the central authority was regarded, suggest an extremely deeply 
entrenched central authority. 
In practice, these dynasties were never truly 'theocratic'. The 
Caliphian theory itself held that the community's leader was bound by 
the Shari'a ; he could only apply this, not change it, and in his 
interpretation he was expected to consult public opinion (in the form 
of ulema - learned jurists). Although his powers came from God, the 
occupant of the position of leader was actually chosen by the 
community. There has been some dispute whether this made the 
relationship between ruler and ruled contractual, and if so, whether 
the ruled could foreclose on a leader's mandate. Lahbabi, for 
example, argues that the community xk always had the right to 
depose a leader who did not respect the Shari'a, or effectively 
defend the community interests. On the other hand, he has been 
accused of reviving the Kharidjite heresy of the 7th and 8th Centuries. 
But whatever the textual glosses, it is certain that, in practice, 
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Maghreb hegemonies deviated from the strictest interpretation of 
Caliphian rights and duties. 
190 
The practical problems of establishing an efficient, centralizing 
administrative hierarchy were immense. Central government faced "a 
structural limitation, essentially tribal", which affected "its 
territorial sovereignty, its degree of centralization, and its 
means of stability". 
191 It also affected the goals of the makhzen; 
the central authorities in the Maghreb were not a succession of 
ever-frustrated nation-builders, for their own perspectives were 
determined by the segmentary environment from out of which they 
had coalesced. The logic of makhzen-tribal relations can best be 
understood in the light of Gellner's metaphor: a shepherd trying to 
maintain his authority by manipulating a situation where there are 
sheep, sheepdogs, and wolves. 
192 
The shepherd, the makhzen, was invariably centred on a core 
tribe, which had successfully transcended segmentary oppositions. 
The bodyguard and military force which this represented was 
occasionally supplemented with contingents of captives or mercenaries 
from West Africa or Mediterranean Europe (the Ju d). 
193 The makhzen 
centred usually on a handful of towns, and the hierarchy of 
functionaries did not usually extend its direct control very far 
into the surrounding countryside. Control of. the countryside was 
indirect; it was effected by manipulation of the rivalries and 
alliances of the segmentary tribes - physically intimidating some, 
'recognizing' or forming compacts with the powerful leaders of 
others, and counteracting the threat of potential rivals by splitting 
their support. This was a process of constant diplomacy and violence. 
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Though hegemonies were often extremely stable, lasting for a century 
or more, they were not centralized, bureaucratic states. "The army 
chiefs", for example, "exercised administrative functions outside 
the capital. But since the army consisted predominantly of contingents 
provided by those tribes associated with the ruling dynasty, the rule... 
implied the domination of the favoured tribes over those who were 
not". 
195 
The physical power of the makhzen centred on privileged tribes - 
makhzen tribes, - the sheepdogs in Gellner's metaphor. In return for 
freedom from taxes, or the granting of land, they provided military 
support. In particular, they mounted expeditions to punish recalcitrant 
tribes, collect taxes and seize booty. The sheepdogs were occasionally 
liable to revolt and savage their master, particularly when his 
authority was under challenge from others. 
'Submitted' tribes were those who came under the indirect 
supervision of an agent of authority (caid), appointed by the makhzen 
usually from among the dynasty's core tribe but occasionally from one 
of the submitted group's most prominent segments. They were sheep in 
the sense that they were taxed regularly and kept in order by the 
makhzen tribes. Apart from this, however, the tribes were free to 
govern their own internal affairs. Caids were not administrators: 
they 'invested' sheikhs from tribal segments to gather taxes, for 
example, the distribution of which was usually decided by the tribe 
itself. 
With other tribes, the makhzen had less assured relations. 
With many, the makhzen had to discuss or fight every year to get 
taxes or tribute. It might get token recognition of the authority 
265 
of a caid, but usually he would have to be appointed from one of the 
tribes in question, and was difficult for the makhzen to control. 
Some communities offered token recognition of the makhzen's authority, 
or helped it against rival dissident groups, in return for effectively 
being left alone. Other groups, those for example in the major 
Algerian massifs and the fierce nomadic communities on the Saharan 
fringe, were sufficiently powerful or difficult of access to escape 
the direct attentions and demands of the makhzen for long periods. 
The 'boundary' of direct makhzen control was not territorially 
neat or static. It varied according to the relative strength and 
solidarity of the makhzen and dissident communities. A strong 
hegemony could enforce its sway over a large area. A powerful 
dissident movement could push back the frontiers of makhzen control 
to a few scattered townships on the coast. 'Dissident' communities 
were wolves in that they constituted not merely a standing annoyance 
to the central dynasty but an active threat; at times of makhzen 
weakness, they preyed on 'submitted' tribes. But: -they were not 
wolves in the sense of total outsiders to the makhzen system and 
what it represented. If successful in making inroads into the area 
of makhzen authority, groupings of dissident tribes might eventually 
found a hegemony which laid claim tö 
authority. Here, indeed, 
Pareto! s metaphor of lions and foxes seems appropriate, for the 
equilibrium might be overthrown, and power circulated by new 
pretenders coming down vigorously from the hills, or out of the 
desert, to replace the former dynasty. The wolves thus staked 
claims to become the new shepherb, often with a burning dedication to 
the purification of Islam among the slumbering sheep. They brought 
with them their own core tribes, allies and victims. 
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Fierce committment to Islam, and respect for the role of the 
leader of the faithful, could thus be combined with steadfast 
re4. L uL to pay taxes or to accept the authority of raids. But 
even 'dissident' tribes were 'marginal' in the sense that dissidence 
was a conscious act, not simply a projection of the makhzen's 
viewpoint. As Gellner suggests, "if tribal groups opted out of the 
wider political system, and refused to accept orders or officials 
from central authority, they were dissidents, opters out, and they 
knew it. The same was true if they opted out morally, at least to 
the extent of observing a tribal custom known to differ from the 
Holy Law of Islam" . 
196 Dissident communities still recognized 
themselves as belonging to the wider moslem community, and the 
various central dynasties were acceptedýas its defenders. 
But it was difficult for any makhzen to capitalize on this 
recognition in temporal terms. The dissident Djebala community in 
the mountains of Northern Morocco, for example, "asks nothing more 
of the Sultan, the administrator of the moslem community, than to 
defend him against the infidel and- admits no other obligation to 
him than that of taking part with him in the defence of the 
territory of Islam. Except for religious obligations, the Djibli 
understands no other: he professes the unity of God, and recognizes 
the Prophet as hjs envoy; he performs the ritual prayers; he fasts 
during Ramadan; he purifies his property by giving the Zakat 
(koranic alms) and the Achour (koranic tithe) to whomsoever is 
worthy of it; he is ready for the holy war, and goes to Mecca if 
he can. Nobody has the right to ask any more of him". 
197 
The Islamic identification and loyalty of the tribes could 
spill beyond individual dynasties to other leaders in the moslem 
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world; one community could be torn between the claims of two rival 
centres of authority. Moreover, recognition as upholders of the 
Holy law and as defenders of the faith imposed an obligation on 
the central dynasty to fulfil those functions in the eyes of the 
community. Both-these factors could corrode the authority of a 
particular dynasty, and justify dissidence. Historically, the 
Central Maghreb, present-day Algeria, was particularly marked by 
fragmented command and rival pulls of influence. In the Eastern 
and Western parts of the Maghreb, by contrast, the embryos of 
present day Tunisia and Morocco were characterized by denser 
urbanization and more stable longer-lasting dynasties. 
VIII. THE TURKISH REGIME 
Algiers, like Tunis and Tripoli, had been the capital of a 
Turkish province since the early Sixteenth Century. Turkish rule 
arrived from the outside, in a sense, rather than as a result of 
internal power crystallization. However, arriving by sea, it 
entered the same local power vacuum as had been filled by 
successive indigenous dynasties arriving from the desert. In a 
sense, the Turks had been 'called into' the segmentary environment 
of North Africa to counteract the threat of Christian emplacements 
on the coast. The goals and methods which they adopted in 
extending their authority were in many respects similar to those 
of the tribal dynasties which preceded them in the Maghreb, and 
which survived in Morocco. But in other respects, Turkish rule 
had original features. 
197 
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By the Nineteenth Century, the Turkish Sultan at Constantinople 
had only a weak moral influence over the Regency in Algiers. He 
exercised no practical control over a regime which, to all intents 
and purposes, was autonomous. "The locally elected Dayis of 
Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli", Gibb and Bowen explain, "... acknowledged 
the suserainty of the Sultans, who confirmed them in office. But 
none of them was tributary; on the contrary they were all recipients 
of gifts from the Porte". 
198 The rulers in Algiers needed to retain 
Ottoman goodwill in order to recruit Janissaries from the Levant, 
and occasionally they sent the Sultan a token military contingent 
in times of war. 
199 But diplomatic niceties were essentially 
"a fiction". 200 
The local Turkish regime, (the odjak) was based on a small caste 
of a few thousand Janissaries. These were originally freed slaves, 
recruited from among the peasantry of Anatolia, with a tradition of 
military service and turbulence throughout the Ottoman Empire. 
They mostly married among themselves, and moved between different 
provinces. They had no real roots in Algeria; the janissary corps 
was their home. "The tatterdemalion Turks who unloaded the vessels 
of the Porte in the harbour" as Julien puts it, "were transmuted at 
Algiers into illustrious and magnificent signors". 
201 They were 
essentially an urban-based caste, providing a household bodyguard 
for their leader, the dey, commanding provincial garrisons, holding 
the chief offices in the odjak hierarchy, and involved in overseas 
trade. 
The other constituents of this small racial caste were the 
Koloughlis, the offspring of Janissaries and native Arab women. 
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They formed the permanent infantry troops of the odjak, and in 
return for performing their military duties they were accorded 
privileges - tax exemption or revenue from domainal lands. 
Ambitious and proud, their aim was acceptance as full Turks; 
often they were entrusted with extremely imýprtant odjak posts. 
At its height, this total odjak caste consisted of 15 - 20,000.202 
Julien calculates its strength in 1800 as only 6,000,203 at a time 
when the indigenous population numbered approximately 2- 2- million. 
The head of the odjak was the , who had replaced the 
Turkish-appointed Pasha in 1711. Deys were elected by the 
U Janissaries, and had never succeeded, unlike the Hesseinite beys 
of Tunis, in establishing a hereditary succession. Indeed, the 
dey was virtually a prisoner of the janissary corps, perpetually 
threatened by palace revolution, deposition or assassination: ' 
30 deys held office between 1671 and 1818, of whom 14 were imposed 
by violence after the assassination of their predecessor. 
204 To 
reduce this threat, Ali Khoja, dey in 1816, moved into the 
fortified Kasbah of Algiers, away from the Janissaries. Despite 
this perilous situation, deys commanded considerable resources 
of wealth: revenues from domainal land, fees from officials, 
presents from consuls, and a share in booty and trade. He was 
"a man of wealth, but far from master of his treasures; a father 
without children, a husband without a wife, a despot without 
liberty, king of slaves and slave of his subjects". 
205 
The dey was assisted by the higher council of the odjak - 
the divan - which included ministers in charge of the Treasury, 
the Army, and the Navy, appointed by the dey. ' The administrative 
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apparatus included a variety-of secretaries (kho a-s) and bailiffs 
(shawsh-s). The main tasks of the odjak were to keep open lines 
of communication and commerce by land and sea, thus permitting 
trade and piracy to prosper, to maintain a modicum of internal 
pease for the Turkish caste on the coast, and to ensure an adequate 
inflow of Koranic taxes, levies, and tribute from the submitted 
tribes. Thetdey's role was also to ensure the administration of 
moslem justice, in which he was assisted by a network of cads-s. 
The major expense of government was the upkeep of the militia, 
which was relatively well-equipped and trained. Considerable 
sums were also absorbed by the navy, the dey's household, public 
works, and general administration. 
The area directly administered by the dey was a smallish 
territory consisting of the town of Algiers- and its immediate 
hinterland - called the dar-es-sultan. This consisted of domain 
land, and estates owned by prominent Turks, which were worked by 
indigenous labour. In the dar-es-sultan the conventional tribal 
structure was weaker and more fragmented than in the rest of 
Algeria. Military command was exercised by the Agha of the 
Arabs, and the area was divided into districts (watan-s) each 
headed by a Turkish Caid. 
The rest of the Regency -a fluctuating sphere of influence 
rather than a territory with precise frontiers - was divided into 
three provinces, each under the authority of a bey: the beylik of 
Constantine to the East, the beylik of Titters (centred' on Medea) 
in the centre, and the beylik of Oran in the West (centred? on 
Mascara until 1792, and thenceforth Oran). The beys were Turks 
271 
or Koloughlis appointed by the dey, usually in return for a gift 
of 'joyeuse avýnement'; often, indeed, the post went to the most 
generous candidate. The bey was responsible to the dey, who 
retained control of the contingents of Janissaries and koloughlis 
stationed in various fortresses (bord -s) in the provinces. On 
behalf of the odjak, the bey commanded these troops, with the 
help of an agha, exercised general supervision over tribal relations, 
and ensured the payment of taxes. Twice a year, the bey was required 
to send tax proceeds to the odjak Treasury, and every three years he 
had to visit Algiers in person (the denouch), accompanied by horsemen 
and native chiefs, to pay tribute, and account for office. 
Bey-s tended to correspond with the dey in the language of 
elaborate abjection. Fmerit cites letters from the bey of 
Constantine in the early 19th Century which manifest apparent fear 
of any initiative and protest utter servility: "I am only your 
slave and servant. May God grant us the prolongation of your 
existence. So be it, 0 Lord of the World". 
206 There was some 
reason for this servility; beys were not secure once appointed. 
They had to keep abreast of the turbulent vagaries of odjak in-fighting, 
and keep an acceptable quantity of tribute flowing in. Between 1790 
and 1825,8 beys were deposed and 16 executed by the dey. 
207 Only 
the most powerful survived for long periods. On the other hand, 
the odjak at Algiers did not exercise a close control over the 
affairs of the beyliks, so long as tax flowed in and order was 
reasonably assured. In this sense, the beys were practically 
autonomous, and acted as the real executive cogs in the loosely- 
assembled imperial machine. Links between the three provinces were 
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extremely tenuous, and each bey was free to pursue his own political 
game vis a vis the tribes within his area of command. On occasion, 
this led them to grow ambitious, to revolt, or to try to establish 
themselves as independent powers with the help of key tribes. By 
the 19th Century, for example, the bey of Constantine particularly 
had become a power in his own right. But this was a dangerous game, 
and accounted for the high mortality rate among incumbents of the 
post. No bey managed to set himself up as the head of a dynasty, as 
the Busseinite beys had done after overthrowing the dey of Tunis in 
1705. 
Though the links between the beyliks and the odjak above were 
fairly slender, this did not mean that the beys securely controlled 
an administrative apparatus beneath them. Areas of the beyliks 
which were effectively under Turkish rule were divided into 
territories (watan-s), to which the bey nominated agents - khalifa-s 
and caid-s - to help him with policing and tax-farming. These in 
turn offered the bey gifts and money, and raked off a proportion 
of taxes levied. Inevitably, these agents tended to develop semi- 
autonomous influence; by the early 19th Century, for example, the 
khalifa of the Eastern part of the Oran beylik was virtually 
independent, and had developed relations with the Alawite dynasty 
in Morocco. 
The depths to which the roots of the beylik tax-collecting and 
military apparatus penetrated the tribal undergrowth varied greatly 
from area to area, and from time to time. The garrisons of militia 
under the bey's command were not numerically large, and prone to 
revolt. This resource of power was supplemented by the granting of 
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tax privileges, land, or other benefits to 'makhzen tribes '. 
208 
These provided cavalry troops (mokhzani-s), a force which kept 
submitted tribes in order. Periodically, usually annually, the 
bey would lead out these makhzen troops as his mobile camp (mehalla). 
They made forays among dissident and semi-dissident tribes, exacting 
taxes and tribute, plundering tribal assets, cutting off exemplary 
heads, and forcing ceremonies of submission ('aman). 
209 Some of 
these makhzen tribes were artificially brought together from diverse 
tribal backgrounds, and settled on State Domains: the Douair-s and 
Smela-s in the Oran beylik were notable examples. Others were 
natural communities whose faithfulness had been rewarded with 
privileges; these were more scattered. Yet others were only loosely 
at the disposal of the odjak; the nomadic makhzen tribes of the 
South, for example, were "in reality..... a military nobility which 
contented itself with sending a hox per year to Algiers, and did 
what it wanted". 
210 Revolt of makhzen tribes was not uncommon. 
211 
The remainder of the tribal environment was variagated. Some 
tribes, especially those near Turkish garrisons, were firmly controlled. 
These submitted groups (ra'ias) were obliged to pay Koranic taxes, and 
often non-Koranic levies too. This was subject to the circumstances 
of demand from above and ability to pay from below. These tribes 
were milch-cows of the regime; so far from their burden being 
equitable, it was based "not in proportion to supposed or real 
resources, but in inverse proportion to their power or ability to 
resist. Warlike nomads were spared at the expense of the sedentary 
populations; the weakest had to pay for the strongest". 
212 
Apart from taxation, the sign of submission was the placing of 
tribes under the authority of cäids, nominated by the beys, usually 
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Koloughlis. These were cogs in the tax-farming machine, who treated 
their office mainly as a source of revenue. For direct links with 
the different tribal fractions, they relied on sheikh-s, appointed 
from among prominent segment elders; these sheikh-s were representatives 
of their communities rather than agents of the odjak. The total amount 
of tax levied on each community was fixed from above, after representa- 
tions from below, including armed resistance, but the community 
itself was left to decide how much each fraction, village, group of 
tents, or family should pay. 
213 Apart from this, the community 
regulated its age-old affairs in its customary manner; assemblies of 
elders survived intact. As Julien suggests, "providing their subjects 
paid their taxes and did not hinder the passage of troops, the deys 
were not interested in interfering with their customs". 
214 
and for 
this reason "the countryside was little affected by the Turkish 
administration". 
215 Evans-Pritchard makes a similar point about 
Turkish rule in Cyrenaica: "The Bedouin were little affected by 
Turkish rule. Those nearest the coastal towns were doubtless 
compelled to pay taxes from time to time, but the tribes as a whole 
must have continued to lead their ancient way of life and settle 
their own affairs among themselves" , 
216 
Other tribes hardly came within the Turkish sphere of influence 
at all; from the odjak's point of view, they were 'dissident'. 
Dissidence involved three things : refusal to pay taxes ("Revolt is 
above all a tax strike); 
217 
refusal to recognize odjak-appointed 
caids (or alternatively refusal of these caids to obey the odjak); 
and attacks on the mehalla and/ or on allies of the odjak. Many 
zones nominally within the bey's command were too remote and 
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difficult of access for the mehalla to penetrate or dare to approach. 
As a result, the highlanders of Kabylia, the nomads of the Sahara and 
the High Plateaux, and the inhabitants of many fortified Saharan cases, 
escaped Turkish control for decades. 
Other groups - the Ouled Sidi Sheikh of the Saharan fringe, for 
example - were "attached by the slenderest thread of vassaldom". 
218 
They offered nominal acknowledgement of Turkish suzerainty, but the 
odjak was never in a position to convert this into tangible currency. 
Where possible, in periods of strength, the odjak exploited the 
segmentary field of alliances, feuds, and struggles for hegemony, and 
turned it to its advantage; conversely, tribes attempted to enlist 
the practical or moral support of powerful beys to strengthen their 
position in the segmentary game. Thus alliances were periodically 
struck between the Turks and such influential families as the Ben 
Gana in the Saharan oases or the Ferdjioua and Zouaoua in Kabylia. 
In these times of military and diplomatic strength, tribes were 
encouraged to rally to the odjak side, and individual beys pushed 
the boundaries of control back a long way. At times of odjak 
weakness, however, the intestine conflicts of the Ottoman caste 
would encourage key tribes to revolt, or renege on earlier alliances. 
The tribal topography was itself turbulent. Periodically tribes 
coalesced over sizeable areas, under the influence of an energetic 
clan, a holy man, or religious brotherhood. The bey might come to 
terms with this, by putting out diplomatic feelers, by trying to 
ignore it, or by armed attack. Serious insurrections could rage 
for years; at the turn of the 19th Century, for example, the Turkish 
presence in the Oran beylik had for long been extremely tenuous. 
Thus, systematic domination was never possible. 
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On the other hand, the overall presence of the Ottoman caste 
in the coastal towns was never seriously threatened. For one thing, 
tribal resistance was always prone to fission, with or without 
Turkish interference; growing menaces often collapsed. For another 
thing, even the most dissident tribes had to come to some arrangement 
with the Turks. Even though the Kabyle communities were never 
militarily defeated, or their territory penetrated, their part in 
the Maghreb economy made them dependent on links with neighbouring 
communities whom the Turks had managed to control. They needed 
outlets for their olive oil and figs, and other merchandise, and 
the Turks controlled important trade routes, including those to 
the coast. Consequently, some taxes had to be paid, and token 
suzerainty acknowledged. 
219 Similarly, the tribes of the South 
needed to exchange their wool, livestock and dates for grain, 
which made them reliant on contacts with the North. Moreover, 
the Turkish presence was an integral aspect of membership of the 
moslem community. Although the Turks followed a Sunni rite which 
was different from the indigenous population (the laxer Hanifite 
school rather than the strict Malikite school), they were neverthe- 
less moslems, and active patrons of new mosques and other pious 
foundations. Even though the claims of the Ottomans to the 
Caliphate were regarded as somewhat spurious by scholars and 
legists, they were respected as defenders of the faith against 
the Christians (roumi). The Alawite dynasty in the West, and the 
Turkish Husseinite dynasty in the East, provided rival poles of 
influence on the fringes of the Regency, but over a considerable 
area of the interior the odjak of Algiers had moral sway. The 
behaviour of the segmentary tribes in relation to it was 'marginal'. 
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Thus the Turkish regime in Algeria presented certain paradoxes. 
It shared many of the characteristics of the mediaeval Maghrebi 
segmentary states, while importing some wholly novel elements. The 
superficial style and some components of Turkish rule implied the 
existence of a quad-state with absolute authority. Its embryonic 
state structure was more marked than in earlier indigenous 
hegemonies. 220 It had an elected ruler, a council of ministers, 
specialized departments of state, fairly stable frontiers and 
internal territorial divisions, a standing army and navy, a hier- 
archical network of governors and executive agents, a system of 
taxation and tribute with a central Treasury, and certain bureau- 
cratic methods of communication. Within this framework, authority 
was exercised with theocratic pretensions: the dey ruled as the 
representative of the Sultan, who according to the accepted theory 
of the Caliphate had authority in spiritual and temporal matters 
subject only to Koranic Law. Other features of Turkish rule are 
suggestive of what Wittfogel called "Oriental Despotism": the 
language of officials was one of unutterable awe before authority; 
extreme violence was used to punish infraätions, repress insurrections, 
and assassinate enemies; and slaves, seraglio, bodyguards, palaces, 
fortresses, and vast estates were by-products of the life-style of 
the dominant foreign racial caste. As Hermassi suggests, "the 
whole government apparatus was considered an extension of the private 
domain of the men in power". 
221 
On the other hand, many novel features of Turkish rule caused 
or revealed weaknesses. Like other Maghreb dynasties before it, 
the Turkish Regency came up against the 'structural limitation' on 
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its power and stability created by the segmentary tribal context in 
which it operated. But the Turks lacked several of the levers which 
indigenous hegemonies had. They confined their governmental apparatus 
to a distinct racial caste of a few thousand, which kept jealously 
apart from the rest of the population and monopolized office and 
profit. This isolation was more marked in Algeria than in the 
neighbouring Regency of Tunis, where the Turks were gradually 
assimilated, and became a relatively settled and integrated part of 
the local community. 
222 The Algerian Turks were confined to a few 
townships and ports on the coastal strip; they were facing outwards, 
so to speak, showing greater interest in Mediterranean trade and 
piracy than in the agriculture"or industry of the hinterland. The 
latter was regarded as little more than a source of taxes and 
periodic trouble. 
Moreover, the power of the Algerian odjak was extremely 
fragmented; it had no strong central or centralizing focus. The 
dey himself was vulnerable to the pressure of the janissaries, and 
to the threat of palace revolution, and only a small territory came 
directly under his command. By contrast, in the Regency of Tunis 
the militia was kept firmly in place, and the Husseinites had 
established a stable dynastic succession. The Regency of Algiers, 
unlike its Eastern counterpart, was also split into three sprawling 
and virtually autonomous provinces, whose governors were subject 
both to harassment from above and dissidence from below. 
The final, basic weakness of Turkish rule was the structural 
one imposed by the segmentary tribal context. De Montety has 
described this as the crucial feature of Turkish administration in 
Tunis: 
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"To this central power, strong to the point of arbitrariness, 
there corresponded no local administrative organization. The 
tribes lived in a hierarchical social framework, but the chiefs of 
tribes did not draw their authority from the Prince; the tribal 
organization - which was of a familial and ethnic nature - was not 
a subdivision of the state, and did not even have any precise link 
with it. In short, as opposed to the situation in Modern States 
whose architecture embraces regional life, the Husseinite State 
was characterized by local anarchy into which there plunged, to 
greater or lesser depths, the tentacles of an all-powerful central 
authority". 
223 
The Turkish regime in Algiers shared this structural duality, 
without having the all-powerful central authority. Behind the 
facade, its characteristic was "virtual absence of any administrative 
apparatus; no corps of paid functionaries; no centralized administra- 
tion with agents paid by the state. The men surrounding the 
sovereign were glorified clerks rather than ministers" . 
224 The 
centre retained nominal control over its own administrative 
framework by a system of tax-farming, Which caus. ¬d a severe 
haemmorhage of authority and potential state funds at every rung 
of the 'hierarchy'. This hiving off of effective control, this 
Cý " "dyefunctional decentralization of authority", rendered the regime 
"structurally incapacitated" to cope with the endemic dissidence 
of inaccessible and unamenable tribesmen; it could not even rely 




Yet the regime survived for three centuries, and was overthrown 
from without, not within. Part of the reason for its viability lies 
no doubt in the very structural dualism. As in other provinces of 
the Turkish Empire, "guilds, village councils, and tribes were to a 
great extent autonomous, though naturally they were supervised by 
the local governors;... their autonomy... split up the subject 
populations into many semi-independent units, whose stability was 
little affected by the political vicissitudes of the Empire as a 
whole". 
226 The 'subject populations' were content with this 
distant presence and nominal suzerainty, for the regime respected 
(shared) their religion, and made no real attempt to interfere 
with their social organization and customs, nor to transform their 
economic environment. Turkish rule was predicated upon the 
traditional forces of the moslem Maghreb. Tribal Algeria was 
"conquered territory, bearing no grudge against its conqueror, 
but equally having no real contact with him". 
227 
In a sense, this duality reflected an incapacity and lack 
of imagination on the part of the Turks. They were not Nation 
Builders. They made, Hermassi points out, "no real attempt at 
societal unification or state building". 
228 While the social 
life of the segmentary tribes carried on much as before, "the 
functions of the state (were) greatly simplified and reduced to 
levying taxes and ensuring public security". 
229 Evans-Pritchard 
noted an analogous approach in Cyrenaica: "The local Turkish 
officials were content for the most part to sit in the towns... 
and to let the Sanusiya control the interior, so long as taxes 
were paid and no overt act was committed against the Sultan's 
authority that might bring them to the notice of the court". 
230 
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But this lack of imagination also had its more positive side, for 
the Turks, Evans-Pritchard concluded, "well understood that the 
successful practice of the art of administration depends not only 
on attention to some things, but no less inattention to others. 
They did not confuse government with bureaucratic interference in 
the name of moral regeneration". 
231 The philosophy and methods of 
French colonial rule were considerably different. 
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I. CONQUEST 
-i. The-Fall of Turkish Regime1 ------------------------- 
37,000 French troops, led by de Bourmont, landed at Sidi 
Ferruch on 19th June 1830, and marched towards Algiers. The dey 
capitulated on 4th July. By treaty, his lawful sovereignty, along 
with the property of the odjak, passed to the French state. The 
rapid collapse of this topmost layer of Turkish government 
encouraged, enabled, and in a sense forced the French to assume 
sovereignty in their own name. Unlike the later colonial regimes 
in Tunisia, and Morocco, no 'protectorate' was established with even 
nominal respect for the suzerainty of the existing rulers. The 
odjak was abolished, and by the end of 1830 the bey and hundreds 
of other Turkish officials and Janissaries had been deported to 
the Levant. In this sense, the French imposed a form of direct 
rule in Algeria from the outset. 
Despite this assumption of titular sovereignty, the large- 
scale physical occupation of the Regency was not urgently or 
deliberately pursued. The first four years of French presence, 
heralded by the immediate collapse of the Bourbon monarchy whose 
scheme the invasion had been, were marked by indecision and 
administrative chaos. 
2 By 1834, the French had still established 
themselves in only three ports: Oran in the West, Algiers in the 
centre, and Bone in the East. Complex pressures from Metropolitan 
merchants, would-be settlers, and the army command gradually 
committed them to the retention of a permanent foothold, but the 
nature and extent of colonial occupation were determined only slowly 
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by the interaction of these pressures with local political and 
economic conditions. 
The demise of the odjak did not deliver to the French control 
of a deeply-embedded and well-oiled administrative machine. With 
the disintegration of centralized command, the inflow of rents 
and taxes from beys and tribes ceased forthwith. Behind the facade 
of 'commanding heights', a:: situation of fragmented authority revealed 
itself. In terms of European concepts of government, the French 
discovered that they were dealing with "sovereigns without 
kingdoms". 3 Not only the provincial level of Turkish command, but 
beyond that the network of indigenous segmentary tribes, remained 
to be contacted and grappled with. In this sense, at these levels, 
direct administration was something which, if sought, required 
construction. 
The French sought initially to win over the beys of the 
three Turkish provinces. Bey Hassan of the Western province, Oran, 
was quick to proffer submission. Unfortunately, from the conquerors' 
point of view, this reflected his total loss of control over those 
tribes nominally under his authority. For several decades the 
beylik had been racked by dissidence, coordinated notably by the 
Derkawa fraternity. In recent years, an aggressive new focus of 
opposition had developed under the impulsion of the Qadriya 
fraternity, centred around the Hachemi tribe and the holy man 
Mahi-ed-din. It was largely in the hope of assistance in 
reasserting his authority that the bey turned to the French. Thus, 
so far from being a firmly-established intermediary able to 
'deliver the support' or even speak on behalf of the local segmentary 
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population, the Turkish bey was in need of French protection from 
them. The French command was rapidly induced to abandon him, and 
attempted direct contact with native groupings 04 
In the central province, Titteri, bey Bou Mezrag prevaricated. 
Initially he made overtures to the Frenci, possibly in the hope of 
assuming some of the powers of the recently-divested dey. To this 
end, he claimed suzerainty over the Eastern bey, though without any 
response. The French perceived his ambitions as a potential 
hindrance rather than help in the establishment of their rule; 
a punitive expedition was organized against him in November 1830, 
and he was deposed and exiled. A prominent Moor was briefly 
nominated to replace him, but though 'loyal' he was even less 
qualified to deliver the effective support of the indigenous 
population. Increasingly, these tribes of the centre were drawn 
into the resistance movement which had developed in the West, now 
led by Abd-el-Kader. The office of bey was an irrelevance in 
this context, and in 1836, indeed, its hapless new incumbent was 
captured and divested by incursive tribesmen. French control of 
the area remained to be asserted. 
The most prolonged resistance from the remnants of the 
Turkish regime took place in the Eastern province of Constantine. 
5 
Of the three beyliks, its core of government had become least 
fragmented and most stable. Turkish rule there was not characterized 
to the same extent as in the West by the delegation of power to big 
privileged tribes. In 1826, in fact, bey Ahmed had suppressed all 
exemptions from land tax within the province. Moreover, his force 
of mounted native auxilairies and infantry was feared and respected 
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by subject tribes and a modus vivendi had been established with 
influential clans on the fringes of. direct control. Successive 
beys of Constantine had established some measure of autonomy from 
Algiers. The downfall of the dey, in a sense, promised to consummate 
this independence. 
Bey Ahmed greeted the French arrival with stubborn hostility, 
and refused tentative offers of and requests for cooperation. To 
strengthen this resistance, he expelled the few garrisons of 
turbulent janissaries, and instead patched together a coalition with 
important Arab and Berber families, notably the Mokrani of the 
Medjana, the Ben Gana of the Bibans, and the Ouled Achour of the 
Ferdjioua. The French attempted in vain to mobilize the ambitions 
of the bey of Tunis against him, then eventually sent, military 
expedition against Constantine. In November 1836, this force 
was decimated and driven into retreat by Ahmed's tribal auxiliaries. 
A year later, 20,000 troops were sent on a better-organized campaign, 
captured Constantine, and forced the bey to flee south. 
Once more, however, Ahmed's demise did not yield the reins of 
assured governmental control into French hands. It destroyed the 
very force of personality and network of alliances on which his 
ascendancy had depended. The process of coming to grips with 
segmentary Algeria had only begun. In the East as in the West, 
the French discovered the limited usefulness of the office of 'bey' 
as a political lever. They appointed no replacement, and relied 
instead on granting the title of khalifa, caid or sheikh to those 
tribal notables whom they had managed to lure from the hostile 
coalition. Even the 'indirect' rule thus established was precarious. 
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Though they were temporarily free to concentrate on the growing 
menace in the West, the French had effected little more than a 
holding operation. Several later expeditions were required to 
'Pacify' the East. 
-ii. Military defeat of the segmentary tribes 
---------------------------------------- 
The conquest, or series of conquests of segmentary Algeria 
was gradual and piecemeal. 
6 
The need for and concept of 'total 
occupation' dawned on the French quite slowly. The army, settlers, 
and local and metropolitan capitalists accepted the project with 
varying enthusiasm and in different senses. There was initial 
hesitation as to whether the French presence should be confined to 
a handful of fortified coastal towns, serving as controlled outlets 
for trans-Mediterranean commerce, or whether far larger tracts of 
Algeria, especially the fertile littoral plains, should be 
opened up for the settlement of European emigrants. Feverish land 
speculation in the mid-1830's decided the territory's fate as a 
settler colony. For most of the first two decades, however, the 
philosophy of 'restricted occupation' - limiting settlement to 
the Mediterranean coast and valleys, and pushing back the native 
occupants into the Tell - was paramount. Enormous pressure for 
further sequestration of land drove the French army eventually to 
extend its campaign of conquest. At the same time, the immediate 
issue was forced by the hostility with which the native population 
greeted the French presence. The security of the coast and its 
lines of communication were constantly menaced by incursions, and 
by the ominous development outside the pale, of large blocs of 
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indigenous political solidarity. These drove the French to look, 
and move, beyond the zone of 'useful Algeria' into the hinterland. 
The confederation built up among the tribes of the West by 
Abd-el-Kader posed a particularly powerful potential challenge to 
the nascent colony.? After being proclaimed flnir-el-muminin 
(commander of the faithful) by the Hachemi, Beni Ameur and Gharaba 
tribes in 1832, Abd-el-Kader declared 'iý had (holy war) on the 
Christians. By a traditional mixture of astute diplomacy and 
physical intimidation, he submitted rivals, divided enemies, and 
welded together a strong basis of political domination. Some 
French commanders were prepared to come to terms with this growing 
hegemony, indeed welcomed the Emir's role in establishing some 
order among the tribes of the interior. In 1837, for example, the 
treaty of Tafna explicitly recognized his suzerainty not only 
throughout the Western province (excluding a few towns and colon 
centres), but also in the former beylik of Titteri and even parts 
of the dar-es-sultan near Algiers. In hindsight, however, these 
early tacit understandings and treaties appear to have been of a 
tactical rather than strategic nature on the part of the French. 
They permitted the consolidation of European settlement on the 
coast, and enabled the intransigence of bey Ahmed in the East to 
be first dealt with. Similarly, the Emir took advantage of these 
periods of truce to consolidate and further extend his area of 
influence, conducting energetic campaigns against rival tribes, 
and particularly against the Derkawa and Tijaniya fraternities. 
Abd-el-Kader's suzerainty over most of the Algerian interior 
clearly constituted an eventual threat to the French presence. 
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Periodic ambushes and serious clashes such as the battle of Macta 
in 1835, were evidence both of his hostility and his strength. The 
fragile truce was broken in 1839, and though the immediate circumstances 
are in dispute, the ultimate inevitability of this confrontation is 
less so. Abd-el-Kader led a wholesale assault on French settlements 
in the coastal zones, and the French poured in troops against him. 
By 1840, the French army numbered 60,000 and by 1846 108,000. Under 
the leadership of Bugeaud, 
8 
this attack (or counterattack) was 
drastic and pitiless. A vigorous scorched earth campaign of mobile 
'total war' was designed to deprive the Flair of supplies, destroy 
his communications, and split his confederated support. It also 
involved the sequestration of huge tracts of land. 
9 By 1843, 
Abd-el-Kader had been forced to retreat to Morocco, although within 
a few months other serious insurrections in the Western Tell mountains 
encouraged him to return to the plains. He inflicted a final serious 
defeat on the French at Sidi Brahim in 1845, but was forced to surrender 
in 1847 and was taken prisoner to France. This lengthy period of 
warfare had resulted in the French seizure and garrisoning of 
territory throughout the Mediterranean lowlands and much of the 
Northern Tell. It forced them to conceive of a more systematic and 
widespread form of domination. 
Abd-el-Kader had rapidly erected a sophisticated structure of 
power. His was an unusually unified confederation. His abolition 
of land tax seems in particular to have welded together a strong 
alliance of hitherto 'subject' tribes. A carefully-assembled 
hierarchy of khalifa-liks, agha-liks, caid-ats and sheikh-ats gave 
him a tightly disciplined system of internal communication and 
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administration. However, in submitting to the French in 1847, 
the Emir did not bequeath a strong governmental apparatus. As 
with previous Maghrebi ascendancies, the major elements in his 
hegemony were his personal baraka, related to the appeal of holy 
war, the physical power and energy of the core tribes, and the 
particular conjunction of power possibilities which drew in the 
fringe tribes. With the destruction of these key elements, the 
edifice inevitably crumbled. Political authority frpLgmented 
itself once more among the constituent segmentary groupings. 
Although the French experimentally employed the system created 
by Abd-el-Kader, appointing 'loyal' khalifa-s and agha-s to 
analogous commands, they had little success. These new commanders 
exercised their 'authority' in a vacuum. "One could not replace 
the men and keep the system", Julien points out, "because the 
prestige of the men was the vital ingredient. The new men did 
not have 'iý had in their blood; their motive was money, or fear". 
10 
Future attempts to 'recognise' indigenous overlordships, and 
especially to erect new ones, confronted this same structural problem. 
The confederation centred around Abd-el-Kader was only one 
manifestation of a widespread and complex pattern of resistance to 
European implantation. The Western Tell Atlas, for example, 
particularly the Dahra and Ouarsenis massifs, could not be forcibly 
occupied until 1842. Three years later, full-scale revolt swept 
the highlands, encouraged by the Taibiya order, and led by the 
mystical Bou Maza, the 'master of the hour'. 
11 A fresh campaign 
was necessary to protect French settlements in the Cheliff valley, 
at a time when Abd-el-Kader was still a threat, and the repression 
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was of startling severity. These Berber mountains long remained 
insecure, and responsive to outbreaks of insurrection elsewhere. 
On the Eastern Tell, the massifs of Greater and Lesser Kabylia, 
refuges of communities which had had little contact with Turkish 
rule, were not finally penetrated by French columns until 1857, 
after years of watchful hostility. 
12 Reaction to the expeditionary 
force was fierce, armed resistance was prolonged, and the methods 
of conquest were extremely brutal, Yet once the armed columns 
had passed by, leaving few garrisons, life returned fairly much 
to normal. This token 'pacification' lasted barely fourteen years 
until 1871, when wholesale insurrection again erupted in Kabylia. 
13 
The flimsy European presence there weakened by the national crisis 
in the Metropolis, was destroyed overnight, and flames of resistance 
broke out anew among neighbouring populations. A massive influx of 
troops and severe repression were required during the ensuing few 
months to restore the French position. Large-scale punitive 
sequestrations of land resulted. 
The whole range of the Saharan Atlas, stretching across 
Southern Algeria from the Monts des Ksour near the Moroccan border 
to the Aures-Nementcha mountains close to Tunisia, also offered 
bitter, if piecemeal opposition to the assertion of military control, 
It was a zone of insecurity for decades. Stern repression was 
provoked in 1859 and again in 1879 when the ßahmaniya order inspired 
revolt among the Berbers of the Aures; insurrection threatened the 
area again in 1916, at another time of French weakness. The tribes 
of the Hodna mountains responded to the threat of European colonization 
in 1860 with large-scale armed resistance, led by a marabout of the 
Ouled Sidi Rehab. 
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In addition to the conquest of these mountain communities, the 
French army had great difficulty in pacifying the nomadic tribes of 
the Saharan fringe. In 1864, the insurgent Ouled Sidi Sheikh, in 
the South of the Oran province, lit sparks of renewed dissidence 
throughout many recently-pacified highlands, and obliged the 
'African army' to intervene in strength. The same region was 
racked by insurrection in 1881.14 The subjection of the chain 
of Saharan cases which ran from El Cued and Touggourt in the 
East, to Ouarghla, the Mzab and Laghouat in the Centre, and Ain 
Sefra in the West - areas where the makhzen's writ% had never 
effectively run - was extremely painful and lasted from 1850 to 
1890.15 
Military operations in Algeria were thus both violent and 
prolonged. The resistance of native communities was rarely 
coordinated over a wide area, due to the segmentary nature of 
political action. The great imbalance of numbers, weaponry, 
training and supplies ensured that it was eventually broken down. 
Nevertheless, a complex assortment of holy men, fraternities, large 
tribal alliances, powerful notables, individual clans and small 
egalitarian groups provided local foci for what was a widespread 
reaction of bitter hostility. Nor was this short-lived: armed 
presence often needed to be reasserted where it had passed previously, 
and signs of weakness invited revolt. As a consequence, the early 
French tactics of 'marching through' or 'pushing back' dissident 
communities inevitably gave way to a more careful strategy of 
"settling" or attempting to "organize" them. 
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To break down resistance, the European invaders were obliged to 
mingle physical force with diplomacy. Like the Turks, the French 
entered into the game of segmentary politics as best they could, by 
exploiting rivalries, encouraging collaboration, offering the 
privileges of alliance to key clans, and using other indirect means 
of conquest. To this extent, the segmentary nature of the tribal 
environment greatly facilitated the task of implantation, although 
force was necessarily a constant companion of these operations. 
However, unlike the Turks, the French turned to the segmentary game 
as a short-term tactic rather than as a long-term strategy. Unlike 
the moslem odjak, they had little understanding of or sympathy with 
segmentary logic. They bore European conceptions of government, 
and imported, or developed locally, novel ambitions directly to 
'organize' and 'administer' the territory. The discovery of a 
teeming segmentary reality beneath the facade of odjak bureaucracy, 
in this sense, posed massive problems. To implant effective 
government as they envisaged it, the French were obliged to build 
their own foundatiorb and impose them, so to speak, from the top 
down. This delicate work of construction was greatly complicated 
by the rapid settlement of much of 'useful Algeria' by thousands 
of European colons, determined to shape the political and economic 
environment according to their needs and world-view. The 
administrative structure which grew out of these conditions 
concretized several basic contradictions. 
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II. MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
-i. Early improvisations -------------------- 
The first elements of regular administration in colonial 
Algeria were provided by the army. An executive ordonnance 
(ordinance) of 22nd July 1834 established "the French possessions 
in the North of Africa" as a military colony, under the French 
Minist're de la Guerre (Ministry of War). It was to be governed 
by executive ordinance rather than by parliamentary laws. Responsible 
locally to the War Ministry was a Gouverneur-G6nkral (Governor General). 
As the military head both of operational command and of administration, 
his task was to coordinate campaigns and shape them to the long-term 
goals of the colony. 
Arrangements for the control of the moslem population developed 
from a series of makeshift policies adopted according to circumstances 
by military commanders in the field. In order to economise on the 
expenditure of force, experiment was made in some areas with 'Turkish' 
methods. 'Loyal' caid-s, khalifa-s and sheikh-s were invested, 
certain tribes were granted privileged status in order to win over 
crucial sections of the population, and native troops were recruited 
as auxiliaries. 
16 Diplomatic overtures were made to some tribes, to 
persuade them to 'submit' in advance of a campaign and indeed to 
join in that campaign against neighbouring rivals. In return, French 
troops refrained from attack, and respect was promised for customary 
rights and usages. As a result of such operations, the Army of 
Africa developed specialists in 'native affairs', who became expert 
on 'age-old' clan rivalries, potential collaborators, powerful 
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families, and likely enemies. Out of this surveillance, and the 
tactics of divide and rule, strategic goals for native policy began 
to evolve and harden. 
-ii. The Bureaux Arabes17 ------------------ 
The first real attempt by the army to sketch out, develop and 
coordinate administrative policy towards the native population 
began in August 1841, when the Gouverneur-General, Marechal 
Bugeaud, established the Direction des affaires arabes (Arab 
Affairs Office), under General Daumas. The aim was to build a team 
of army officers concerned with pacification proper, rather than 
with military operations per se. The Gouverneur-Gen4ral's arr9te 
(regulation) of 1st February 1844 took the process a stage further 
by setting up a hierarchy of Bureaux Arabes (Arab Bureaus) wherever 
military implantation had already been effected. The three provinces 
were split into 'subdivisions' and 'circles', each with an Arab 
Bureau. This command post, housed in a small fortified building, 
was headed by an army officer assisted by one or two junior officers, 
with a squad of mokhzani (native horsemen) at his disposal. 
The network of Arab Bureaus developed gradually over the next 
25 years, but it never provided very dense coverage. There were 
fewer than fifty local Bureaus and only 195 officers even at the 
organizational peak in 1869, a time when the moslem population of 
Algeria numbered approximately 23 million. 
18 Inevitably, Arab 
Bureaus were committed to techniques of vicarious control and 
influence; "it was not direct administration but a protectorate 
regime". 
19 Their modus operandi, above all, was to contact local 
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notables, and treat them as intermediaries with indigenous communities. 
20 
Many were invested as caids and aghas, in accordance with the philosophy 
of Bugeaud expressed in his 1844 circular: "good policy will perhaps 
always require us, in secondary tasks, to leave the Arabs to be 
administered by Arabs, reserving the overall direction to the French 
commandants of provinces and subdivisions". 
21 
The Arab Bureau organization was expected to perform multiple, 
and far-ranging tasks. In 1840 Daumas outlined its goals: "to bring 
about the lasting pacification of the tribes by means of fair and 
regular administration, as well as to pave the way for our colonization 
and trade through the maintenance of public security, the protection 
of all legitimate interests, and the improvement of native welfare. 
Its personnel must aim at the peaceful solution of difficulties which 
too often have required the use of force; and at the overcoming of 
all obstacles erected against us by a society sd different from us 
in its customs and religion. By studying the country, and analyzing 
the motives which underlie the behaviour of the Arab population, they 
will help to indicate the best ways of employing military force in 
case of insurrection, and enable the most effective and least onerous 
methods of repressing revolts to be adopted. Finally, they should 
bring the natives to accept with the minimum of repugnance both our 
domination and the elements of government which are needed to affirm 
it". 22 
Much of the workload resulting from this philosophy of action 
was over-ambitious, and other parts of it consisted of inconsequential 
routine. Many of the goals were ill-defined, inconsistent, and indeed 
contradictory. Security was always a paramount concern in the action 
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of the Bureau' Arabes. They sought to provide constant surveillance 
and up-to-the-minute military and political information in order to 
prevent 'insurrection' and facilitate 'repression of revolts'. The 
army command laid constant stress on the need for military preparedness 
against the threat of rebellion. Bugeaud warned in 1842 that "roughly 
the same forces which made the conquest will be needed to maintain it... 
Their antipathy for us and for our religion will last for centuries; 
so let us remain strong among them... You submitted them by arms; you 
will only keep them in this state of submission by arms". 
23 Such 
sentiments received frequent echo. G4ngral de Clonard declared in 
1865, for example: "The virus of insurrection is in their habits, 
in their blood, in their heart: the Koran wills it!.... We are camped 
in the middle of a population which is extremely adventurous, and 
admirably organized for war. Nothing less than an army of a hundred 
thousand and Marechal Bugeaud was needed to defeat it, and although 
defeated it has never been submitted" , 
24 Gdneral Deligny made a 
similar assertion in 1669: "In my experience, I consider... native 
society to be in a permanent state of conspiracy against us... They 
are merely awaiting their opportunity to chase us out of the 
country". 
25 With this in mind, the Arab Bureau, though entirely 
separate from the "operational" wing of the army, was required to 
make a constant display of military 'presence'. Its head, a uniformed 
officer, made regular mounted tours of inspection, accompanied by his 
detachment of mokhazni-s. He was responsible for maintaining public 
order, and had wide discretionary powers to punish individuals or 
groups whom he deemed to have disturbed this. More important, he 
was expected energetically to foster contact with reliable notables in 
order to prevent serious infractions from occurring. 
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In addition, the Bureau was a source of regular information; 
it supplied local detail on topography, ethnography and demography; 
it provided statistics on local economic resources, especially 
taxable ones, and on the precise status of indigenous property. 
The 'circle' head was responsible for the registration of births, 
marriages and deaths; for the establishing of tax liability (with 
the aid of the caid, who did the collecting); for the delimitation 
and registration of individual and communal land ownership; and 
for the execution of countless regulations passed down to him from 
the Gourvernement-Gen6ral. Indeed, the host of petty bureaucratic 
demands began to fix many Arab Bureau officers - those men of 
action par excellence - to their desks. As one officer complained 
in 1848: "Thirteen registers to be filled in and thirty filing 
cabinets to look after! This half kills the Arab Bureau and 
suffocates its activity by surrounding it with paperwork, one of 
26 the worst afflictions of our times". As a result, many were 
overwhelmed with work, and indeed unable to perform it in more 
than a perfunctory manner. 
27 
Part of the original function of the Arab Bureau, as suggested 
by Daumas, was "to pave the way for our colonization and trade". 
Besides keeping careful surveillance over the political activities 
of their charges, and ensuring the collection of statistics and 
taxes, many of the more energetic Bureau heads became involved in 
local 'development' projects. Various schemes for promoting 
agricultural improvement, 
28 fostering local trade, 
29 
and encouraging 
public works and community development30 nestled under their wing. 
For these activities, they earned their nickname: "Robinsons in braid". 
31 
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In some respects, these efforts pointed in the same direction as 
colonization, in that they aimed to replace 'inefficent' methods 
of extensive peasant economy (particularly established patterns of 
grazing and cultivation) with those of intensive capitalistic 
enterprise. Their goal was the 'valorization' or 'rational use' 
of local resources. The thinking behind some of the projects 
smacked of the 'totalitarian' transformative urge which often seems 
to lie at the heart of the colonial undertaking. The ambition of 
one officer in 1849, for example, seemed to be to occupy the total 
native year: "One of our great enemies in Arab life is their 
leisure time, during which their imagination has time to roam and 
can be exploited against us. From this point of view, any labour 
of public or private utility which we oblige the Arabs to perform 
during slack farming periods is of particular benefit to our interests 
and we cannot be too energetic in preparing such enterprises". 
32 
Such plans are of interest in exposing traits of colonial logic, 
but they had little real impact on indigenous life. The flimsiness 
of the Arab Bureau infrastructure, its excessive work load, the 
paucity of its resources, and the sporadic and localized nature 
of its officers' efforts, rendered it inadequate for dealing with 
a self-willed task which was immense, complex, and ultimately 
self-destructive. 
33 
Another purpose of this 'developmental' work was more important: 
security. Sedentarization was regarded as a key strategy in the 
pacification of nomadic and semi-nomadic populations. Thus Richard 
observed-in 1846: "One of the first things to strike anyone 
observing this country is undoubtedly the great scattering of the 
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population over the soil. This unfortunate state of affairs 
deprives the Arabs of any cohesion, gives them a mobility which 
makes it impossible to lay a hold on them, and allows them somehow 
to slip between our fingers. This lack of aggregation has another 
serious disadvantage, in that it delivers them into the hands of 
the first adventurer who comes along to exploit their fanaticism 
and thirst for pillage... ". Accordingly, he suggested, "the first 
thing to-do is to remove this potential situation from agitators 
by grouping together the scattered limbs of population, organizing 
all the tribes we. have submitted into zemala-s (militarily-supervised 
hamlets), and making this a condition for our establishing permanent 
peace with them". 
34 In this spirit, Arab Bureaus made numerous 
attempts to construct permanent markets and residential centres as 
magnets to attract and fix surrounding groups. There is no real 
evidence of success. 
Arab Bureaus also strove locally to "protect the legitimate 
interests" of the indigenous population, and to "improve native 
welfare". This led them to try to stave off or counteract specific 
projects and general developments which threatened the economic 
ruin of their charges. Officers in post perceived that the social 
distress resulting from such disruption created political insecurity 
and hindered acceptance of European rule. Many came to argue that 
the socio-political fabric of indigenous life, particularly the 
role of 'notables', should be positively shored up: without such 
intermediaries, instability would develop and the French would lose 
contact with the tribes. It was this kind of thinking that brought 
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the Arab Bureaus increasingly into variance with the interests of 
the colons who wished to hasten the 'valorization' Of local resources 
and the spread of European settlement. 
Initially, the army regarded the growth of European colonization,, 
and the intermixing of this population with the tribes, as one of the 
keys to long-lasting domination and security. 
35 Similarly, the 
earliest settlers looked upon the army as the indispensable 
guarantors of their living-space. The two interests were not 
diametrically opposed ab initio. However, as the immigrant population 
swelled dramatically and established itself, policy differences 
emerged, then hardened and widened. The Bureau Arabe, as one 
embodiment of the army's policy, became involved in bitter polemics 
with the colon press. The land question, in particular, was a 
catalyst. Many army officers began to propound the view that 
large-scale sequestration and subsequent piecemeal alienations 
of native land were fundamental obstacles to pacification. 
"Wherever the vanquished have borne frenetic hatred and indignation 
towards the conqueror", wrote Richard in 1848, "it is clearly when 
the soil bearing the bones of his ancestors has been taken from 
him". 36 Many officers became irritated at the incessant demands 
and growing influence of 'the colon party'. Colonel Robin was 
to voice this kind of feeling in 1901: "The colons are insatiable", 
he wrote, "Once the resources of the Domain had been exhausted, to 
give them land meant to take it from the natives. Every manner of 
chicanery was employed to prove that the latter were not the real 
owners, and that they should be expropriated. To see Arabs in 
possession of fine properties which would have suited them, the 
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colons felt as if they had been victim of spoliation". 
37 The army 
therefore sought locally, in countless obstructive ways, to defend 
their charges from the full impact of land laws decided nationally. 
In the 1850's and 1860's, for example, they began to press fervently 
against the colon programme of "cantonnement" (cantonization), which 
sought to open up large quantities of native land to European 
purchase. Napoleon III's protective "Arab Kingdom" policy, and the 
1863 land reform legislation, was partly the fruit of this resistance. 
After this policy had been undermined, Bureau Arabe officers were 
notably unenergetic in responding to pressures to register individual 
and collective native property. 
38 
It would be wrong to conclude that the army was fundamentally 
benevolent or far-sightedly developmental in its native policy. 
In this polarization of views between Arab Bureau and-colons, the 
basic concern of the former remained security, to which other 
considerations took second place. Bugeaud made this precise point 
as early as 1847: "It is generally believed", he explained, "that 
the administration of the ninety thousand Europeans of all 
nationalities is the main thing. I put first our domination over 
the Arabs, without which there is no security for the European 
population nor progress of colonisation; as a second priority, 
for the same reasons, I place the government and administration 
of the Arabs; in the third place, colonization and the administration 
of the Europeans". 
39 Long after the colons were pressing for 
'normalization', 'liberalization' and breathing space for their 
activities, army spokesmen emphasized the continuing need for 
special conditions to preserve security. For this reason, they 
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long opposed the extension of 'civil government' beyond the coastal 
strip. Partly this was the reaction of a proud corps at the prospect 
of losing its role in government and administration. But partly, also 
it reflected the military world-view that the colonial situation was 
riven by a basic conflict between conqueror and conquered, and that 
only force - embodied in the army - could hold it together in the 
forseeable future. Thus, paradoxically, the Bureau Arabe found 
itself attempting to restrain one of the fundamental drives of the 
colonial situation - economic exploitation - in the name of preserving 
that colonial situation. Though its officers often spoke in favour of 
native evolution, they usually conceived of it in gradualist terms and 
under a protective military aegis* 
40 
In reaction, the colons charged. the Bureaux Arabes with 
'aristocratic' contempt for the realities of civilian and Republican 
government. 
41 
They stigmatized "the rule of the sword" as aristocratic, 
and called for the liberation of the indigenous population from its 
sway. They identified the army with "feudalism" also because of its 
policy of associating with "native chiefs". Often this reflected a 
misunderstanding of the nature of authority in segmentary communities; 
to use Berque's terminology, they could not distinguish between "the 
natural influence of the notable in his clan" and what they conceived 
of as "the command of administrative functions by native chiefs who 
are either legatees of an irrational past, or abusive creations of 
our regime". 
42 
However, to the extent that some Bureau Arabe 
officers made a similar confusion, there was some justice in colon 
allegations. Some officers became active and enthusiastic participants 
in segmentary intrigues, and when clumsy examples came to light - the 
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Doineau Scandal of 1856-7, for example 
43 
- they were inflated 
royally by the settler press as evidence of backward militarism. 
Perhaps the most bitter and revealing attack on the role of 
Arab Bureaus, however, concerned their alleged "Arabophilia". 
They were seen as part of a conspiracy to thwart the legitimate 
interests of France. The brief flowering of the 'protective,. 
policies of the army during the 1860's brought this vituperation 
to a height. The measures of this period, limited though they 
were, were not lightly forgiven by the settlers. The fall of 
the Second Empire in 1870, and the establishment of the sympathetic 
Third Republic, gave them an opportunity to settle the scores 
rapidly, and indeed to extract a prolonged revenge. Beginning 
with the decrees of 24th October 1870 which drastically curtailed 
the role of the Arab Bureaus, the power of the army was systematically 
reduced. "Civil territory", from which Arab Bureaus were banished, 
was swiftly extended throughout the Tell. Civil rule covered only 
4,700 square miles in 1869, but 12,100 square miles by 1873, 
28,400 square 'miles by 1880, and 49,400 square miles by 1891.44 
The Arab population in this area expanded even more dramatically: 
from 220,000 in 1869, to 1,890,000 in 1882 and 3,050,000 by 1891.45 
By the latter date, the "Military Territories of the South" 
contained fewer than half a million moslems. The Arab Bureau 
network had withered dramatically, and it never recovered more 
than a vestigial role. 
328 
-iii. The Senatus-Consulte of 1863 
There was a temporary reorientation of Algerian colonial 
policy during the last decade of the Second Empire. The Metropolitan 
background to this has not, apparently, been the subject of thorough 
study. It seems that the interests of larger scale French capitalism - 
finance houses, manufacturers and food merchants - prevailed over 
the immediate demands of existing smaller-scale Algerian settlement, 
and that these institutions were concerned with establishing a 
modus vivendi with indigenous society. Rather than pushing forward 
with piecemeal land expropriation and pursuing 'assimilation', a 
more stable form of 'association' was sought which would acknowledge 
the particularities of tribal life and offer some protection of 
remaining indigenous property. This became known as the policy 
of "Royaume Arabe" (Arab Kingdom) following a speech by Napoleon III, 
who visited the colony in 1860 and became convinced of the need to 
change the emphasis in Metropolitan action. One of its prime 
architects was Ismael Urbain, 
46 
a moslem-Christian publicist 
influenced by St-Simonian thought, 
47 
and its protagonists included 
a large number of Arab Bureau officers. 
48 
The policy which began 
to emerge during this period contained contradictory strands of 
thought, but was not sufficiently long-lived for them to receive 
full expression in practice. 
The crowning achievement of the Arab Kingdom phase was the 
Senatus-Consulte (Act of the French Senate) of 22nd April 1863- 
49 
It radically affected the status of native land. Hitherto, the 
process of cantonnement (cantonization) had treated all indigenous 
land as Public Domain land, belonging to the conquering French 
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state, on which tribes merely exercised a right of usufruit. 
Consequently, where tribes were deemed to be in occupation of 
more land than they could 'fully use', the state had carved off 
large slices for European settlement. 
50 The Senatus-Consulte 
put an end to this. "The tribes of Algeria", its first Article 
declared, "are... proprietors of the lands which they have permanently 
and traditionally enjoyed, under whatsoever title". 
The bulwark which this Land Act provided against continuing 
dismemberment of tribal lands nevertheless had several flaws, 
and proved a mixed blessing for those it ostensibly protected. 
Firstly, although it closed one stable door, it made no attempt 
to round up the escaped horsesi land already absorbed into the 
Public Domain, sequestrated, or alienated to settlers, was not 
returned. Moreover, the Act did not really confirm existing 
indigenous land rights so much as reclassify them into three 
categories - collective cultivation ('arch), common pasturage, 
and individual appropriation (melk) - which, at least potentially, 
fitted them into the operative context of European laws of property. 
The Act insisted that individual natives could only alienate 
individualized (melk) property; collective - or undivided - property 
could only be alienated with the consent of all its 'owners', and 
control of common land was vested in a communal unit, the douar. 
A roving Commission, known as the cadastre, was set up to register 
the dimensions and classify the nature of native landholdings, 
and until these titles had been delivered no transq, ations were 
possible. All this certainly slowed down private sales to settler 
profiteers. Nevertheless, though reviled by the colons for these 
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reasons, registration le64 in practice to wide-scale constitution 
of individualized property. Even property registered in other 
categories was rendered vulnerable to the indirect pressures of 
the market. The protection offered by the Act proved less than 
comprehensive, and, in subsequent years, the settlers were able 
to exploit its 'positive' aspects. After the overthrow of the 
Second Empire and its Arab Kingdom policy the land laws of 26th 
July 1873 and 22nd April 1887 opened up large quantities of 
native land to speculation without having to repeal the 1863 
Senatus-Consulte. 51 
From the point of view of colonial administration, the most 
significant aspect of the 1863 reform was the designation of the 
native douar as the unit to which common land (about 20% of the 
total) was assigned. The first task of the cadastre commissioners 
was to divide up indigenous groupings into these douars. 
According to the arrete (regulation) of 14th July 1863, douars 
were to be responsible for the management of common land, and 
were to voice their views through a 'emaa (assembly) appointed 
by the French administration. 
This new development in colonial policy revealed both 
schematic and imaginative thought on the part of its instigators. 
It was schematic in that the douar was conceived as a territorial 
unit, with static boundaries, and a permanent, quasi-corporate 
assembly. This was an alien projection on to the complex and 
fluid world of segmentary Algeria. In its traditional context, 
the 'douar', meaning literally a circle of tents, was merely one 
of many potential levels of political action. These levels, 
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moreover, were defined agnatically, hot territorially. The particular 
level at which the authors of the Senatus-Consulte chose to freeze this 
segmentary reality was especially inappropriate. Douars were too big 
and unwieldy to have close ties of economic or political solidarity; 
the commissioners split most tribes into a maximum of two. 
52 The 
traditional level of segmentation 4b. which the douar corresponded, 
if at all, had been mobilized only in times of major armed conflict, 
and the disarming of the tribes under the French 'peace' rendered it 
irrelevant. The natural levels of segmentary organization remaining 
in Algeria were more intimate: fractions, clans, or, in sedentarized 
areas, villages and village segments. All of these were ignored by 
the new douar structure. To set up the latter, particularly in 
densely-populated sedentary areas like Kabylia, was to import a 
foreign institution, and its congruity with the traditional pattern 
was largely illusory. In practice, moreover, the work of the 
commissioners was hurried and peremptory-53 Some extremely artificial 
units resulted, either grouping together disparate and hostile 
communities, or alternatively splitting apart groups which had 
cohesive ties. 
54 
Despite these fundamental weaknesses, the Senatus Consulte of 
1863 did contain ingredients of revolutionary purpose. Its authors, 
Urbain in particular, had planned to sow seeds of "association" 
between French and moslem Algeria. Rather than insisting on 
"assimilation", which they saw as both unrealizable and disruptive, 
they sought to come to terms with and to foster autochthonous 
communal institutions. The colonial framework, in their view, must 
be adapted to the moslem reality. The douar was conceived as a 
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transitional structure which would induce the agnatic loyalty of 
the Algerian tribe to interact with, and perhaps evolve towards, 
the municipal mentality of the French commune. Even the 
anachronistic aspects of the douar, in as far as they were 
acknowledged, were justified in developmental terms: as tending 
to generate 'higher' levels of solidarity. 
55 In the meantime 
the recognition of the role of a emaa, the traditional assembly 
of segmentary Algeria, constituted an acknowledgment of the need 
to embrace existing nodes of legitimation rather than to impose 
alien structures from above. 
However, the developmental potential in the 1863 reform, with 
all its attendant inconsistencies, anachronisms and contradictions, had 
little opportunity to test itself. For the settler-dominated regime 
which entrenched itself from 1870 onward, the problems of "association" 
were at best tangential. In particular, the douar as a base cell for 
a transformative system of native administration was stifled in its 
cot. 
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III. THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL GOVEMIENT56 
-i. EtzroEean settlers and MetroEolitan France 
Algeria was a magnet for European immigration from the earliest 
years of conquest. Extensive State seizure of land and property, 
and the expulsion and exodus of many native groups, facilitated the 
rapid settlement of peasants, traders and artisans on the littoral 
plains. The ports of Algiers, Oran and Bone, abandoned by much of 
their moslem population, soon developed sizeable French communities, 
and small colon centres began to burgeon throughout the Mediterranean 
region. By 1836, there were already 32,000 European inhabitants of 
Algeria. This number had swollen to over 100,000 by the time of 
Abd-el-Kader's surrender in 1847, and had reached 600,000 by the 
turn of the century. The interests, concepts and pressures of this 
group had far greater influence on the type of administrative 
framework erected around native political life than either the 
military command or the Metropolitan government. 
The priorities of military administration centred on security. 
The pacification and control of the native population required an 
'exceptional regime', and the exercise of 'emergency powers'. Once 
a modicum of security had been established, the settlers perceived 
this as an obstacle to their bourgeois interests. They sought not 
merely an expansion of colonization, but also the development, or 
'normalization', of civilian government for the European population. 
They cast these demands in terms of "assimilation". 
In one sense, this concept of political "assimilation" concerned 
the European settler population exclusively. It contained at least 
I 
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two ideas, often confused but never coterminous, which frequently 
led to different practical conclusions. ' One notion of "assimilation" 
simply entailed the extension to French residents in Algeria of 
conditions of social and political life analogous to those prevailing 
in the Metropolis: similar governmental institutions, for example, and 
a similar legal framework, Another version of "assimilation" was 
essentially a theory about the relationship between the government 
of European expatriates and that of their Mother Country; it 
constituted an assertion that European Algeria be incorporated within 
the same political system. The settlers attitude to this question 
of the political relationship between Algeria and France was 
fundamentally instrumental. On the one hand, certain practical 
advantages resulted from remaining a constituent part of the French 
polity; in particular it was a logical basis on which to demand the 
extension of analogous civil rights. On the other hand, to ensure a 
"French life style" in the special colonial conditions of Algeria 
actually required different local arrangements and special institutions 
to supervise them and, for this reason, settlers pressed to loosen 
certain ties with the Metropolis. Paradoxically, this latter argument 
could also be pursued in terms of'assimilation', the settlers 
demanding the 'fundamental right of Frenchmen' to participate in 
and control their own affairs. 
Oscillation between these poles was a constant feature of 
settler politics, and indicates a problematic at the heart of their 
enterprise. To an extent, the dominance of one or other of the 
tendencies appears to correspond to temporal stages. During the first 
half century of the colony's existence, the settlers were chiefly 
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concerned with tightening their political links with France. - 
By this means they sought to establish civilian direction at the 
head of Algerian affairs, to open access to representative 
institutions at Metropolitan and Algerian levels, and to achieve 
the same political, legal and administrative status for expatriate 
groups and individuals as was current across the Mediterranean. 
Once assimilation in these forms had been achieved, however, the 
colons later shifted into a policy of demanding or defending a 
calculated measure of autonomy from France. 
In the first phase, the demands for 'assimilation' at the 
highest level of government had little impact until the military 
position became established and settlement was widespread. 
Eventually, despite the opposition of the Gouverneur-Gdn4ral, 
Mar. chal Bugeaud, Algeria was in 1845 divided into 'civil', 
'mixed', and 'military' territories. The civil area was defined 
as that "in which there is a sufficiently numerous European 
population to have been organized already, or to be organized in 
the future". 57 The departure of Bugeaud in 184?, and the fall of 
the Orleanist monarchy and advent of the Second Republic in 1848, 
opened the way to the spread of 'republican' institutions to 
Algeria. Its consummation was the assiqiilative decrees of 
November-December 1848.58 Algeria was proclaimed an integral 
part of "French territory". It was not given special colonial 
status, but instead was fitted out with a politico-administrative 
structure akin to that of France. French citizens there were given 
the right to send elected deputies to the French National Assembly. 
The three former Turkish beyliks, hitherto called provinces, were 
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split into 'civil' and 'military' parts. The former became 
d4partements on the Metropolitan pattern, headed by a prefet 
appointed by and responsible to the Ministere de 1'Interieure in 
Paris. The same model was followed in the subdivision of 
departements into arrondissements (districts), each to be headed 
by a sous-prefet. Finally, an increasing number of communes 
(municipalities) was planned as the bottom rungs of this hierarchy. 
The area and population which each of these institutional levels 
was expected to administer was far larger in Algeria than in France, 
but otherwise the colonial framework was a transplantation of the 
Metropolitan structure. 
The most notable 'anomaly' in this schema was the continuing 
role of the Gouverneur-Gýnlral, situated in Algiers. 
59 He was 
appointed by the Executive in Paris - by the President of the 
Republic from 1870 - and was responsible to it for the local 
coordination of military and civil administration. The task 
of his organization was to execute in Algeria both the general 
corpus of Metropolitan legislation, and those decrees issued 
specifically for Algeria. To this end, he had considerable powers 
to issue his own local arretes (regulations). 
The role of the Gouvernement-General often provoked 
considerable suspicion and disgruntlement among the settlers, 
and provided a focus for pressures for and against 'assimilation'. 
Originally, it was a manifestation of military rule, and thus 
seemed to colons designed to thwart their interests. After 1870, 
its role became almostexclusively civil, yet certain Gouverneurs- 
GenýraL% were btill appointed from military backgrounds, which 
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caused continuing unease. Above all, perhaps, the Gouverneur-G4n6ral 
was an outsider, appointed by the Metropolis, usually from Metropolitan 
stock. The rapid turnover of incumbents - few remained in office for 
more than five years - prevented their developing too "Algerian" a 
view of policy. 'Some appeared to arrive with 'preconceived ideas', 
occasionally with plans for reform, and all received a flow of 
instructions from Paris. To this extent, the Gouverneur-G4neral was 
potentially a symbol of Metropolitan 'ignorance', 'lack of sympathy', 
or ! interference'. What was perhaps more threatening to settler 
interests was that he controlled a specialized organization capable 
of effective local action. In other words, although his activity 
appeared in theory to exemplify the decentralization of authority 
from Paris to Algiers, in practice it threatened to render the voice 
of Paris more effective in local affairs. 
For these reasons, the Algerian settler community pressed in 
the early stages for a reduction in the role of the Gouvernement-G4neral. 
They demanded that Algerian administrative services be directly and 
separately attached to specialized French Ministries. The decree of 
26th August 1881 gave them considerable satisfaction in this regard. 
It complicated the distribution of authority in Algeria between 
Gouvernement-Genoral, PrIfets, Metropolitan Ministries, and local 
elected municipalities, but this suited settler interests. The 
colons preferred token dependence on a remote Paris bureaucracy, 
incapable of developing or imposing a coordinated and energetic 
Algerian policy, to real dependence on an intermediary Algiers 
buteaucracy, capable of forging and actively implementing a 
coherent policy. In short, "assimilation", in this sense of annexing 
services directly to Parisian ministries, offered de facto autonomy. 
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The Gouvernement. -Gen4ral, apart from its temporary abolition between 
1858 and 1860, in fact remained a permanent feature of colonial administra- 
tion. Yet it wqs never a powerful lever for the imposition of Metropolitan as 
opposed to settler policy in Algeria, and after the initial phase it was 
rarely an object of unremitting settler hostility. As Ageron suggests, 
the relationship between the Metropolis and the colony, with the 
Gouverneur-General as its apparent lynch-pin, constituted "a trompe l'oeil 
construction in which Paris apparently administered, but the politicians 
and functionaries of Algeria really gave the orders"* 
60 
One reason for this state of affairs was that no divergence of 
political interest between Metropolis and Algeria actually took on 
organized institutional forms for most of the colonial era. The French 
National Assembly, for example, was greatly influenced by an active and 
vocal delegation of deputies representing Algerian constituencies. At 
the instigation of French Algerians, the law of 26th July 1881 had 
doubled to six their parliamentary representation which, by the 
operation of strict assimilative logic, would have been limited to 
three. This disproportionate voice grew: by the Second World War, 
there was a bloc of 30 Algerian deputies in the National Assembly, 
elected almost exclusively by French settlers. In any case, the 
extreme 'Republicanism' of the Algerian colons found a natural echo 
among most of the deputies of the Third Republic. 
61 
A web of financial 
and commercial interests linked their welfare with that of the Metropolitan 
bourgeoisie. 
Policy differences between settler representatives and the 
Metropolitan Executive were also minimal. The absence of one specialized 
Ministry dealing with Algerian affairs meant that responsibility was 
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dissipated between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of War, 
and several other specialized departments. Metropolitan politicians 
seeking changes in colonial policy found that there was no easy route 
through which to channel them. The Algerian section within the Ministry 
of the Interior was not large or prestigious; rather than pressing 
comprehensive policies upon the Gouvernement-Gen'ral, it provided fairly 
lax and passive supervision over a limited area of concern. When the 
need arose during the 1950's to impose a Metropolitan policy radically 
opposed to that advocated by the settlers, the necessary machinery was 
lacking. Only in 1956 was a hasty arrangement made for a separate 
Ministry of Algeria, with a seat in the French Cabinet; indeed this 
tardy reform involved the replacement of the Gouverneur-G4ndral by a 
Resident Minister. 
Not only was there no stream of firm Metropolitan directives on to 
the desk of the Gouverneur-G4n4ral, but political realities on the 
Algerian side of the Mediterranean ensured that he was subject to 
incessant colon pressure. His own staff was predominantly French 
Algerian in composition, and thus sympathetic to settler interests. 
Moreover, as well as Metropolitan channels the colons had important 
representative organs at the local departemental level with great 
influence on the Gouvernement-General. Foremost among these were 
the conseils-generaux, established in 1858. Essentially settler bodies, 
with only a small number of unrepresentative moslem members, they were 
energetic and powerful propagadists, and their cooperation was vital for 
the successful implementation of many departemental projects. In addition, 
each conseil-general had representatives on the Algerian conseil superieur 
or conseil du gouvernement. This was an all-European consultative body 
comprising high Algerian functionaries, including the Gouverneur-G&n4ral, 
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as well as elected delegates from the conseil-g4neraux. It provided 
an Algeria-wide platform for sustained colon pressure on the Executive, 
and was a further anomaly in terms of 'pure' assimilation. Additionally, 
between 1898 and the Second World War, Algeria-wide d6ligations-financieres 
were set up to debate and supervise the special Algerian budget which the 
colons had successfully demanded. The two French sections - one 'colon', 
one 'non-colon'-wielded great influence on the financial priorities of 
the Gouvernement-Gendral, and were an infinitely more significant force 
than the single Native section. 
These organized outlets for political demands, orchestrated by the 
colon press, could not be lightly ignored by the Gouverneur-Genoral, even 
if he disagreed with them. There was invariably great interest among the 
expatriate community in Gouverneur-General appointments, and new arrivals 
were immediately subjected to an avalanche of advice, delegations and 
pressure. Some Governees had to be replaced when they provoked excessive 
$ ire or lost settler confidence; other/ seem partially to have owed their 
appointment to known sympathy with the settler cause. Many in effect 
became spokesmen for the-colons to the French government. In this sense, 
the settler community often welcomed the role of the Gouverneur-General, 
expecting him to understand and defend its interests vis a' vis the remote 
Metropolis. 
Thus the concept of "assimilation", in settler hands, was complex and 
ambivalent. Defence of or demand for local 'anomalies' was an equally 
important ingredient of their political position. They long argued in 
favour of local tax privileges and financial subsidies from the Metropolis 
in the name of encouraging settlement; close financial ties with Franct 
were an essential aspect of this. Towards the end of the 19th Century, 
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however, the settler community perceived that the balance of advantage 
was changing. Algerian agriculture and trade had grown extremely prosperous. 
Accordingly, settler representatives began to press for a separate Algerian 
budget in order to retain more of the colony's wealth for the colony's 
direct benefit. 
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Yet in so doing, they urged that 'special items', 
including the cost of the army, should continue to be borne by the 
Metropolis. The turn of the century, in fact, saw the development among 
French Algerians of certain autonomist and even separatist tendencies. 
They alleged that the Metropolis was deliberately stunting the expansion 
of Algerian trade and industry in order to protect its own interests and 
attacked its 'interference' in the colony's affairs. 
63 
These elements of 
resentment surfaced again most dramatically from the mid-1950's onward, 
when the Metropolis, faced with the growing financial embarrassment and 
political crisis caused by the outbreak of guerilla warfare, began to 
search for solutions which would harm the privileges of the expatriate 
Europeans. The settlers rapidly developed a paramilitary resistance 




The ambivalence of "assimilationist" terminology 
then reached an ironic climax in their emotive slogan: "Algerie 
fran5ai. se! " 
-ii. Assimilation and native-policZ 
Despite certain appearances, "assimilation" was never a purely 
'domestic' issue concerning European emigrants and their homeland. 
From the outset, it was inextricably interwoven with questions of 
policy towards the indigenous population of Algeria. The 'colon 
programme' of the mid-19th Century, 
65 
which fought for the end of 
military rule and the extension of French political norms and 
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institutions to Algeria, also pressed for the autochthonous community 
to be included within this civil framework. This was not a grudging 
concession but a central goal of the settler bnterprise. 
The concept of the "assimilation" of moslem Algeria was an 
ideological weapon used to justify and disguise exploitation. It 
implied that there should be no toleration, support, or protection 
for the separate customs and traditional institutions of the native 
population. The latter should be exposed uncompromisingly to the same 
organs of law and government as controlled and expressed settler life, 
Within this new framework, obstacles to the free operation of 'market 
forces' should be deliberately dismantled. Naturally, this put the 
settlers at an overwhelming practical advantage, though in principle 
this would be only temporary, for the native was 'expected' progressively 
to adapt himself to this modern world. In the meantime, objective 
exploitation could be rationalized in terms of 'destroying feudalism', 
'spreading civilization', or fostering such progressive ideals as 
'liberty, equality and fraternity'. 
At the same time, various devices deprived the native, in practice, 
o. 
ý fr access to protections which a genuine process of assimilation 
J 
might appear to have offered him. 'Compensations' such as the right 
to vote, an equitable share of government expenditure, or freedom from 
arbitrary laws were systematically denied or 'postponed'. The right for 
moslems to vote at d1partemental level was only a minor example of this, 
insignificant in view of the remoteness of this level from real moslem 
experience, but significant as a small illustration of the mechanics of 
the colonial situation. The conseil general debated the budget of each 
ddpartement. The moslem population contributed a significant share of 
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these financial resources: between 55% and 65% of departemental income 
in 1890, for example. 
66 
Yet at the same time, it had virtually no say 
in the allocation of this money. Throughout the Nineteenth Century 
conseillers-generaux were elected only by the French population. From 
1870, the colonial administration nominated moslem 'assessors' to sit 
on the conseils. Not only were these unrepresentative figures 'loyal' 
to France, but they formed only one-sixth of the membership. Thus in 
the Akbou district, 285 French electors in 1890 chose the conseillers, 
without any consultation of the 219 865 moslem taxpayers. 
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From 1908 
these moslem conseillers were made elective, but the franchise was 
accorded to a handful of socially 'acceptable' natives. In 1919, the 
proportion of moslem conseillers was raised to one quarter, and in 1947 
to two-fifths. Moslem participation at'dtpartemental level was thus 
carefully restricted throughout the colonial era. 
At higher levels of government, the situation was even more 
exclusive. No moslems at all were elected or nominated to the conseil 
du gouvernement. As for elections to the French National Assembly, the 
very ideology of assimilation served to deprive the moslem population 
of any vote. It was insisted, until the ordonnance of 17th August 1945, 
that the right to vote could only be granted to moslems who became 
'naturalized' French citizens. Since 'naturalization' involved the 
renunciation of moslem status, an unthinkable step for all but a few 
individuals cut off from communal solidarities, this apparently 'logical' 
stipulation neatly barred the natives from their notional right to 
parliamentary representation. A more 'generous' franchise was ultimately 
extended to moslems for elections to the short-lived Algerian Assembly 
established in September 1947, but a multitude of formal and informal 
devices, such as twin electoral rolls, nongistration of voters, 
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gerrymandering, and electoral fraud helped to ensure that even in this 
flimsy framework the full weight of moslem numbers would not be brought 
to bear. 
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These various mechanisms of exclusion was reconciled with the 
verbiage of "assimilation" by the sub-ideology of transition. As yet, 
the argument ran, the native was factually unprepared, insufficiently 
evolved, for full participatory rights. In the meantime, his evolution 
would be accelerated by subjecting him to the obligations implicit in 
the new framework. Vague promises of rights in the future were thus 
crudely traded off against actual extraction of duties and refusal of 
special protection in the present. This was made explicit by the 
Gouverneur-General Tirman in 1889, in refusing to improve specialized 
moslem administration: "We must not lose sight of the fact that the 
time will come when all the natives will be brought to enjoy the 
benefits of municipal life. To prepare for this future day, we must 
as of now act in conformity with the rules which will then be in 
operation". 
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The terminology of transition, however, was of temporary value 
cd m 
only. Once again, the attitude to assimilation was instrumental. 
Any real threat that "this future day" was about to dawn, despite 
their efforts, led them to abandon the concept of "assimilation", 
which they often openly derided. Instead they uttered alternative 
theories about the impossibility of truly Europeanizing the intractable 
native and the desirability of 'separate development'. Thus the 
President of the hitherto ultra-assimilationist conseil-g4n4ral of 
the däpartement of Constantine felt able to declare in 1893 that 
"we are destined to live with the Arabs, to use their special capacities 
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for the exploitation of this country, and our first duty is to respect 
their customs by banishing any idea of assimilation". 
70 These two 
propaganda strands rationalised different strategies of local or 
Metropolitan exploitation of natives. Alternation between them was an 
endemic feature of settler politics and revealed deep contradictions in 
the colonial situation. 
These conflicts in native policy were intimately bound up with the 
question of colon-Metropolitan relations. The occasional struggles 
between Paris and Algiers usually centred on who was to determine, and 
in whose interests, the treatment accorded to the indigenous population. 
Many complex ideological cross-currents churned 
WOW this fundamental 
issue. On occasion, the settlers demanded a measure of local autonomy 
from France in order to "assimilate" the natives and subject them to 
the rigours of European law; conversely, the Metropolis found itself 
seeking to intervene more directly in Algerian affairs, using channels 
which bound Algeria to the French polity, in order to protect or 
provide specialized institutions for the moslem population. At other 
times, the settlers demanded the right 'as Frenchmen' to determine their 
own affairs in order to maintain special Algerian laws affecting the 
moslem population; while the Metropolis sought, in the name of 
assimilation, to extend fundamental common law rights to moslems. 
The Metropolitan 'case' which we can trace through these currents 
was little more than a subdued logical counterpoint to the reality of 
settler dominance. In practical terms, the Metropolis was not a 
separate political bloc actively controlling or confronting colon 
ambitions. The colonial situation in Algeria was colon-centred, and 
its structures concretized settler interests and concerns. This was 
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not 
true Ao ly at the levels of central and regional government, 
but also 
at the local level where European administration directly impinged on 
the segmentary life of indigenous Algeria. 
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IV. THE COMMUNE DE PLEIN EXERCICE71 
-i. Establishment 
The arrangements made for the local administration of tribal 
Algeria were moulded, or distorted, by the needs of colonization. 
They originated in the rather haphazard development of municipal 
institutions in centres of European settlement. During the firsttwo 
decades of French rule, a handful of colon townships - Algiers, Oran, 
Mostaganem, Bone and Philippeville initially - acquired certain powers 
of self-administration akin to those of 'communes' in France. With the 
establishment of civil territory ih 1845, these communes began to 
proliferate as the base cell of the European hierarchy of government. 
By 1856 there were 47, and by 1873 a total of 126. Originally designed 
for and confined to predominantly European areas, they extended 
conditions of French municipal life to expatriates. They were not 
designed for the direct administration of the indigenous population. 
But although all newly-established communes centred around an immigrant 
nucleus, they increasingly came to affect and incorporate large numbers 
of moslems as well. 
The Algerian commune was later suffixed de p4ein exercice (with 
full attributes) in order to distinguish it from the commune mixte, 
which became the pattern for the remaining parts of Algeria. Its 
machinery was closely modelled on its French counterpart. Indeed' 
following the loi (law) passed by the French National Assembly on 5th 
April 1884, both were regulated by the same statute, apart from a few 
significant amendments affecting moslem participation. 
72 It was as if 
county councils, municipal boroughs or rural district councils had been 
introduced into Nigeria under British rule. 
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The commune de plein exercice had a separate budget and communal 
property. Responsibility for managing these was vested in a directly- 
elected conseil municipal (municipal council), which in turn elected a 
maire (mayor) and his adjoint (deputy). The maire made executive 
decisions on behalf of the commune, including the drafting of local 
by-laws, subject to the supervision of the conseil. He was not merely 
a representative of the commune, however; he also acted as an agent of 
central government. In Algeria, this made him responsible both to the 
rp 4fet and to the Gouverneur-Genoral, and through both to the Ministere 
de l'Interieur in France. As an agent of central government, he was 
expected to safeguard public order, foster public welfare, conduct 
civil registration, and ensure effective liaison with specialized 
services. He headed a small administrative unit, the mairie, which 
included one or several assistants, secretaries, gardes champetres 
(rural police), and Bardes forestiers (forest rangers). In larger 
townships, this administrative apparatus was often quite extensive. 
Into this structure, corresponding to French concepts of municipal 
life, huge numbers of moslems were rapidly squeezed. Settlers were 
eager to include neighbouring indigenous groups within the aegis of 
their fledgling communes. A deliberate policy of "annexation of douars" 
was pursued, and became particularly feverish between 1870 and 1914. 
As a result, virtually half of the population of communes de plein 
exercice was moslem by 1873; this proportion had risen to two-thirds 
by 1939, and to three-quarters by 1954. The average moslem population 
in a commune rose 450% between 1881 (when there ware 192 communes) and 
1955 (when there were 330). This overall "nativization" process took 
place despite the formation of separate communes mixtes in the 
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exclusively moslem areas. Often the result was a striking imbalance. 
The commune of Mekla in Kabylia, for example, contained 9098 moslems 
and only 140 Europeans in 1914.73 
The reason for this willingness, indeed eagerness to annex native 
douars was simple: they were a major source of municipal finance. 
74 
Once annexed, the inhabitants of a douar were liable to pay municipal 
taxes - both the direct municipal levy (prestations) and various excise 
duties. These contributions accounted for between one quarter and a 
half of the typical communal budget even in the Nineteenth Century. 
Moreover, the douars had communal property, established under the 
provisions of the 1863 Senatus-consulte; once within the jurisdiction 
of the commune, this property became an integral part of its resources. 
As a result, indigenous groups could find themselves paying rent to the 
municipality for farming their traditional lands. 
75 Non-payment in 
such cases could lead to confiscation of the property, or its enforced 
sale to a European tenant. In addition, the moslem population was the 
principal source of fines, which resulted from a massive repertoire of 
new regulations concerning such matters as pasturage and forest 
management. Fees for municipal services were another source of income 
from the native population. 
The annexation of native douars actually made it possible for 
communes to balance their budgets, at least during the 19th Century. 
Before agreeing to the establishment of a commune, indeed, the 
Gouvernement-General often had to guarantee its financial viability 
by 'granting' douars to it. This stimulated considerable greed. The 
colon centre of Cannot, for example, with a population of 117, applied 
for commune status in 1884 and claimed jurisdiction over surrounding 
douars containing 9,000 moslems; it received commune status, but was 
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'allowed' only 3 000 moslems. 
76 The contributions of these tax-payers 
enabled communes to spend fairly lavishly on public facilities. "Even 
the smallest Algerian commune", wrote Jonnart in 1892, "sets itself up 
with squares, tree-lined and paved streets, drinking-water, wash-houses, 
markets, abbatoirs - commodities and luxuries which so many communes in 
France have to do without for financial reasons". 
77 From 1890 onwards, 
between 25% and 30% of communal budgets was being swallowed by the 
general running costs of the mairie, including generous salaries for the 
maire and other European employees* 
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-ii. The-MuniciEal-Councill and the Maire --------- ---------- 
Although major financial contributors, the moslem inhabitants of 
communes de plein exercice were 'members' of them only in a restricted 
sense. The conseil municipal of the commune was made elective by the 
decree of 27th December 1866.79 French residents were granted the right 
to chose their conseillers by universal suffrage. Moslems, on the other 
hand, were accorded an extremely restrictive franchise, which reached 
only a handful of socially unrepresentative 'loyal' or 'evolved' voters. 
The decree of 6th February 1919 enlarged this category only slightly, 
to include all males over 25 who were either army veterans, active or 
retired employees of the central or local administration, landlords, 
large-scale farmers, licensed traders, holders of the certificate of 
primary studies, members of Chambers of Agriculture and Commerce, and 
prizewinners in agricultural exhibitions (sic). 
80 
This reform left 
90 000 moslem voters out of well over 1 000 000 moslems in communes 
proper. The ordonnance of 7th March 1944 extended the municipal vote 
rather further, but it remained well short of universality up until the 
development of armed insurrection in the midi-1950'x. 
81 
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Moreover, these few voters formed a separate electoral roll, the 
"Second College", while French voters constituted their own distinct 
"First College". The number of conseillers whom the Second College could 
elect varied according to the number of moslem inhabitants of the commune, 
but in no case was this allowed to exceed a fixed maximum percentage. In 
1866, moslems, Jews and foreigners together were allowed to choose up to 
33% of the conseil; in 1884, the maximum percentage for moslems alone 
was adjusted to 25%; this was raised to 33% in 1914, and again to 40% in 
1944. Thus, no matter how many moslem inhabitants or qualified voters 
there were, the representatives of the European First College always had 
a comfortable built-in majority. A handful of French voters controlled 
the council even in those communes overwhelmingly composed of native 
Algerians. In Tizi-Ouzou in 1881, for example, the destinies of 22 537 
moslem inhabitants (of whom 1311 were voters) were effectively decided by 
236 French voters. 
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This kind of anomaly became all the more striking 
as the ratio of moslems to Europeans increased. 
Moslems who became municipal councillors under these conditions had 
been elected by and belonged to a narrow and often collaborationist 
social stratum. They were regarded with contempt both by their 
coreligionaries and by the Europeans. 
83 
Their role in the conseil's 
proceedings, which were conducted entirely in French, was generally 
docile and self-effacing. Under changing circumstances after the First 
World War, a few determined moslem conseillers endeavoured to voice 
grievances on behalf of the moslem community, 
8 
but the reins of power 
remained firmly in European hands. Before the Second World War, the 
conservative bourgeois-nationalist Federation de Elus (Federation of 
Elected Representatives), founded by Dr. Bendjelloul, began to 
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orchestrate organized demands among a few of these councillors. 
Increasingly, a handful of men such as Ferhat Abbas, the future 
leader of the pro-assimilationist Union Democratigue du Manifeste 
Algerian, became municipal councillors. 
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After the war, with the 
expansion of suffrage, even the more radical nationalist groups made 
sporadic attempts to use communal elections as a platform for their 
views. But this kind of political activity had little impact on 
local government as such. Ahmed Ben Bella, for example, who became 
municipal councillor for his home town Marnia in 1945, explained 
twenty years later that:, "we the minority only had the right to agree, 
and in order to disagree we had to resign. The alternatives were to 
agree to everything, or to turn everything down". 
86 
Nationalist parties 
came to declare that both the municipal institutions and the method of 
election were parts of a sterile game, and furthermore accused the 
French administration of wholesale ballot-rigging. 
87 
Communal 
elections became chiefly a focus for the organization of boycotts, 
88 
and of mass resignations of existing councillors. 
89 
In any case, the most powerful person in the commune remained the 
maire, Whatever the composition of the municipal council, he was 
invariably a Frenchman. He and his deputies were elected by the 
council. Representatives of the Second College were disbarred from 
participating in this procedure until the decree of 1st January 1914, 
and even thereafter moslems were disqualified from becoming maires or 
deputies. The built-in French majority made it impossible in practice 
for even a naturalized native to become maire. 
90 
The quintessence of the maire was his Frenchness; he was a 
prominent settler, and the focus of the expatriate community. Though 
he was technically a representative of the whole municipality, 
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including the moslems, he was in all important respects the spokesman 
and agent of the European community alone. He was European, he was 
elected by Europeans, and to Europeans he felt responsible. He was 
also an amateur, for no special qualifications or training were required. 
Especially in the more rural communes, his administrative competence was 
often highly questionable: Sabatier sweepingly dismissed maires as 
"illiterate butchers and cafe-owners". 
91 Motives for seeking mayoral 
office were often related to personal affairs, and occupation of the 
post did not preclude the continuation of a former business or trade. 
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With the position went social prestige and the accumulation of useful 
contacts and debts of honour. Moreover, the Algerian maire, unlike his 
French counterpart, was paid, and often generously, depending on the 
size of his commune. He had many opportunities for patronage, since 
communal resources could support a considerable workforce and offered 
lucrative contracts to local entrepreneurs. The supervision provided 
by the prLfectorat and Gouvernement-Genlral was lax, or non-existent. 
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As a result, corruption and illegal practice in mairies was far from 
unknown. 
94 
The maire of a large commune could often become very 
powerful indeed. 
95 
-iii. Administration of native douars 
This municipal framework, designed to make the French community 
"feel::. At home". 
96 
largely neglected the administration of its growing 
moslem population, except in the matter of revenue collection. Not 
until 1919 was the financial contribution of douars in any way earmarked 
for expenditure on their specific needs; it-disappeared into the 
communal budget, controlled by the settlers. As a result, few projects 
of benefit to moslem areas were sponsored, a situation which Ferry 
354 
described as "daylight robbery". 
97 For the Gouvernement-General to 
devolve upon communes the execution of measures deigned to relieve 
social distress or foster social welfare among the moslem population, 
was to condemn them to delay and often to oblivion. The transfer of 
financial responsibility for free Franco-Arab schools to the communal 
budget in 1865, for example, was a kiss of death; all ten of them had 
closed within five years. 
98 As Jonnart argued before the French 
National Assembly in 1893: "The interests of the Natives, who cannot 
vote but must pay, and indeed who bear a heavy burden, are unfortunately 
sacrificed to the interests of a few dozen voters... Virtually nothing is 
done for the Native. The fact is that electoral considerations and the 
demands of local politics preoccupy and determine the activities... of 
the municipal councils.!. "No doubt", he added, "the colons have 
legitimate and respectable interests to safeguard, but their outlook 
is necessarily limited. To place in their hands the fate of the 
3 500 000 natives living in Algeria is to expose them to injustice and 
to what can only be called exploitation. Disguising this behind 
written laws does not make it any less profoundly immoral. It delays, 
even jeopardizes, the expansion of our influence". 
99 This view went 
largely unheard. 
Even with the best will in the world, it was difficult for the 
small maize to exercise effective supervision over the interests of its 
moslem administrees. One result of the greedy scramble for douars in 
the last decades of the 19th Century was the establishment of communes 
responsible for an impracticably large physical ara6tand population. 
At a time when the typical Metropolitan commune covered less than 6 
square miles, and Paris itself extended over only 30 square miles, 
the average size of an Algerian 'commune de plein exercice' in 1879 was 
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34 square miles. Some were enormous; the commune of Oued Zenati 
covered over 290 square miles in 1881, for example. 
100 Moreover, 
the moslem population lived in scattered segmentary groupings, not 
in agglomerated townships. The commune of Tizi-Ouzou in 1919, for 
example, incorporated a native population of 30 000 distributed in 
75 separate hamlets. 
101 Inevitably, as Chanzy admitted, "a maire 
rarely has sufficient ability or time to visit the douars". 
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Despite colon propaganda to the effect that. the commune freed the native 
from the evils of 'feudalism' and tutored him in new tasks and methods 
of social construction, its general result was actually to abandon him 
to his own devices. "The native area placed under the common law", 
Marchal claimed in 1879, "is precisely the worst administered area". 
Such a state of affairs, he went on to argue, prevented all hopes of 
gradually assimilating the indigenous population within the colonial 
framework: "though not very noticeable today, because limited to a 
small area and scattered in small patches, (this) will certainly have 
extremely disastrous consequences for Algeria if it were imprudently 
allowed to spread". 
103 Nevertheless, spread it did. With further 
annexations and demographic growth, the settler-centred commune de 
plein exercice became the colonial framework for an ever-increasing 
proportion of the autochthonous community. 
The fundamental weakness of native administration within the 
commune de plein exercice was not its reluctance to devote time or 
money to moslem welfare, but its very institutional character. A 
European-inspired territorial net was-flung loosely, almost absent- 
mindedly, over a segmentary reality with which it made little attempt 
to come to terms. Two possibilities were systematically ignored, or 
stifled: the development from above of a specialized corps of 
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administrators, and the encouragement of indigenous communal growth 
from below. Failure in the first respect was illustrated by the fate 
of the short-lived experiment with civil Arab Bureaus. 
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From time to time, liberal Metropolitan politicians and 
administrators produced tentative plans to withdraw responsibility 
for native douars from the mairie and to vest it in a centrally-supervised 
and coordinated corps of specialized administrators. Inevitably, these 
met such a torrent of hostility from settler organizations that action 
was paralyzed. A half-hearted experiment of this kind was actually 
implemented during the Second Empire, but expired rapidly from both 
internal weaknesses and external neglect. In 1854, Arab Bureaus began 
to be established in areas of civil, communal control. Hitherto, they 
had been military institutions, found only in areas of military rule. 
These new organisms, known as "Bureaux arabes departementaux", were 
staffed by specially recruited civilians. 
The purpose of these Bureaus appears to have been poorly thought 
out. They were designed to supplement rather than replace the work 
of the mairie, and the affected douars still paid their municipal 
taxes. They were expected to form some kind of links with native 
notables, and to encourage projects of communal development. Yet 
they were also intended to hasten the disaggregation of segmentary 
groupings within the framework of European municipal institutions. 
For the fulfilment of these ambivalent requirements, they were not 
generously endowed with resources, either in manpower or finance. 
Their somewhat hybrid personnel was intended on the one hand to wear 
uniform and go on the regular mounted tours of inspection associated 
with its military counterpart, but on the other hand lacked any 
military forces (mokhazni) to command. T)ey remained closely 
answerable to the d4partemental prefectorat. Accordingly, the settlers 
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viewed them with a mixture of derision and hostility, and gave little 
cooperation to their efforts. The army command treated the development 
with condescending scepticism. Though little study has been made of 
the experiment, it appears to have had no appreciable impact on native 
life in the communes where it was instituted. In 1868, these bureaus 
were disbanded, though their growth had long before been halted. In 
the same year, moslems had been accorded token participation in the 
election of municipal councils, and the influential assimilationist 
thesis claimed that this afforded adequate means for native communities 
to defend their interests. The unhappy life and rapid death of the 
civil Arab Bureaus illustrates the indifference towards specialized 
native administration which was also to cripple the work of indigenous 
caids. 
-iv. The CaidlO5 
In theory, communes de plein exercice continued to supervise the 
life of their douars through special indigenous intermediaries, called 
adjoints indigenes (Native Assistants) by the decrees of 1866 and 
1868, and renamed caids in 1919. The function of these agents, 
however, was ill-defined. Their creators seem to have intended 
'native assistants' to take up within the new civil framework of the 
commune the role performed by the traditional caid. They were to 
provide a link between the colonial administration and autochthonous 
social groupings, in the same way as caids had been intermediaries 
between central government and local tribes. However, their resemblance 
to the traditional Maghreb caid was minimal. They neither enjoyed the 
confidence of local segmentary communities, nor were they recipients 
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of effective authority from the colonial state. The expectations of 
that state were very different from those of the traditional makhzen, 
and those segmentary societies had different needs in the new situation. 
The commune de plein exercice was not designed as a framework of 
indirect rule. The appointment of native assistants to the mairie was 
not intended to afford positions of authority to douar notables. 
Rarely were they chosen from prominent local families. Many were- 
either of lowly origin, seeking the security of a humble career in 
the colonial administration, or indeed were complete strangers to the 
district to which they were appointed. The post of commune assistant 
was frequently a reward for proven 'loyalty', especially military 
service. As a result, most of them were cut off from intimate contact 
with the authentic representatives of douar communities. The latter 
associated them with the settler-dominated regime. As their nickname 
of "Beni-Oui-Oui" (literally meaning the tribe of yes-men) suggests, 
commune caids were regarded as collaborationist nonentities. Their role 
was parasitic; many spent more time in the colon centre than in the 
douars where their nominal responsibility lay. Even had the French 
sought to attract authentic 'notables' into caid-ships, they would 
have difficulty in doing so in view of those notables' tendency to 
withdraw from contact with the colonial administration. The choice 
of the menial title of 'adjoint indigene' in 1866 suggests that the 
French never intended to attract their participation. To rename the 
incumbents 'caids' in 1919 was to recognize the deficiency, without 
remedying it. 
The 'native assistant' or 'caid' did not acquire alternative 
supplies of authority from above to compensate for his lack of roots below. 
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He was treated simply as a minor employee of the commune. Until 1919, 
he was nominated by the prefet on the simple recommendation of the 
maire; even when the Gouvernement-Gene'ral assumed responsibility 
thereafter, individual appointments were essentially decided by the 
municipality. The small-scale colon principality of the mairie was 
a far cry from the traditional makhzen as a source of authority. 
Furthermore, the tasks to which the caid was assigned were extremely 
petty: collection of taxes, civil registration, the issuing of permits 
and minor police work, for example. He was poorly paid, Many were 
even unable to read or write, so had few sources of real prestige 
even in terms of bureaucratic rationality. Above all, the caid of 
the commune was not employed in any positive sense as a political 
intermediary. He had no real powers of initiative; indeed he did not 
even have the right to sit on the municipal council. In short, even 
his limited potential was under-utilized. 
The appointment of caids was left to the discretion of the 
commune. Article 5 of the Algerian municipal decree of 1884 stated 
merely that adjoints should be appointed "in communes de plein 
exercice where the native population is sufficiently numerous for 
special surveillance to be necessary". The Metropolis and the 
Gouvernement-G4n6ral did not press for its implementation. Supposedly, 
the ideal situation was to have one caid for each douar, but many 
communes did not trouble to appoint a single said, Only 46 caids 
had been appointed to 178 communes de plein exercice by 1878, and 
201 to 278 communes in 1913- One motive for this reluctance to 
appoint was financial; a caid's salary was payable from the communal 
budget and settlers were reluctant to devote such resources to 
moslem administration. A more fundamental reason was that the 
institution was not perceived in developmental terms. It was not 
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regarded as an effective means of involving the native population in 
municipal undertakings, which itself was not regarded as a goal of 
prime importance. Instead the caid was treated as an anachronistic 
survival, destined to disappear with the process of civilization. 
Although in the interim he performed chores which were reluctantly 
acknowledged as necessary, he did not appear destined to play a 
special role in the protection, representation, or development of 
native interests. This would be contrary to the spirit of assimilation. 
Haphazard pressure from above to establish a regular corps of 
caids, with entry standards and a reEsonable salary, was consistently 
staved off by the communes. Eventually in 1919 the Gouvernettir-General 
took over responsibility for appointments of caids, and imposed a 
minimum salary guarantee payable from Algerian funds, but this belated 
effort to breathe life into the ailing institution was unsuccessful. 
The number of caids dwindled steadily during the 20th Century. 
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Indeed, a simultaneous reform further undermined the caid's role. 
The establishment of elective douar jemaas with designated presidents, 
in 1919, forged a separate link between the native population and the 
municipality. Long before the end of colonial rule, the institution 
of commune caid was otiose, rendered so by indifference both from 
above and below. 
-v. Douars and Jemmasl07 ----------------- 
Assimilationist ideology often contained the vague assertion that 
communes de plein exercice were schools which prepared the indigenous 
population for new forms of public responsibility. Exclusion of 
moslems from participation at municipal council level belied this, 
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but even more significant was the stifling of communal developrent 
from below. Attempts to generate separate foci of native social 
life within the commune framework were systematically thwarted. The 
fate of douar jemaas was particularly instructive in this regard. 
The 1863 legislation on native land declared that every douar 
with a significant amount of common property should be endowed with a 
jemaa (assembly), appointed by the French administration, to be 
consulted on its use. The survival of traditional channels of authority 
was thus acknowledged, and in a sense given an official blessing at 
douar level. A decree of 24th December 1870 reaffirmed that in communes 
"jemaas of douars would be maintained where they already existed and 
established where t1 y: did not". 
The intention of the framers of these Metropolitan statutes was 
not entirely clear. The guiding notion seems to have been that such 
assemblies should be consulted by the municipality before any decision 
to alienate or otherwise make use of a douar's patrimony. In other 
words, they were to be protective mechanisms. Some more liberal 
reformers seem to have envisaged their eventual evolution into quasi- 
municipal institutions in their own right, providing a natural nucleus 
for indigenous solidarity. Urbain argued in 1881, for example, that 
it was wrong simply to annex douars to settler-communes. Wholesale 
exploitation and the smothering of indigenous community life would 
result, he suggested, unless the administration ensured 'the prior 
trsformation of the douar into a sort of preparatory commune"* 
108 
The role of the douar jemaa, he felt, should be not merely passively 
defensive, but positively developmental. 
Even in the former sense, the role of the douar was effectively 
aborted. The status of douar jemaas remained one of the haziest areas 
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of administrative jurisprudence throughout the colonial period. The 
statutes of 1863 and 1870 failed to spell out any specific functions 
for them to perform. Nor did they make their establishment mandatory; 
this was left to the discretion of municipal councils under the broad 
supervision of the Gouvernement-GLneral. The decree of 1884 which laid 
down the constitution of communes de plein exercice made no mention of 
douar assemblies whatsoever. As a result of these significant omissions, 
douars in communes de plein exercice were systematically ignored by the 
wettlers. Throughout the 19th Century and also for most of the 20th 
Century, they were no more than shadowy commune 'sections'. Their 
interests were theoretically represented at the mairie by the adjoint 
indigene, while the municipal council remained the sole representative 
and managerial body in the commune. For the most part, douar jemaas 
were neither constituted nor consulted. 
The settler-dominated council continued in practice to control the 
disposition of douar property, and the Gouvernement-G4neral made very 
little effort during the 19th Century to encourage them to seek 
indigenous advice on this. Towards the end of the Century, contradictory 
circulars, and indeed conflicting decisions by Algerian courts, alternately 
indisted on and denied the need for the maire to consult a douar's jemaa 
before alienating its property. 
109 A liberal Gouverneur-General, Cambon, 
alarmed by the widespread spoilation of douar lands, pressed hard during 
the 1890's for the establishment of douars as protective mechanisms, but 
his efforts were resisted from below by the communes and hampered from 
above by the colonial group in the French Assembly. Not until the loi 
of 1st August 1918 and the decree of 6th February 1919 were municipal 
councils legally obliged to consult the douar jemaa in matters affecting 
363 
its interests, with the power of adjudication in cases of dispute 
was vested in the prefet. 
Even greater settler resistance greeted subsequent efforts to 
develop the douar jemaa into an authentic cell of indigenous social 
life. These efforts grew out of the growing awareness of some 
politicians and bureaucrats that real associative links between European 
and moslem communal structures were lacking, and that this was because 
of, not despite, the nature of the settler commune. One sign of this 
lack was the continued 'unofficial' regulation of important aspects of 
native life, by traditional segmentary processes; clandestine tribal 
assemblies still met, for example, particularly at clan, fraction or 
village levels. The legislation of 1918 and 1919 accordingly sought 
to bring these clandestine organisations'into the open' and thereby to 
bring the colonial framework into closer association with authochthonous 
structures. It not only re-established the douar jemma in Algerian 
legislation, but made it an elective body. Its members were thence- 
forward chosen by all Second College voters. It chose its own President, 
who attended all municipal council meetings involving his douar's 
interests. 
However, the terms under which these 'official' elective jemaas 
were set up made them far from embryonic communes. They were not nuclei 
of an "authentic communal reform". 
110 At best they were passive 
instruments for the protection of a fast-disappearing form of native 
property. Yet again, no obligation was laid down that they be 
established; they were required only "when the size and interests of 
that population makes them useful". Many communes continued to refuse 
to constitute native assemblies; by 1945 there was a grand total of 
215 of them, between 296 communes de plein exercice 7 each with several 
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douars. 
ill In any case, the restrictive franchise of the Second 
College made these institutions socially unrepresentative and usually 
collaborationist in character. In addition, their responsibilities did 
not go beyond the management of douar property, distribution of pasturage, 
provision of credit, and other narrowly economic matters. In this field, 
their role was purely consultative; most decisions required the assent 
of the municipal council. Finally, the prRet or Gouverneur-Ggn4ral 
had the power to suspend or dismiss the president and any member of the 
jemaa; indeed the whole assembly could be dissolved if deemed recalcitrant. 
Accordingly, douar-jemaas never escaped the stranglehold of the settler- 
dominated commune. Despite piecemeal extensions of their responsibilities 
in 1945,112 they remained "purely fictitious bodies"9113 and jemaa 
elections were exercises in inconsequentiality. 
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V. THE COMMUNE MIXTE-t 
-i. Establishment 
Throughout the colonial era, most of the moslem population of 
Algeria lived outside the framework of communes de plein exercice. 
Alongside these there was established another structure of local 
government, based on the commune mixte, an. institution unique to 
Algeria. It was a hastily-improvised organization, and had only a 
temporary status throughout its life. Yet despite periodic schemes 
for its gradual transformation or rapid disappearance, it survived 
from its conception in 1874 until its disintegration amid the chaos 
of guerilla warfare in the mid-1950's. Its rigidity and inability 
to evolve came to symbolize the 'fixism' of the colonial regime for 
the majority of indigenous groups. 
As suggested above, the initial thrust of the settler policy 
of expanding civil government was for the constitution of communes 
proper, centred around a European agglomeration, and the annexation 
to thewýof as many nearby native douars as possible. In most areas 
of the Tell and pre-Saharan Atlas, however, hitherto divided into 
large military circumscriptions and supervised by scattered Arab 
Bureaus, there were no significant centres of colonization at all. 
The growing political weight of the colons nevertheless pressed 
strongly for the eradication of army control in these regions, in 
order to open them up to settlement and civil law. "No part of the 
territory", argued Lambert de Roisey in 1879, "should be kept under 
military command. Not even one palm tree should be excepted, for 
under this tree the supreme effort of the great native chiefs would 
entrench, itself". 
115 
As a result of such feelings, vast tracts of 
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military territory were proclaimed part of the civil zone within a 
year of the fall of the Second Empire in 1870. However, the question 
of exactly what form of civil government to organize in these areas 
remained problematical. 
In the absence of European centres, the raison d'etre for 
existing forms of municipal government, it was inconceivable for the 
colonial authority immediately to extent the communal structure proper 
to purely native populations. Some settlers argued that the maire of 
a distant commune should be given authority over parts of these new 
civil territories, or even that a special corps of maires might be 
placed at the head of these districts. But to Metropolitan politicians, 
to the Gouvernement-Glnnral, and to most colon representatives in the 
immediate term, such a solution was both impractical, posing major 
problems of communication and finance, and undesirable, in as far 
as it would abandon huge scattered populations to the exploitation 
or neglect of remote settler groups. Some kind of specialized 
administration was required. As far as the colons were concerned, 
this should avoid the evils of military government, yet provide an 
effective means of patrolling the indigenous population until such 
time as European settlement was sufficiently extensive to permit the 
establishment of communes proper. 
A Gouvernemental arrete of 22nd July 1874 attempted to come to 
terms with these conflicting criteria. Alongside existing communes 
de plein exercice, and those still to be founded, it instituted a 
network of special communes mixtes (mixed communes) in areas without 
a significant concentration of French settlement. The construction 
of this network was rapid: within a year there were 10 such communes 
mixtes, 44 by 1879, and 79 by 1884. These new civil dividions were 
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extremely large. Those established by 1881 each covered 440 square 
miles on average, and enclosed 20 000 inhabitadls. By 1926, this 
was an even more striking feature: their average size had risen to 900 
square miles, and their population to over 40 000. Thus they were 
essentially administrative divisions - superimposed from above - 
rather than municipalities in the true sense. They had no real 
personality or communality of interests. Each was headed by a civil 
administrateur, recruited from a specially-formed Algerian corps. 
He was responsible to the Gouvernement-Genoral for a wide range of 
executive and quasi-functions. Alongside him, in a purely consultative 
capacity, was a commission municipale (municipal commission), comprising 
elected representatives of whatever European population existed, plus 
moslem representatives appointed by the administrator. 
In certain respects, in name at least, this new civil institution 
was inspired by the commune mixte-established in military territory by 
the arr6te of 20th May 1868. Some of its formal ingredients were 
similar: the 1868 commune mixte was commanded by an Arab Bureau head, 
acting as local judge, tax agent and civil registrar, aided by a 
consultative commission municipale comprising army officers and 
appointed European and moslem representatives. In other important 
respects, however, particularly the question of its future evolution, 
the 1868 commune mixte was a very different body. 
The 1868 arret4, issued as part of the 'Arab Kingdom' programme, 
conceived of the mixed commune as a transitory structure for the 
native, taking him from fairly close military supervision towards 
communal autonomy. One of its authors, Urbain, pressed upon Napoleon III 
the need to "develop indigenous municipal life in such a way as to 
gradually limit the influence of the native aristocracy... We must 
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allow the natives to manage their own communal interests under the 
supervision of the State". To bring this about, he suggested, it 
was vital that indigenous municipal life should not be swallowed up 
within the framework of European municipal life: "we must not too 
hastily distribute the natives among the French communes, where they 
would be exploited by the immigrants". 
116 Thus he envisaged the 
mixed commune as a separate, indigenous institution, with a developmental 
purpose; it would survive in its initial form, in Lapasset's phrase, 
"only until the day when enough bonds of solidarity have been built 
and sufficient local revenues generated... to enable it to be called 
into the ranks of communes de plein exercice, and to enjoy their 
rights". 
117 
We should not exaggerate the far-sightedness and 'associative' 
liberality of this short-lived scheme of 1868, as Ageron is somewhat 
disposed to do. 118 Many of its intentions were confused, contradictory 
or impractical. Lapasset, for example, appears to have envisaged the 
eventhal transiti6n of the whole commune mixte -a huge and artificial 
unit - into one commune de plein exercice; in other respects, however, 
the reform seems to have ü separate douars within the commune mixte 
to evolve into separate communes. There was confusion, too, about the 
role of European colonization in this evolution; Article 2 of the arrete, 
which explained that communes mixtes were only appropriate in areas which 
"do not yet contain a sufficient European population to be erected into 
communes de plein exercice", seemed to imply that eventual autonomy was 
dependent on the progress of immigration. 
119 
Nevertheless, the 1868 commune mixte was unmistakably an attempt 
to construct a special vehicle for indigenous evolution. The settlers 
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greeted it distrustfully as a potential obstacle to the expansion of 
their interests and of 'full' civil government. The civil commune 
mixte of 1874 spring from their quite different view of the future. 
120 
They regarded it as a stopgap arrangement placing the moslem population 
under the supervision of a civilian administrator until such time as 
sufficient centres of colonization could be implanted. Then, as the 
Gouverneur-G4neral Tirman indicated in 1887, the commune mixte was 
"destined to be steadily dismantled as annexations to communes de 
plein exercice become possible". 
121 From 1874 onwards, there was 
continuous pressure to carve out communes proper, with annexed douars, 
from existing communes mixtes. In this sense, the colons insisted on 
the temporary status of mixed communes. 
The immigrant community sought from the outset to prevent 
communes mixtes from developing into potentially separate native 
communes. They voiced anxiety lest the institution become an obstacle, 
rather than a stepping stone to 'assimilation' of the natives. Their 
earliest concern, as this network of 'civil' administration spread to 
ever-larger areas of indigenous Algeria, was to ensure that it did not 
become too dense. They favoured a small number of big communes mixtes 
rather than a big number of small ones. Partly this was for financial 
reasons; the cost of native administration fell upon the colony's 
budget. But fundamentally it was to prevent the formation of compact 
embryonic native municipalities. From the mid-1880's the proliferation 
of communes mixtes was halted. Thenceforward, extensions of civil 
territory involved swelling the size of existing communes mixtes, 
redrawing their boundaries, and indeed merging existing ones, but not 
creating additional ones. The number of mixed communes actually fell 
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to 73 by 1891, and never rose above 78. At the same time, numbers 
of communes de plein exercice continued to grow. 
122 
-ii. The Municipal Commission and Administrator 
Executive responsibility in the commune mixte was vested entirely 
in the administrateur. Unlike the municipal council of the commune de 
p. ein exercice, the municipal commission was purely a consultative 
body. It met only four times a year. Apart from the administrator, 
its membership comprised representatives both of the European community, 
some nominated by the prefet at the administrator's instigation and 
others elected by First College residents, and of the moslem community. 
The latter commissioners were either nominated by the pr1fet at the 
administrator's instigation, or sat ex officio as caids and jemaa 
presidents. This deprived moslems in commune mixtes, the great majority 
of the Algerian population, of any elective representation throughout 
the colonial era. Moreover, the arrete of 1874 stipulated that elected 
membership of the commission should never be numerically inferior to 
non-elected membership, so that even the nominated moslems were never 
in a majority, At least half the commissioners were French even in 
communes with virtually no French residents. 
123 In any case, the 
French administrateur dominated proceedings, 
Unlike the maire of a commune de plein exercice, the administrator 
belonged to a full-time, professional service. This civilian corps 
served exclusively in Algerian communes mixtes, and its members were 
recruited almost entirely from among French Algerians. In the early 
decades, many were former army officers with Arab Bureau experience, 
but others came from administrative posts in the Gouvernement-General 
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and prefectures. Career prospects were fairly limited, as there were 
few posts and virtually no promotional hierarchy. Both the isolated 
conditions of the job itself, and the chronically 'provisional' nature 
were adeterrentto nevi entra4s. Asa resu.! £, ad itnisfrators 
of the commune mixte instititi. onwere never of the very highest calibre. 
Their training was rudimentary, and even such desirable qualifications 
as spoken and written Arabic, or Berber, were not insisted upon. Nor 
was there a coordinated and regular system of supervision at Gouvernement- 
General or prefectoral level; in many respects, they were abandoned to 
their own devices. 
However, unlike the maire, the administrateur did have specialized 
interest in moslem affairs. Within this broad field, his tasks were 
numerous and wide-ranging. As an agent of the colonial government, he 
was responsible for implementing its regulations locally. The civil 
registration of moslems, the furninhing of statistics and the 
administration of property laws, were important parts of his work. 
He was expected to exercise general oversight over local agriculture, 
trade and industry; supervise credit schemes; safeguard public health; 
foster public welfare (including education); and initiate public works. 
In short, he was "Jack of all Trades". 
124 Like a maire, he could issue 
regulatory arretes, though these needed the prior approval of the 
sous-prefet. 
In addition to the paperwork thus generated, the administrateur 
had a political role to perform. He was supposed to display physical 
energy in making regular inspection tours to outlying douars and 
developing contacts with his administrees. He was a representative of 
authority, and as such wore a uniform of military appearance. This 
differed from that of the Arab Bureau chiefly in the colour of its 
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cap braids for in many respects he had assumed that institution's 
role. He was responsible for the maintenance of public order, and 
to this effect heard complaints, and took immediate police action. 
Though regular magistrates were responsible for the due processes of 
the normal criminal law, the administrator had special disciplinary 
powers under the provisions of a 'Native Code'. 
Some additional complications in an administrator's role arose 
if a significant number of European settlers resided within the commune. 
Since part of his function was to facilitate colonization and safeguard 
the security and welfare of European inhabitants, this inevitably 
caused conflicts of loyalty. A European presence established a vocal 
pressure-group within the commune mixte which inevitably took up a 
disproportionate amount of his time. 
Thus the administrator had an enormous workload. It was unrealistic, 
in fact, and even a large elite corps of well-trained officials would 
have found it impossible to cope with. The typical commune mixte had 
upward of fiteen native douars, scattered over a wide area. To deal 
with these, the Administrator usually had the help of one of two 
junior administrators, a secretary, and a handful of native factotums. 
His financial resources were equally inadequate. As an inevitable 
result, the supervision of native affairs was lax and indirect. As 
one administrator admitted in 1945, "really, in certain respects, we 
have set up a protectorate in this commune mixte". 
125 
-ii. The Native Code 
126 
The 'civil administration' of natives in communes mixtes was 
extremely paternalistic in style. Fundamental neglect was combined 
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with an assortment of arbitrary regulations. The operation of the 
"Code de 1'Indigenat" (Native Code), placed in the hands of the 
administrator, was an example. 
The establishment of "civil government" in 1874 did not result in 
the disappearance of the disciplinary powers formerly exercised by 
the Arab Bureaus; it simply led to their formalization. Alongside 
the corpus of the common law, administered by French 'iuges de paixr 
(professional magistrates), there developed a body of 'special' or 
'exceptional' criminal regulations concerning the activities of moslem 
communities. The loi of 10th April 1881 organized these long-existent 
piecemeal controls into a so-called Code de 1'Indig4nat (Native Code). 
Many of them were exceedingly puerile; "every disrespectful act and 
speech directed at an agent of authority, even off duty" was expressly 
forbidden, for example, and this could be construed to include refusal 
to salute the administrator. Other restrictions were petty and 
bureaucratic; it was an offence, for example, to hold a public meal 
without permission, to indulge in unauthorized singing and dancing 
in cafes, or to detonate firearms at family celebrations without 
prior notification. Other provisions in the Code transformed slackness 
in the performance of civic duties into criminal acts; this included 
non-registration of marriages and divorce, for instance, delay in 
payment of taxes, contravention of tenancy agreements, and the 
incurrance of rent arrears and other debts. Certain other sections 
of the Code were clearly oppressive: the obligation to perform various 
kinds of labour service at the administrator's request, the restrictions 
on forest usage127 and on the holding of religious meetings, and the 
stipulation - finally abol; shed in 1914 - that a travel permit be 
obtained before leaving the territory of the commune. 
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The Code resulted from an orchestrated campaign about insecurity 
and the need to discipline the native community, and actually applied 
throughout civil Algeria. In communes de plein exercice, however, it 
was enforced according to conventional judicial process by French 
magistrates and was infrequently invoked. In communes mixtes, by 
contrast, the loi of 28th June 1881 confined the magistrature to 
ordinary common law offences and gave sole authority for the judging 
and punishment of special infractions to the administrateur. This 
gave him important disciplinary powers. He could charge individuals 
or groups with a multitude of 'offences' which were difficult to 
define, which pertained as much to attitude as to specific commission 
or omission, and which were of a questionable, often quasi-political 
nature. The procedure by which he judged them was extra-judicial: 
there was no public hearing, no formal rules of evidence or' proof, 
no written record, no right to representation, nor even a requirement 
that an interpreter be present. Finally, the administrator had the 
power to impose fines or short periods of imprisonment, within 
discretionary limits laid down in the Code. Thus he was at the same 
time policeman, prosecutor, judge, and executor of the law. The 
situation was wide open to abuse, particularly in view of the slack 
supervision from above, and the absence of responsibility to the 
community below. 
Thus, in the sense of separation of powers, real civil government 
was not a notable feature of communes mixtes. While pressing for an 
end to the "Turkish methods" of the army, the settlers had simultaneously 
ensured the entrenchment of 'emergency' regulations in native administration. 
Paradoxically, as Ageron points out, "the rule of common law resulted in 
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the legislative consacration of exceptional powers". 
128 
The ideology of transition was often employed to justify this 
situation. The European community argued that the Code was a temporary, 
'exceptional' arrangement which would fall into disuse as security was 
ultimately established and the native learned the necessary self-discipline. 
In fact the bode was passed initially only as an emergency measure for a 
seven year period. However, successive short-term extensions by the 
Frency National Assembly, each accompanied by protestations of insecurity 
by Algerian deputies, prolonged its active life effectively until 1944. 
In this respect, it symbolized the nature of the colonial project: a 
holding operation or artificial crisis, which froze the native's access 
to certain rights and institutions while exploiting him in the name of 
the pretended universality (f those rights and institutions. From the 
colonizer's point of view, this 'crisis' was never ending; many claimed 
that emergency regulations were the only effective means of ensuring 
domination over the moslem population and should be retained in perpetuity. 
An investigatory commission of the French Senate, persuaded of the justice 
of Algerian settler fears, gave credence to this view in 1890 when it 
openly argued for a sine die extension of the Code: "These are not mere 
expedients designed to respond to transient needs; they are logical, 
rational measures which conform to the permanent exigencies of the 
milieu". 
129 
In important respects, however, the rule of the administrator was 
remote and lax rather than authoritarian. It was paternalistic, but 
often in a fumbling ineffective manner. The specific provisions of the 
Code, and the administrator's role in implementing them, were less 
perhaps of practical than of psychological benefit to the European community. 
376 
As Ageron suggests, they were "symbolic rather than truly indispensable". 
130 
During the 20th Century, enforcement of sections of the Code was gradually 
transferred to the jurisdiction of magistrates; finally in 1927 they took 
the whole Code over from the administrateur: The ordonnance of 7th March 
1944 completed this process by abolishing the Code altogether, only a 
decade before the 'emergency' of guerilla insurrection brought the 
hurried imposition of martial law. 
131 But it cannot be said that the 
disappearance of the Native Code marked a noticeable shift in the balance 
of power between native and colonial society. 
-iv. The Caid132 
The administratepr was inevitably an isolated, remote figure in the 
segmentary landscape of the commune mixte. He was responsible for a 
miscellany of scattered communities, grouped by the French into an average 
of about 15 douars. If colonial administration were to come to terms with 
the structures and processes of this milieu, an effective support system 
of specialized native intermediaries was crucial; it was perhaps even more 
important here than in the settler-dominated communes proper. However, 
it was essentially lacking. 
The arretg of 22nd July 1874 instituted a system of ad joints 
indigenes in communes mixtest following in the tradition of the caids 
of Arab Bureaus. They were appointed, until 1916, by the departemental 
Pr4ýfet - on the recommendation of the local administrator - and 
subsequently by the Gouverneur-Gengral. From the outset however, the 
choice of personnel confronted many problems. 
Many caids or adjoints indigenes initially invested by the French 
were open collaborators, and to this extent lacked intimate contact with 
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the communities with whom they were supposed to act as intermediaries. ' 
In the earliest period, designation as a caid was often a reward for 
assisting French conquest. A fairly dramatic but not wholly untypical 
illustration was the caidship of Necmaria, in the Dahra mountains. 
133 
This had been granted since 1845 to descendants of a local Fraichich 
clan leader who had actively cooperated with French troops during the 
notoriously genocidal campaign of that year. In fact, he had personally 
guided General 
Plissier to local caves in which a whole community of 
men, women, and children had taken refuge; 'the exits were sealed, and 
everyone buried alive. The man had subsequently been disowned by his 
own clansmen, and his house and crops destroyed, but, in the words of 
Gautier "this faithful khalifa, who had lost all his property for us, 
certainly deserved a reward". The reward took the form of the French 
administration granting both land and the local caidship to his family. 
Gautier suggested, not without reason, that "for sixty-five years 
these people have not lost sight for one day of the tragic caves on 
which their fortunes were based". Nor, one can be sure, had their 
administrees. Equally significantly, the local administrateur in 1914 
was totally unaware of this historical episode. 
In other cases, a caidship was the fruit of collaboration by 
families who were outsiders to the communities over which they were 
accorded responsibility. The caidship of the Ouled Djella and Sidi 
Khaled tribes, in the Algerian Ziban, was an example. It was conferred 
in the 1920's on a family from the Tunisian Djerid, as a reward for 
facilitating French penetration of the Eastern Saharan oases. 
134 The 
acceptance of a caidship, in any case, implied the promise of future 
collaboration, and the authentic leaders of local communities were 
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not usually eager to commit themselves openly to such a role. 
The 
paradox was noted by Sabatier: "Whoever faithfully serves us among 
the natives loses their respect; whoever is our agent but wants to 
maintain his popularity betrays us". 
135 
Originally, the recipients of caidships included a few quite 
prominent families, but the role of these notables declined steadily. 
Partly, no doubt, this was the result of pacification and the related 
disintegration of the widest levels of segmentary organization; partly 
it was the result of economic transformations. Increasingly, 
appointments as adjoint indigenes were conferred on less socially 
influential figures, whose loyalty to the French cause had b; en manifested 
in a more individualized fashion. Many were outsiders. Already in the 
19th Century some caidships in the South were bestowed on 
&oughlis 
from Tlemcen, or Berbers from Kabylia. 
136 Increasingly, former soldiers 
in the French army, petty functionaries, and others from humble backgrounds, 
many from distant regions, were designated as adjoints indigenes. 
Inevitably they lacked the prestige among the local community which was 
the touchstone of the traditional caid. As part of this circular process, 
the office itself lost its attraction to traditional notables. The trend 
continued throughout the colonial era, and campaigns such as Cambon's in 
the 1890's to revive the traditional nature of caidship, 
137 
or such 
token gestures as the restoration of the official appelation of 'said' 
in 1916)were powerless to reverse it. 
The French compounded this situation by neglect. The caid was not 
treated as a potential channel for local indirect rule, nor accorded a 
significant developmental role in the colonial administrative scheme. 
His status slowly declined towards that already achieved by his counterpart 
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i the commune de plein exercice: that of a menial agent for the 
assessment and collection of taxes, civil registration, and the 
implementation of minor directives from above. He was treated as 
obsolescent, due to disappear as native society progressed, and of 
purely vestigial use. This attitude verged on self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
Partly, for this reason, and partly to save money from the 
Algerian budget, caids were not accorded any Official salary until 
1913" Prior to that date, they simply received a small percentage 
of the taxes they gathered, usually 5%. As a result, caids of poor 
douars were indigent themselves. Even after 1913, salaries were very 
modest. A side-effect of this neglect was widespread extortion of 
fees, levies, 'gifts' and forced labour from their administrees. 
This helped to build up a bank of community grievance against caids, 
but also served to confirm the colon press in its conviction that 
they were backward, parasitic, feudal vestiges. This became an 
argument, paradoxically, for thwarting attempts after the First 
World War to transform commune mixtes caids into a regular, well-paid 
corps of Algerian functionaries, with entry standards and effective 
supervision. 
Even as potential agents of direct administration, the commune 
mixte caid was treated half-heartedly. Appointments ire neglected. 
In theory, each douar should have had one caid - assisted locally by 
a variety of indigenous auxiliaries: Bardes champetres, kho as, and 
wakafs. In practice, one caid often had oversight of two or more 
douars. At the beginning of the 20th Century, 1015 douars in civil 
communes mixtes were covered by only 85J caids. As the moslem 
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population in these douars grew steadily, the number of available 
caids, so far from increasing, actually declined. By the Second 
World War their numerical strength was approximately 600.138 
As in communes de plein exercice, prospects of developing the 
role of caids were further undermined by the decree of 6th February 
1919 which established elective douar jemaas in every commune mixte. 
Each jemaa was given automatic representation on the municipal 
commission through its chosen president. Hitherto, the caid had 
been an ex-officio member of this commission, providing its only 
direct link with the native douar populations. The decree did not 
deprive him of that seat, and in fact it gave him the additional 
responsibility of observing all emma meetings "as the representative 
of the Administration", 
139 but it clearly helped to sap his effective 
authority. The trend towards 'functionarization' of caids had 
weakened his already dubious status as an indigenous 'representative', 
and the Administration how had a financial incentive for devolving 
even his more bureaucratic functions on to the unpaid jemaa president. 
Not without reason, therefore, many observers before the Second 
World War were speaking, with Montagne, of "the crisis of authority 
facing the local functionary, the Caid". 140 One of these voices 
was Marcy's. He compared the feckless role of the Algerian Caid 
with that of his namesake in another part of the Maghreb, Morocco. 
Under the Moroccan Protectorate regime, he argued, "the caid is usually 
the head of a big tent, a rich man living as a grand seigneur, usually 
originating from the region, and linked by family ties with the 
traditional local oligarchy existing before the conquest. Respected 
or simply feared, he can always obtain obedience. Also, of capital 
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importance, the Moroccan caid has received his investiture from the 
Sultan, the religious leader of the moslems of his Empire". 
141 
In 
Algeria, by contrast, Marcy's experience among the Berber communities 
of the Aures massif, impressed him with "the lack of authority which 
the native caids, nominated by the French administration, enjoy 
among their tribes". 
142 They were regarded as aliens - many indeed 
could not even speak Berber - and as servants of France. 
The caid was typically out of touch with his administrees. 
The newly-appointed caid, Berque pointed out, "immediately feels 
out of place. The local leaders organize an undercover conspiracy 
against him". 
143 Occasionally, this stemmed from a cultural gap. 
The caid of Rabelais in the Dahra, for example, as described by 
Gautý, ier in 1914, was a total stranger to the region, was steeped 
in French cultui, and had adopted a European lifestyle; his eldest 
son attended a French College far away at Mostaganem. 
144 More often 
however the caid was simply an incompetent parasite, as at Necmaria 
for example, spending the majority of his time near the centre of 
European administration far from his moslem flock. 
145 The latter 
phenomenon became all the more prevalent as the number of caids 
declined and their area of nominal supervision expanded. 
This 'crisis of authority' made the caid an ineffective intermediary 
in the commune mixte. The situation was so bad, Berque claimed, that 
"it is through the administrator that some caids learn the news about 
their douar". l46 Many administrators, Montagne explained, "do their 
work with the help of the jemaa president rather than with that of 
the increasingly authority-less Caid". 
147 Similarly, Parant observed, 
the indigenous population often ignored the Caid and went, if at all, 
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straight to the administrator for action. 
148 The institution of 
caids was viewed by native communities as at best a nuisance and 
at worst a blight; in their estimation, according to Marcy, "without 
having any basic utility itself, it is an obstacle to the full 
expansion of local activities". 
149 They ignored the caid as far 
as-hey could, came to terms with him where unavoidable, and channeled 
their energies into their own authentic social institutions. "The 
douar certainly could not prevent the caid from existing and milking 
his administrees when they needed the slightest administrative action 
from him", Bromberger observed in Kabylia, "but nevertheless the 
village elected a clandestine jemaa alongside which made the real 
decisions on its own affairs". 
150 Even the official elected jemaas 
often contrived to circumvent the caid in his supposed capacity as 
'representative of the Administration'. One caid in Kabý. ia, for 
example, was to be discovered rather pathetically complaining to 
his administrateur in 1951: "When you order him to hold a (jemaa) 
meeting, the president will not allow me to attend... All the 
discussions which you required to be held about leasing communal 
property to douar inhabitants have taken place in Gasmi Said's 
Moorish Bath-House, and I have neither been present nor even notified". 
151 
This combination of systematic French diffidence, and indigenous 
resistance, culminating in a campaign of assassinations from 1954 
onwards condemned the caid to impotence. It was never clear , indeed 
what role a 'potent' caid might conceivably have played in the 
Algerian context. Behind the flapping folds of his official burnous, 
he was paralyzed by the contradictions of the colonial situation. 
The outcome was observed by the dismayed last Gouverneur-G4nlral 
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of Algeria, Soustelle, in 1956, after inspecting areas of nascent 
guerilla insurrection: "A few caids, mostly absent from their douars, 
and a few wakafs (local assistants), were supposed to supervise local 
life, but in fact controlled nothing at all... At every step I felt 
how much we had allowed a void to grow up behind the facade of 
regular administration". 
152 
-v. Douars and Jemaas153 
Communes mixtes were extremely large. As Soustelle described 
them, they were "giant communes... as vast as Metropolitan departements, 
stretching from the High Plateau as far as the Sahara, across cyclopean 
piles of lunar mountains and wild bled (open countryside) inhabited by 
tens of thousands". 
154 Each comprised between 10 and 20 native douars, 
which in turn might each contain 10 or 20 segmentary fractions or 
hamlets. Thus they were heterogeneous and unwieldy conglomerations. 
The administrative organization associated with them was makeshift. 
Rather than coming to terms with old or attempting to generate new 
communal solidaritjes, it loosely contained the native population on 
a 'provisional' basis. The direction in which this rambling framework 
eventually evolved was of key importance for the Algerian colonial 
situation, particularly since the great majority of Algerian moslems 
lived within it. In these areas, virtually free of European settlement, 
there was considerable potential, at least in principle, for 
specifically indigenous forms of political organization to be fostered 
in close association with superimposed colonial structures. The 
intermediary position of the douar was of greater significance in this 
context than in the settler-dominated and smaller-scale commune de plein 
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exercice. The prolonged sterility of its existence over almost a 
century provides evidence of suffocating contradictions in the 
colonial situation. 
The inability of the Algerian douar to emerge as an 'associative' 
nucleus within the commune mixte was rooted in three sets of 
interrelated circumstances. One of these was the opposition of 
the settlers to its development. Another was the contradictory and 
noncommittal nature of associative efforts. lie final set centred on 
the relationship between the nature of the douar itself and that of 
segmentary societies. The first of these circumstances, the resistance 
of the settlers, provides a partial explanation of the second. The 
very size and artificiality of the commune mixte was largely a result 
of settler pressures in the 1870's. They originally conceived of it 
as a kind of administrative ante-chamber for populations who would 
eventually shift into communes proper as colonization grew. However 
European settlement in the less economically-valorisable parts of 
Algeria petered out in the late 19th Century, and indeed during the 
20th Century tended to withdraw from the interior and concentrate 
nearer the coast. 
155 Thus the settler community lost any incentive 
to press for the rapid dismemberment of communes mixtes. Instead, 
they opposed as 'premature' any scheme allowing communes mixtes 
gradually to dissolve into clusters of autonomous indigenous cells. 
In particular they sought to obstruct the development of douarjemaas 
into municipalities. For want of any long-term alternative evolutionary 
programme of their own, they wished, in effect, to freeze the commune 
mixte in a state of permanent temporariness. 
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The forces seeking to break down this kind of resistance and 
to breathe life into the febrile body of the commune mixte were sporadic, 
half-hearted and ambivalent. Though in principle the douar was 
earmarked for a more active role than its counterpart in the commune 
proper, it was almost wholly neglected during the first half-century 
of the Third Republic. The arre^te of 22nd July 1874, which established 
commune mixtes, made the important provision that a douar's resources 
should be separately managed rather than merged with those of the whole 
commune as was the case in settler municipalities. It also specifically 
called for the nomination of douar assemblies to manage these communal 
resources. However, the administrator was not obliged to consult this 
jemaa, even when formally constituted. Reluctant to diminish his own 
authority, and given little guidance on the intended role of douar 
jemaas, he rarely did so. As in communes de plein exercice, the 
available legislation fell into disuse. An arret4 of 11th September 
1895 sought to reactivate it, requiring the prdfet to appoint an 
official jemaa from 6-16 notables in each douar, and enjoining the 
administrator to seek its advice before disposing of common or 
collective property. However these nominated jemaas consisted of 
'safe' men. They rarely met in practice and at best were facades 
behind which the administrator's authority continued to operate 
unhampered. 
A quarter-century later, the decree of 6th February 1919 made 
a more serious effort to establish the commune mixte douar as a 
living entity. As in communes proper, douar jemaas became elective. 
Despite the socially unrepresentative nature of Second College voters, 
this was of some significance in that it provided the native populations 
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of communes mixtes with their first and only 'official' elective 
body. Following the decree, 'official' jemaas, chosen every six 
years, became widespread. However, their developmental potential 
was severely circumscribed. Their sole concern was communal property, 
in which they had a consultative capacity only. The administrator 
called their meetings, and had various means of circumventing their 
role; he was still able to alienate douar property in the face of 
expressed opposition. 
156 Moreover, the prefet could suspend an 
'uncooperative' jemaa, and the Gouverneur-General could appoint a 
'special delegation' to take over its functions if need be; neither 
of these powers went unused in subsequent years. 
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These restrictions made douar jemaas of dubious value as 
vehicles for authentic "association". Many Metropolitan liberals 
argued, indeed, and not without cause, that to establish separate, 
impotent, small-scale 'official assemblies' for the moslem population 
was a retrograde step, designed to stave off elective representation 
at Municipal Commission level. They saw "association" as a device 
to block the more positive concomitants of "assimilation". These 
criticisms were joined by the rather less ingenuous settler argument 
that the setting up of official. jemaas perpetuated and legalized 
the existence of 'anomalous' and even 'reactionary' bodies hindering 
the process of assimilation. A great deal of ambivalence thus 
surrounded plans to develop the role of douars. 
In any case, the douar and its 'official' jemaa proved to have 
little relevance to the indigenous environment, and met with 
indifference and resistance from below. Occasionally, clans and 
other political groupings exploited them as additional channels for 
the furtherance of local rivalries, 
158 but essentially they were ignored. 
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This situation stemmed from the very nature of the douar. It was, 
as suggested earlier, an artificial unit remote from the authentic 
solidarities of segmentary life. Milliot explained the failure of 
the 1919 decree to have any real impact on the life of sedentary 
Kabylia in these terms: "The promoters of this reform did not bear 
in mind that... it is the village, not the douar which is the 
equivalent of our rural commune. The political horizon of the 
Kabyle dies out at the frontiers of the small political community... 
The Kabyle douar is nothing more than an administrative division 
supervised by a caid, and the jemaa which it was given is nothing 
but a useless body". 
159 
To conceive of douar jemaas, or indeed jemaas at other levels 
of segmentary reality, as fixed institutions with patrimonial rights 
and managerial functions was to compound this anachronism. As de 
Preville suggests, "the 'communal' in the sense of territory owned 
by an administrative unit does not exist in indigenous tradition". 
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Even had they been seriously implemented, radical plans for the 
evolution of douars towards the status of European municipalities 
would have confronted this structural problem. To impose formal 
mechanismSof voting on what traditionally was an informal group of 
'elders', 'notables' or 'heads of families' was to introduce other 
alien concepts. The resultant assembly was greatly different from 
the traditional jemaa. 
As a consequence, traditional processes and institutions, including 
jemaas at clan, fraction and village levels, continued to operate in 
semi-clandestinity, unaffected by the rather empty operations of the 
colonial douar. Marcy's account of the situation in the Aures in 
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1938 was echoed by observations in various parts of Algeria: 
"Alongside the official jemaas of the douars, created by us and 
given modest administrative responsibilities, 'unofficial' jemaas 
of tribes, fractions and villages have survived. Though they now 
have to operate in secrecy, these 'unofficial' councils, with the 
tacit agreement of everyone, retain most of their traditional 
attributes. Only political control proper escapes them, taken 
over by French authority, but they are obviously quite ready to 
take it over again at the earliest opportunity. These jemaas have 
preserved all their economic functions, and more seriously their 
role in civil jurisdiction; they even still play a certain role in 
penal matters". 
161 This situation of 'parallel administration' 
162 
reflected not merely determined withdrawal from contact with the 
colonial structure, but also the lack of correspondence between 
the imposed douar and traditional forms of solidarity. 
However, for a growing block of liberal, mainly Metropolitan 
opinion between the wars, the inccngruency and sterility of the 
commune mixte structure was a matter of far greater concern. The 
years following the Algerian Centennial of 1930 were marked by 
numerous reappraisals of the effectiveness of the colonial framework. 
Many conclusions were extremely pessimistic. Mil]! ot claimed in 1933, 
for example, that "North Africa remains in the state of unfinished 
conquest". 
163 Marcy concluded similarly that "one cannot at all 
see taking shape... the beginnings of that intimate consensus, 
profound and durable, extending far beyond the narrow framework 
of the tribe, which elsewhere presides over the nascent idea of a 
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Western-type State. Quite the contrary ... º, 
164 This school of 
opinion argued that. effective consolidation of the colonial 
enterprise required more than continuing force and sugjection; it 
should involve the "association" of indigenous channels of legitimation 
with the superimposed structures of government. The hitherto-practised 
policy of neglect-through-assimilation was thought to have prevented 
any such process from taking place. 
The approach was succinctly summarized in the contemporary 
urgings of de Montety, in relation to another part of the Maghreb. 
"The problem of decentralization", he insisted, "must be approached 
from below, by seeking the human collectivities which have public 
interests and an embryonic individuality... and not from above, by 
cutting up the territory arbitrarily into theoretical circurgscriptions, 
with administrative bodies which are delegates of the central power". 
165 
According to this view, the most urgent task of colonial administration 
was to seek out, carefully encourage, and harness, rather than to 
destroy, the "associative instinct" in native life: "From this 
rediscovered spark, we must make the flame of communal spirit flare 
up". 166 
Such 'associationist' views were not new in Algeria; they were 
extensions of a submerged current of thought which went back at 
least to the Arab Kingdom period. However, the growth of widespread 
social distress and political unrest in the 1930's - both outbursts 
of popular violence such as those in the Constantine region, and 
the organized legalistic pressures of 'elite nationalists' - added 
sharpened urgency to this divergence within colonial opinion. 
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'Associationists' tended to agree with Parant, that "the 
fundamental problem... is to find a solid basis for our construction". 
167 
Communal reform, and in particular the need to foster the autonomous 
developmental potential of the douar, was a key element in their 
programme. In this they were supported by emergent bourgeois nationalist 
groups who still sought to forge a fraternal association of the two 
communities within the framework of French culture and sovereignty. 
Ferhat Abbas, for example, tried to persuade Petain in 1941 that 
"neither the commune mixte, which is too big and highly populated, 
nor the rural commune de plein exercice, created for the needs of 
colonization, are the formulas required for the future of moslem 
society. They are artificial units which do not correspond to our 
conceptions of communal life". 
168 But on the other hand, he went 
on to suggest, "the same is not true of the douar... a well-localized 
social embryo, on the basis of which a new world, a new civilization, 
can be built... It offers a unique chance to change the face of the 
country by sedentarizing nomadic and pastoral life, in the Western 
way. The creation of a municipal centre or of a douar-commune... 
will bring about a flourishing peasantry, handicrafts, cooperatives, 
corporations and housing projects. It means schools, jemaa councils, 
hospitals, post offices, police stations. It brings hygiene, 
medical aid, social security. The native population groups together 
and settles down". 
169 Such dreams, embroidered suitably for Petain's 
eyes, expressed the optimistic side of the associative world-view. 
These opinions had to wrestle with the strong and well-entrenched 
hostility of the colon community. The latter was reluctant to accept 
the 'disintegration' of communes mixtes into separate 'douar-communes'. 
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The experiments which were made were inevitably small-scale and 
tentative. One of these was the institution of Centres Municipales. 
170 
Decrees in 1937 and 1945 freed a few native douars from dependence on 
their commune mixte; they became 'municipal centres', intended eventually 
to acquire the full status of municipal councils. It was a first step 
towards establishing a network of native communes. It was a very small 
step however; at first it affected only four douars, in the North of 
Algeria. Moreover the responsibilities of each Centre Municipal jemaa 
were still restricted to the broad sphere of communal resources; 
'general' or 'political' motions were expressly forbidden, as was 
communication with other jemaas. The administrator retained the right 
to summon the jemaa and to prevent it from meeting, and the pr4fet had 
to approve its 'decision, '. 
The pilot scheme was scarcely a resounding success. In the Centre 
Municipal of Seriet (Commune Mixte of Tablat), Parant reported that 
"nobody, except for the (jemaa) president, is interested in the 
creation of this Municipal Centre, whose life exists only on 
administrative reports". 
171 Meetings were rare and extremely formal; 
jemaa members signed minutes which many did not understand. In the 
Centre Municipal of Oumalou (Kabylia), Duplessis-Kergomard reported 
that the jemaa was similarly ineffective and ignored, which he 
attributed chiefly to the rambling nature of the douar, with its 18 
different villages. 
172 Parant concluded pessimistically that the 
douar jemaa was "not the framework we are looking for". 
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Nevertheless, pressures for the proliferation of douar-communes 
continued. Growing political insecurity after the Second World War 
obliged the Metropolis to think seriously about ways to render 
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Algerian administration more effective and responsive to social change. 
An apparently pijor stride in this direction was made by the "Statut 
de l'Algerie" of 20th September 1947, which aimed to put the government 
of the colony on a new footing. 
174 Article 53 of the Statute 
proclaimed that all communes-mixtes were to be dissolved, and replaced 
by a network of small douar-communes, as part of a programme of 
'decentralization'. Another provision of the Statute, however, was 
the establishment of an Algerian Assembly, and it was to this body 
that the drawing up of the- timetable for communal reform was entrusted. 
In effect, this gave the settler community the power to defer its 
implementation again and agai. n. 
175 During the next seven years, until 
the outbreak of the 1954 insurrection, a few new douar-communes and 
communes de plein exercice were established, but the proposed radical 
recasting of colonial structures never took place. The commune 
mixte maintained its stubborn existence right up until the collapse 
of regular administration in the mid-1950's. 
The growing insurrection in the mid-1950's provoked urgent 
reappraisals of the nature of the colonial administration. The 
appointment of Soustelle as Gouverneur-Gen6ral in January 1955 began 
a period of severe and somewhat desparhte self-examination. As he 
toured one of the cradles of the war of liberation, the Aures massif, 
Soustelle was horrified by the flimsiness of the commune mixte 
structure. Beyond the remote outposts inhabitated by the administrator, 
he declared, "emptiness reigned". 
176 For too long, he suggested, 
France had tried "to administer on the cheap". 
177 The colonial 
superstructure "skimmed along at too lofty a height; it should have 
kept down to the grassroots level of those who lived and suffered 
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in these expanses". 
178 His cry of 'underadministration' was to 
become the theme of countless Metropolitan observers as insecurity 
developed into guerilla warfare and then into full-scale armed 
confrontation. 
The crisis of the mid-1950's inspired a number of hastily-devised 
schemes for accelerated communal reform, and impelled the Metropolis 
to try to impose them despite settler misgivings. However confusion 
and political deadlock in Paris, and the military situation in 
Algeria, made it physically impossible to implement them; most in 
fact, remained paper exercises. They were less significant as 
concrete possibilities than as illustrations, like the troubled 
images thrown up by a feverish nightmare, of pathplogical tendencies 
and blockages in the colonial situation. During the administration of 
Soustelle, Metropolitan reformers were torn between different 
proposals. Some, such as Mitterand, wished to transform whole 
communes mixtes into 'grand communes', each with a municipal council, 
but with a civil administrator as the maire. 
179 Others, like 
Soustelle himself, urged that each commune mixte should be split 
into three or four rural communes. 
180 
A radical committment was finally made under the new Minister 
for Algeria, Lacoste, on 28th June 1956.181 The youthful Algerian 
Assembly was disbanded, and a 'deconcentration' programme along lines 
suggested by Soustelle was announced throughout Algeria. All communes 
mixtes were dissolved, and replaced by 1162 'douar-communes'. Each 
was intended to have the same status and organization as the 333 
communes de plein exercice which were by then in existence. Furthermore, 
Algeria was divided into a total of 12 departements, instead of the 3 
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which had existed throughout most of colonial history. The 
conversion of these new arrangements into working reality, however, 
depended on the re-establishment of security, for which purpose 
special military powers were simultaneously mobilized. Election of 
the proposed new bodies had to be postponed until pacification made 
it possible to hold them. During the six remaining years of French 
presence they never became operative. 
In February 1958, a loi cadre (Law laying down the overall 
framework of government) took the by now abstract process of reform 
even further. 
182 Algeria was divided into 15 departements, grouped 
into 5 semi-federal territoires (territories) and with elective 
assemblies at both levels. Existing municipalities were dissolved, 
in order to prepare for the eventual establishment of the new 
comprehensive hierarchy of government. The latter expired on the 
drawing board, for by this time civil government had effectively 
ceased and the army had taken over. It was wholly divorced from 
political reality, for even had security been somehow restored, and 
even had the scheme corresponded to indigenous needs, the new framework 
would have met with the unrelenting oppositipn of the settlers, 
hitherto submerged within the more general clamour caused by the 
military crisis. 
The bankruptcy of these belated schemes for "association" and 
"deconcentration", as much as the earlier and more general neglect 
of native administration, illustrates the structural contradictions 
created by the juxtaposition of the European and moslem communities 
within the colonial framework. These are examined more closely in the 
next chapter, in relation to the concept of "underadministration". 
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